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Abstract
This is an original study assessing the role of transatlantic policy networks in the
formation of core Europe at the Schuman Plan conference. Based on extensive archival
research in governmental records and private papers in twelve archives in five countries
and informed by the innovative combination of the methodological tools of the network
and cultural transfer concepts, the thesis sheds new light on how the process of
European integration was triggered in 1950-51. The thesis reconceptualizes the
negotiations on the treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community in a
long-term historical perspective as the outcome of the co-operation of transatlantic
policy networks reflecting the interaction of American and European thought and
politico-legal concepts. It therefore advances the history of early European integration
and post-World War II transatlantic relations.
Against the backdrop of Franco-German rapprochement and the emerging Cold War,
transatlantic policy networks of a variety of academic and other experts, civil servants
and state and non-state actors, assumed a vital function in determining the negotiation
tactics of various stakeholders at the Schuman Plan conference. Mediating between
American and European thought and politico-legal concepts, these transatlantic policy
networks crucially contributed to shaping the first supranational European institutional
framework and anti-trust law. The institutions that transatlantic policy networks helped
to establish in 1950-51 can be regarded as the precursors of the institutions of the
contemporary European Union. The anti-trust provisions, in turn, provided one
important model for the competition rules of the European Economic Community,
which ultimately came to playa crucial role in the European integration process and in
the construction of a common market. It is demonstrated therefore that transatlantic
policy networks thus helped to create important path dependencies for the process of
European integration.
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Conventions
Throughout this thesis the term Germany is used for the western zones of occupation
and the Federal Republic of Germany from 1949 onwards.
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1 The formation of core Europe at the Schuman Plan
conference, 1950-51: literature, approaches, and
concepts
1.1 Introduction
Seldom have we seen any international negotiations going so far and progressing
so rapidly come to such a happy conclusion. We let the experts discuss among
themselves. The governments did not give them instructions. We wanted the best
possible men to find out what the difficulties are and what kind of solutions can be
found for them.
Robert Schuman, 20 September 19501
Given the exceptional importance American legal thought, in particular, has
gained for the development of law in Europe, it will be necessary on the European
continent, too, to obtain a comprehensive understanding of American law.
Walter Hal/stein, 22 May 19452
When French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman gave his statement at a luncheon of the
American Committee on a United Europe (ACUE) in New York, he did not fully
anticipate the difficulties that still lay ahead for the delegations of France, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries before the successful conclusion
of the treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) on 18 April
1951. For almost a year, these six states were negotiating a treaty on the basis of a short
policy document issued by the French government, which had quickly become known as
the Schuman Plan declaration. Announced by the French foreign minister in a press
conference at the Quai d'Orsay on 9 May 1950, the declaration proposed to pool the
coal and steel industries of France and Germany under a supranational 'joint high
I Schuman Luncheon, Archives of the American Committee on United Europe,
Lauinger Library, Georgetown University, Box I, Folder 5.
2 Letter Hallstein to the Dean of the Faculty of Law, University of Chicago, Deutsches
Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BA), Personal papers Walter Hallstein (N 1266), 1620.
9
authority'.' The significance of the Schuman Plan declaration was twofold. Firstly,
given the importance of coal and steel to the war effort and the production of weaponry,
the choice of this policy sector to improve the formerly acrimonious Franco-German
relationship only five years after the end of World War II and against the backdrop of
three major wars within less than a century, represented a highly symbolic gesture.
Secondly, its originators expected the Schuman Plan declaration to establish a basis and
framework for what eventually was to extend beyond economic co-operation and
become a European political union. An initiative by the French government, the
declaration was primarily directed at the newly established Federal Republic of
Germany, but was open to other states that wished to participate. But why did Schuman
draw special attention to the leading role of experts, allegedly acting independently of
governmental instructions in the multilateral negotiations on the ECSC treaty? Did the
French government in fact 'let the experts talk among themselves'? To what extent was
policy-making an expert affair at the Schuman Plan conference? Who were the actors
involved in the negotiations and how did experts, civil servants and politicians interact?
Walter Hallstein, the head of the German delegation, certainly did not anticipate
his involvement in the inter-state conference. As a prisoner of war in the United States
(US) and on the evening of his return to Germany, he reflected on the significance of
American law for the future development of European law. However, impressed with
American legal thought, Hallstein expected it to interact with European law. But did,
3 Declaration officielle du gouvernement francais, corrigee de la main de Robert
Schuman, 9 May 1950, Gregoire Eldin, Pierre Fournie, Agnes Moinet-Le Menn,
Georges-Henri Soutou, L 'Europe de Robert Schuman, Paris: Presse de l'Universite de
Paris Sorbonne, 200 I, pp. XI-XIV. For the contemporary English translation see
Bonbright to Acheson, 9 May 1950, 740.00/5-950, Foreign Relations of the United
States (FRUS) 1950 Ill, pp. 692-4.
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broadly speaking, American politico-legal concepts influence the evolution of the ECSC
treaty? These considerations raise the question of the nature of the involvement of US
actors in the inter-state conference. During the incipient Cold War, the government of
Harry S. Truman favoured the supranational integration of western Europe and
supported the Schuman Plan. While US state actors did not formally or officially
participate directly in the inter-state negotiations, a variety of US actors were involved
in and alongside the negotiations.
Against this backdrop, the thesis will for the first time explore systematically the
role of the informal co-operation of individual and collective and state and non-state
actors from both sides of the North Atlantic in the complex negotiation process at the
Schuman Plan conference. Specifically, it will investigate the co-operation of these
networks and the interaction of American and European thought and politico-legal
concepts in the creation of the supranational institutional framework and in the
economic development, specifically, the anti-trust provisions. The reconstruction of the
networks and the analysis of their impact on the formation of the ECSC are based on the
innovative combination of the methodological tools of the 'network' and 'cultural
transfer' concepts and on multi-lateral archival research. This is a refined historical
account of the formation ofthe first supranational 'core Europe' organization by the six
founding member-states of what eventually developed into the expanded European
Union (EU), currently of twenty-seven member-states. In this context, the thesis will
shed new light on how the process of European integration was triggered in 1950-51 and
advance our knowledge about a phenomenon, which, to this date, no social science
theory has explored or explained satisfactorily.
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1.2 Transnational and state-centred approaches:
interpretations of core Europe formation
This literature review will discuss the main trends in the historiography of European
integration with a twofold goal: firstly, it aims to point out those deficiencies or gaps in
literature that provide the basis for the research questions of the thesis. Secondly,
theories of European integration and interaction of theory and historiography" will be
addressed where they are relevant to further shaping these research questions.
The historiography of European integration has been characterized by the
national paradigm. Literature on the Schuman Plan conference has predominantly
portrayed the formation of the ECSC from a state-centred perspective. Accordingly, the
ECSC treaty is the result of inter-state bargaining of 'national interests' by governments
that functioned as cohesive and purposeful actors." The negotiations on the Schuman
Plan can be divided into two main periods, in which different parts of the treaty were
negotiated. Historiographies have previously adopted this frame with regard to both
chronology and contents. Correspondingly, a number of publications deal with the
4 On the relationship between the history and theory of European integration see
Wolfram Kaiser, 'Transnational Europe Since 1945: Integration as Political Society
Formation', in: Wolfram Kaiser, Peter Starie (eds.), Transnational European Union:
Toward a Political Space, London: Routledge, 2005, pp. 17-35, esp. pp. 19-28; cf. also
idem., 'History Meets Politics: Overcoming Interdisciplinary VolapUk Research on the
EU', in: Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 15, no. 2 (2008), pp. 300-13; and Alex
Warleigh-Lack, 'Interdisciplinarity in Research on the EU: Politics, History and
Prospects for Collaboration', in: Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht, Morten Rasmussen
(eds.), The History of the European Union. Origins of a Supranational Polity 1950-72,
London: Routledge (forthcoming 2008).
S See for example, the official history of the High Authority: Dirk Spierenburg,
Raymond Poidevin, The History of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel
Community: Supranationality in Operation, London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1994,
esp. part 1, pp. 9-40.
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negotiations of the institutional framework on the one hand,6 and the deliberations on
the economic provisions on the other," Other authors have accentuated the link between
the discussion of the economic provisions and the post-World War II reorganization of
the German heavy industries.! At the same time, Francoise Berger" and Andreas
Wilkenslo have demonstrated that non-state business actors, whose interests were clearly
at stake in the conference, namely French and German industrialists, played only a very
limited role in the negotiation process. On the whole, however, historiography has given
little attention to the role of non-state actors in the period of agenda setting and at the
conference. Moreover, the contribution of US actors and the informal co-operation of
6 Hanns-Jurgen Kusters, 'Die Verhandlungen Uber das institutionelle System zur
GrUndung der Europaischen Gemeinschaft fur Kohle und Stahl', in: Klaus Schwabe
(ed.), Die An/tinge des Schuman Plans 1950151, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1988, pp. 73-
102; Hermann Mosler, 'Die Entstehung des Modells supranationaler und
gewaltentei lender Staatenverbindungen in den Verhandlungen Uber den Schuman-Plan',
in: Ernst von Caemmerer, Hans-JUrgen Schlochauer, Ernst Steindorff(eds.), Prob/eme
des europaischen Rechts. Festschriftfor Walter Hallstein zu seinem 65. Geburtstag,
Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1966, pp. 355-86; Carl Friedrich Ophuls, 'Zur
ideengeschichtlichen Herkunft der Gemeinschaftsverfassung', ibid., pp. 387-413.
7 Matthias Kipping, 'Concurrence et competitivite, les origines de la legislation anti-
trust francaise apres 1945', Comite pour I 'histoire econamtque et financiere: Extrait de
Etudes et documents, vol. VI, 1994, pp. 429-55.
8 Volker Berghahn, The Americanization of West German Industry 1945-73, Lemington
Spa, New York: Berg, 1986 [German 1985]; John Gillingham, Coal, Steel, and the
Rebirth of Europe, 1945-55. The Germans and the French/rom Ruhr Conflict to
Economic Community, New York et.al.: Cambridge University Press, 1991; A.W.
Lovett, 'The United States and the Schuman Plan. A Study in French Diplomacy', in:
Historical Journal, vol. 39, no. 2 (1996), pp. 425-55.
9 Francoise Berger, 'Les siderurgistes francais et allemands face a l'Europe:
convergences et divergences de conception et d'interets (1932-1952),' in: Journal of
European Integration History, vol. 3, no. 2 (1997), pp. 35-52.
ID Andreas Wilkens, 'L'Europe des ententes ou l'Europe de l'integration? Les industries
francaise et allemande et les debuts de la construction europeenne (1948-1952)" in: Eric
Bussiere, Michel Dumoulin (eds.), Milieux economiques et integration europeenne en
Europe occidentale au AXe steele, Arras: Artois presses universite, 1998, pp. 267-84.
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European and US actors in the formation of the ECSC have not been analyzed
adequately and the significance of their roles highlighted and acknowledged.
Initially, European integration historiography was not based on the national
paradigm, however. I I German historian Walter Lipgens, who first developed the study
of European integration as a historical discipline in its own right in the 1960s,12assigned
a key role to transnational social and political actors. Specifically, Lipgens regarded the
transnationally networked elites among the European resistance movements during
World War II as the driving forces for post-war European integration. As a historian of
ideas, Lipgens explored the concepts and plans for post-war integration that these elites
developed, promoted and circulated during the war.13
The unification of post-war Europe represented the solution to a threefold
problem for Lipgens: the political and economic decline of Europe during the inter-war
period and the accompanying rise of the Soviet Union and the USA; the devastating
effects of nationalism and the fascistlNational Socialist regimes; and the perceived
anachronism of the nation-state." Together these developments caused a profound
change in the political consciousness of European leaders. As a result, European states
II For a concise overview of the shifting trends in European integration historiography
see Wolfram Kaiser, 'From State to Society? The Historiography of European
Integration', in: Michelle Cini, Angela Bourne (eds.), Palgrave Advances in European
Union Studies, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006, pp.190-208.
12Wolfram Kaiser, '''Oberzeugter Katholik und CDU-Wahler''': Zur Historiographie der
Integrationsgeschichte am Beispiel Walter Lipgens', in: Journal of European
Integration History, vol. 8, no. 2 (2002), pp. 119-128.
13Walter Lipgens, Europa-Foderationsplane der Widerstandsbewegungen, 1940-1945:
eine Dokumentation, Munich: Oldenbourg, 1968; idem., Die Anfang» der europaischen
Einigungspolitik 1945-1950, Erster reil: 1945-1947, Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, 1977.
14Cf. Clemens Wurm, 'Early European Integration as a Research Field: Perspectives,
Debates, Problems', in: idem. (ed.), Western Europe and Germany: the Beginnings of
European Integration, 1945-1960', Oxford: Berg, 1995, pp. 9-26, here p. 14.
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agreed to surrender sovereignty to a supranational European union. From the point of
view of contemporary methodology, Lipgens' transnational approach is problematic in
that there is no effort to link ideas and concepts to governmental policy and preference
formation. By focusing on the ideational motivations of transnational elites, Lipgens has
failed to show how their ideas were translated into actual post-war policies of national
governments in initiating European integration. Lipgens' early transnational approach
therefore leaves open crucial questions including which actors were involved in policy
and preference formation at the Schuman Plan conference; in which way these actors
were related to the earlier transnational elites promoting European integration; how US
actors come into the picture; why the six governments jointly adopted certain ideas,
concepts or policy proposals and rejected others; and more generally, how to
conceptualize the conditions under which certain ideas, concepts or policy proposals
materialized or failed in 1950-51.
In their theory of supranational governance, Alec Stone Sweet and Wayne
Sandholtz have claimed that 'transnational activity has been the catalyst of European
integration' .15 The authors accredit early theorists of neo- functionalism with devising
the conception of a transnational European society." Nee-functionalist theory shares
with Lipgens the anticipation that the nation-state will slowly disappear. According to
nee-functionalism, however, European integration is not conceptualized as an outcome
such as a federation, for instance, but as a gradual process in which the notion of 'spill-
15 Wayne Sandholtz, Alec Stone Sweet, 'Integration, Supranational Governance, and the
Institutionalization of the European Polity, in: idem. (eds.), European Integration and
Supranational Governance, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 1-
26, here p. 4.
16 Ibid. pp. 5-6.
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over' represents an important element. Integration in one policy sector - a 'low politics'
sector such as trade rules, for example - therefore creates pressures for integration in
other, related sectors. As the functional areas of government become more integrated, it
could be expected that crucially, the political and bureaucratic or technocratic elites who
administer these policies would increasingly switch their loyalties, expectations and
goals from the national government arena to the overall aims of the integration agencies.
Driven by an elite socialized into the integration project, spill-over of integration from
one sector to others would therefore ultimately lead to some kind of political
comrnunity.l" Ernst Haas, in particular, highlighted the role of non-state actors including
economic actors, technocratic elites and political parties in transferring the solution of
problems from the national to the supranational level." However, transnationalism
within the neo-functionalist model- and this also refers to the spin-off by Sandholtz and
Stone Sweet - is limited in that it ties the importance and influence of transnational
actors exclusively to supranational European integration. Since political scientists only
developed the idea of neo-functionalism after the institutionalization of the ECSC, any
transnational dimension of the negotiations of the ECSC treaty pre-dates significant
developments in theory. According to Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, '[n]eo-functionalism in
17 Cf. for an introduction Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration,
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000, chapter 3, pp. 50-73; see also Dimitris Chryssochoou,
Theorizing European Integration, London: Sage Politics Texts, 2001, chapters 2, 3.
18 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-
57, Notre Dame/IN: University of Notre Dame Press 2004 [1958]; cf. also idem.,
Beyond the Nation-State. Functionalism and International Organization, Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1968 [1964].
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the end tends to equate transnationalism with European supranationalism'. 19 It can be
argued therefore, that while neo-functionalism rightly draws attention to the role of non-
state and transnationally networked actors, it is unsuitable to offer an explanation for the
actual formation of the ECSC.
Two sub-fields within European integration historiography began to challenge
key assumptions of Lipgens' appraisal of the origins of European integration. Both
diplomatic history and economic revisionist accounts have introduced material interests
into the explanation of core Europe formation. At the same time such accounts
downplay ideational interests and disregard transnational influences on policy-making.
Diplomatic history accounts have explored how allegedly autonomous foreign policy-
making elites determined governmental policy and preference formation and ultimately,
the outcome of the Schuman Plan negotiations.i" These accounts implicitly accept
'realist' assumptions of International Relations (IR) theory about the dominance of
material power and the resilience of the state." Accordingly, foreign policy-making
elites consider national political and security concerns while paying little attention to
domestic politics underlying these preferences. From such a perspective, for France, the
inclusion of Germany into the supranational European framework of the Schuman Plan
was a choice motivated by a dual objective: to control the Federal Republic while
19 Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, 'Transnational Business: Power Structures in Europe's
Political Economy, in: Kaiser, Starie (eds.), Transnational European Union, pp. 83-106,
here p. 88.
20 Cf. select contributions in Anne Deighton (ed.), Building Postwar Europe National
Decision Makers and European Institutions, J 948-63, New York: St. Martin's Press,
1995; Gilbert Trausch (ed.), Die Europaische Integration vom Schuman-Plan his zu den
Vertragen von Rom, Brussels: Bruylant, 1993.
21 See Mark A. Pollack, 'International Relations Theory and European Integration', in:
Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 39, no. 2 (2001), pp. 221-44, here pp. 222-5.
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utilizing its economic resources and to assume political leadership in western Europe.
Germany, in turn, allegedly pursued European integration to regain national sovereignty
on the basis of equality and to secure the Federal Republic a firm position within the
US-led western Alliance.22
In contrast, revisionist economic history accounts have paid emphasized
attention to how domestically derived economic necessities influence governmental
policy-making. Almost exclusively relying on state-based sources and focusing on inter-
state bargaining, the British economic historian Alan S. Milward has proposed that
national governments triggered and have been the driving force behind European
integration. Like Lipgens, Milward has emphasized the significance of the experiences
of World War II and the weakness of the post-war nation-state to explain the formation
of core Europe. However, Lipgens and Milward differ radically in assessing the
consequences of these developments: whereas World War II represented the beginning
of the end of the nation-state for Lipgens, for Milward, it launched its post-war
restoration.v' In his seminal The Reconstruction of Western Europe'", Milward argued
on the basis of then newly accessible governmental records that the French government
proposed the Schuman Plan to defend the national post-war programme for the
22 See for example Ulrich Lappenkuper, 'Der Schuman Plan. MUhsamer Durchbruch zur
deutsch-franzosischen Verstandigung', in: Vierteljahreshefte for Zeitgeschichte, vol. 42,
no. 3, 1994, pp. 403-45; and idem., Die deutsch-franzostschen Beziehungen 1949-1963.
Von der "Erbfeindschaft" zur "Entente elementaire", Quellen und Darstellungen zur
Zeitgeschichte 49, 2 vols., Munich: Oldenbourg, 2001.
23 Cf. Kaiser, 'From State to Society?', p. 195; Wilfried Loth, 'Die Beitrage der
Geschichtswissenschaft zur Deutung der Europaischen Integration', in: idem., Wolfgang
Wessels (eds.), Theorien europaischer Integration, Opladen: Leske & Budrich 2001, pp.
87-106, here pp. 91-6.
24 Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, London: Routledge, 1992
[1984].
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reconstruction and modernization of France; a motive, which he developed further in
The European Rescue of the Nation-State.2s Accordingly, nation-states transferred
competencies to the European level for economic motives, to ensure the continued
existence of national welfare systems and for political motives, to resolve the German
problem." That economic state interests - even if their formation in the domestic
context is considered - sufficiently account for the transfer of competences to the
supranational level remains doubtful, however. In the end, Milward's account is not
convincing since he fails to integrate key aspects of core Europe formation including a
variety of non-material interests, such as ideas, beliefs and values, which motivate actors
as well as any informal transnational and transatlantic patterns of co-operation.
In emphasizing the economic focus of state interests Milward has advanced ideas
that are shared by the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism. Intergovernmentalism
rejects nee-functionalist theory. Its liberal variant, developed by political scientist
Andrew Moravcsik during the first half of the 1990s against the backdrop of the 're-
launch' of the integration process in the mid-1980s,27 highlights the economic focus of
state interests and explores two stages of preference formation: within the domestic
context, and at inter-state conferences, where national delegations bargain over
domestically derived preferences.f Focusing on preference formation in a purely
2S Alan Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, London: Routledge, 2nd ed.
2000 [1992].
26 Milward, The European Rescue, chapter 2, pp. 21-45.
27Most relevant is Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and
State Power from Messina to Maastricht, London: veL Press, 1998, in which
Moravcsik also addresses the differences between his own work and that of Milward:
rrF·4,81.. d .. I'b I' I' PII k'I . Ior an mtro uction mto I era mtergovernmenta Ism see 0 ac, nternanona
Relations Theory', pp. 225-7, here p. 225.
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national context, however, liberal intergovernmentalism falls short of integrating the
role of transnational actors in initiating European integration in 1950-51.
Moreover, Moravcsik only starts his controversial Choice for Europe'" with the
negotiations on the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1956-57, which
represents the first of five chronological case studies that he uses to test his hypotheses
on the causes of integration. Moravcsik's approach of testing hypotheses with historical
case studies does not lend itself to conceptualizing long-term historical developments,
however. By sidelining the formation of the ECSC of the six-founding member-states-
the same states that signed the EEC treaty - Moravcsik moreover neglects any possible
'path dependencies' for European integration that may have been created at the
Schuman Plan conference or even before. Paul Pierson has emphasized the path
dependence of institutional change and policy developments and has argued that initial
institutional or policy decisions have the potential to become self-reinforcing over
time.3o With regard to core Europe formation, path dependence therefore highlights the
question of how informal transatlantic policy-making preceded, shaped and perhaps
29 While historians have criticized Moravcsik's selective use of archival sources, which
is motivated by theory testing, political scientists have attacked the assumptions
underlying liberal intergovernmental ism and The Choice for Europe. Cf. for example
Thomas Diez, 'Riding the AM-Track through Europe, Or: The Pitfalls ofa Rationalist
Journey through European Integration', in: Millennium: Journal of International
Studies, vol. 28, no. 2 (1999), pp. 355-69; and Moravcsik's rebuttal: Andrew Moravcsik,
'The future of European Integration Studies: Social Science or Social Theory?', in: ibid.
Pt 371-91.
Paul Pierson, 'The Path to European Integration: A Historical-Institutionalist
Analysis', in: Sandholtz, Sweet (eds.), European Integration, pp. 27-58, esp. pp. 34-43,
46.
20
'locked in,31 the European integration process even before supranational institutions
started to operate in 1952.
The concept of path dependence is representative of more recent approaches
within European integration theory, which tend to focus on understanding policy-
making and decision-making processes within the EU rather than providing an overall
framework for European integration. This shift in the research focus was partly fuelled
by the desire within the theory of European integration, following the coming into force
of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987, to overcome the dichotomy of neo-
functionalism and lntergovernmentatlsm." Partly, the new research focus reflected the
disillusionment with 'grand theory' after the end of the Cold War - an event, which no
previous theories of IR had predicted. Constructivist approaches have highlighted the
importance of social interaction within EU institutions and have focused on cultural
influences that only change slowly over time. Further, constructivist literature has
emphasized the desirability of providing empirical confirmation of theoretical claims."
Similarly, institutionalism has emphasized the role of EU institutions in the convergence
of ideas and policies." Sociological institutionalism treats institutions broadly as
instances of formal and informal interaction and systems of norms, such as conventions
and codes of behaviour. Historical institutionalism, in turn, stresses the significance of
31Ibid.; Rosamond, Theories, p. 117.
32Rosamond, Theories, p. 99.
33On the new dichotomy of constructivism and rationalism, the latter of which embraces
elements of the originally competing realist, liberal, and institutional approaches and
portrays the EU as the product of conscious member-state design, see also Pollack,
'International Relations'. For the applicability of institutional theory to historical
research see Morten Rasmussen, 'Supranational Governance in the Making: Towards a
European Political System', in: Kaiser, Leucht, Rasmussen (eds.), The History (2008
forthcoming).
34 Chryssochoou, European Integration, pp. 115-18.
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the temporal dimension of politics. Generally, these approaches have pointed to the
significance of examining political processes over time and have therefore provided the
basis for the fruitful interdisciplinary co-operation of historians and political scientists."
However, as with nee-functionalist and intergovernmental theories, these approaches
focus on the institutionalized system of the EU, not its origins in the formation of the
ECSC.
At the same time, the transnational approach has been revived within European
integration historiography but with major alterations to its original conception. The new
transnational historiography has attempted to take into account political science
approaches to studying the EU. While Lipgens did not regard interdisciplinary exchange
important enough to engage in it, Milward for a long time was the only historian of
European integration who discussed European integration theory and presented a broad
approach to conceptualize the integration process.l" More recently, Wolfram Kaiser has
offered an alternative to Milward's state-centric approach by arguing for the importance
of studying transnational actors and their shared ideas and values, while at the same time
acknowledging the significance of material interests and economic motives in domestic
policy and preference formation." For example, Kaiser has demonstrated the influence
of the Christian democrats and the importance of their transnationally co-ordinated
activities in the formation of core Europe even before the Schuman Plan conference." In
35 See for example Kaiser, Starie (eds.), Transnational European Union.
36 Milward, The European Rescue, chapter 1, pp. 1-20; Alan Milward, Frances Lynch,
Frederico Romero, Ruggero Ranieri, Vibeke Sorensen (eds.), The Frontier of National
Sovereignty. History and Theory 1945-1992, London and New York: Routledge 1993.
37 Kaiser, 'From State to Society', pp. 195-208.
38 Wolfram Kaiser, Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
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brief, recent transnational EU historiography presents perspectives to qualify or counter
the national paradigm.
To this date no transnational perspective has been applied to the inter-state
negotiations on the ECSC treaty. More specifically, the role of US actors and
transatlantic policy-making has not been analyzed adequately. To overcome the
limitations of Milward's and Moravcsik's approach without falling victim to the
shortcomings of Lipgens' early transnational historiography, a twofold strategy shall be
pursued in this thesis. Firstly, in addition to governmental sources, select private papers
of actors in the US and Europe and state and non-state actors will be scrutinized to
provide a multilateral as well as a multi-archival basis for the analysis. Secondly,
governmental sources will be re-investigated with a new, refined set of research
questions, which will be informed by the network and the cultural transfer concepts.
Before discussing these concepts, however, it is necessary to review the historiography
of transatlantic relations.
1.3 The American 'empire': a transatlantic perspective on the
formation of core Europe
The literature of post-World War II transatlantic relations has interpreted the Schuman
Plan conference in terms of intergovernmental bargaining, but has also acknowledged
'American influence' on the negotiations.l'' This historiography is based on the notion of
39 Paul Melandri, Les Etats-Unisface a l'Unificatton de l'Europe 1945-1954, Paris:
Pendone, 1980; Gillingham, Coal. Steel; Lovett, 'The United States and the Schuman
Pian'; Klaus Schwabe, '''Ein Akt konstruktiver Staatskunst" - die USA und die Anfange
des Schuman Plans', in: Schwabe (ed.), Die An/tinge des Schuman Plans, pp. 211-39.
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the 'American empire', particularly associated with the work of Geir Lundestad."
According to such approaches, the US government supported efforts at European
integration and the formation of a democratic and capitalist western Europe within an
Atlantic framework in their opposition to Soviet Communism." For Lundestad 'empire'
represents a hierarchical political system with a centre, namely the US, which had no
formal control over western Europe, but established informal control based on their
unique strength after 1945. Indeed the US had come out of World War II undamaged
and the economically strongest state of the victorious Allies. The emerging strength of
the US coincided with the declining power of the traditional European empires, Great
Britain and France. Lundestad provides a stimulating overall interpretation of US-
European relations during and beyond the Cold War. At the least, this places US foreign
post-war policy in a wider chronological framework and helps to account for the
presence of US officials in a variety of newly established agencies administering
policies in western Europe after 1945. At the same time Lundestad's approach is entirely
state-centred and fails to capture the important more informal patterns of transatlantic
co-operation at the Schuman Plan conference.
Lundestad's point of departure shares affinities with the IR hegemonic stability
theory, which is based on two premises: firstly, hegemony is the exercise of power or
influence of a dominant polity, here the US, over other polities or regions. Secondly, in
a state-centred and anarchic world it is desirable to have a dominant polity assert
40 Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe since 1945. From 'Empire by
Invitation+to 'Transatlantic Drift', Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
41 Cf. also Francis Heller, John Gillingham (eds.), N.A.T.O. The Founding of the Atlantic
Alliance and the Integration of Europe, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992; and idem.,
The United States and the Integration of Europe. Legacies of the Postwar Era, New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.
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stability by getting less powerful states to accede to its policy prescriptions. Hegemony
therefore is a means to control the political, economic and cultural spheres of a world
region.42 In contrast to this theory, however, Lundestad has stressed the notion of the US
'empire by invitation'. Western European states sought to prolong the US government's
engagement in Europe for economic motives, notably to finance their national post-war
reconstruction programmes; for political motives, specifically to weaken any
Communist influences and strongholds in their societies; and most importantly for
security motives, to position themselves vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in terms of security
and military policy." In turn, Lundestad provides five reasons to explain the US
government's support for European integration: firstly, a desire to implement a federal
US model in Europe based on an argument of moral superiority; secondly, the belief that
an integrated Europe would be more efficient and rational; thirdly, the hope that
European co-operation in the security and economic spheres would reduce America's
burden; fourthly, the belief that a strong Europe would help contain the SU; and lastly,
the hope that tying Germany into a federal European structure would prevent future
problems with this state." Notwithstanding that it was an empire by invitation, the
empire thesis has resulted in a focus in literature on the one-way transfer of ideas,
concepts and policies from the US to Europe, rather than on the two-way interaction of
American and domestic European ideas in post-war policy-making in western Europe.
This focus in literature is reflected in the appraisal of US programmes for post-
war European reconstruction as well as in the analysis of bilateral policy-making
42 Robert Jackson, Georg Serensen, Introduction to International Relations: Theories
and Approaches, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 190-7.
43 Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe, pp. 55-9.
44 Ibid. pp. 86-91.
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between the US government and individual European states. The most significant
European-wide programme, which the US government introduced as part of a series of
policies for political re-education, military alliance and economic restoration in western
Europe, was the European Recovery Program (ERP) or Marshall Plan. While there is
agreement in the literature that the Marshall Plan served as a decisive US foreign policy
instrument, the economic impact of American aid for European recovery has been
challenged." On the one hand, Werner Abelshauser has proposed that the decisive input
for economic recovery predated the Marshall Plan and that its economic results were
only limited." Similarly, Milward has argued that European recovery would have gone
ahead with or without US funding." Michael Hogan, on the other hand, on the basis of
US sources, has stressed the significance of Marshall Plan aid for Europe's economic
reconstruction." For Lundestad, the Marshall Plan serves as a case in point that meets
all of the five criteria he lists for the US government's support for European
integration.V However, as regards the first motive, for example, such an approach one-
sidedly privileges the significance of the federal US model over sometimes
complementary or competing domestic European concepts to federate Europe, some of
4S A good introduction into the literature is provided by Michael Cox, Caroline
Kennedy-Pipe, 'Special Forum: The Marshall Plan and the Origins of the Cold War
Reassessed', in: Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 7, no. 1 (2005), pp. 97-134, and
various articles responding to Cox and Kennedy in the same journal issue.
46 Werner Abelshauser, 'Wiederaufbau vor dem Marshallplan. Westeuropas
Wachstumschancen und die Wirtschaftsordnung der zweiten Halfte der vierziger Jahre',
in: Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, vol. 29 (1981), pp. 545-78.
47 Milward, The Reconstruction, chapter 3,90-125.
48 Michael Hogan, The Marshall Plan America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of
Western Europe, 1947-1952, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987;
see also Charles S. Maier, The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in
Twentieth Century Western Europe, in: idem. (ed.), In Search of Stability: Explorations
in Historical Political Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
49 Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe, pp. 87-9.
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which Lipgens has collected. 50 In short, the empire approach leaves out the possibility of
the interaction of American and European thought and politico-legal concepts in post-
war Europe.
In her assessment of the role of the US government in the European integration
process from 1945 to 1958, however, Beate Neuss has confirmed Lundestad's
arguments, though she primarily consulted US governmental records. Neuss portrays the
US government as the one decisive external federator that triggered the integration
process from outside.51 Her interpretation fails to shed light on the question of why it
was the ECSC treaty that provided the basis for European integration through
supranational sectoral integration and not, for example, the organizations established to
administer the Marshall Plan, which also were designed to unify or federate Europe. The
notion of empire does not contribute to answering the question of the relationship
between the promotion of the US federal model in post-war Europe and US-led
initiatives to federate or integrate Europe and the actual introduction of a supranational
institutional framework in the ECSC treaty. Similarly, the incorporation of economic
provisions into the treaty - albeit only for the coal and steel sector - which represent the
principle of free market economy that formed another cornerstone of US foreign policy,
has not been accounted for satisfactorily.
Literature on bi-Iateral policy-making between the US and individual European
states has also predominantly adopted the frame of empire. Most research has been
produced on German-American relations after 1945. Two cases in point are provided by
50 Lipgens, Europa- F'oderationsplane.
51 Beate Neuss, Geburtshelfer Europas? Die Rolle der Vereinigten Staaten im
europaischen Integrationsprozefi 1945-1958, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000.
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collective efforts investigating the entire spectrum of the bi-lateral relationship, which
included politics, security, culture and society.52 As regards France, William
Hitchcock53 and Richard Kuisel " have qualified the notion of empire and have
emphasized the role of France in actively shaping the American empire. These authors
are not, however, concerned with the formation of core Europe, but tend to focus on the
cultural dimension of the incipient Cold War.55
Cultural relations, US cultural diplomacy and the transfer of American forms of
production, technology and management to Europe principally have been studied within
the framework of 'Americanization' .56Although the concept accommodates a variety of
52Detlev Junker (ed.), Die USA und Deutschland im Zeitalter des Kalten Krieges 1945-
1990. Ein Handbuch, Band /, 1945-1968, Stuttgart, Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt,
200 I; and Heinz Bude, Bernd Greiner (eds.), Westbindungen. Amerika in der
Bundesrepublik, Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1999; cf. also Jeffrey M. Diefendorf,
Axel Frohn, Hermann-Josef Rupieper (eds.), American Policy and the Reconstruction of
Germany. 1945-1955, Washington DC: German Historical Institute and Cambridge
University Press, 1993; and within the broader framework of US foreign policy in the
20th century Klaus Schwabe, Weltmacht und Weltordnung. Amerikanische Aufienpolitik
von 1898 bis zur Gegenwart. Eine Jahrhundertgeschichte, Paderborn et.al.: Ferdinand
Schoningh, 2006.
53William Hitchcock, France Restored. Cold War Diplomacy and the Questfor
Leadership in Europe, Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press,
1998.
54Richard Kuisel, Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization, Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1993.
55Cf. also for the case of Austria Reinhold Wagnleitner, Coca-colonization and the
Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria After the Second World
War, Chapel HiIlINC: University of North Carolina Press, 1994.
S6Cf. Berghahn, The Americanization; various contributions in Bude, Greiner (eds.),
Westbindungen; cf. also Alexander Stephan (ed.), Americanization and anti-
Americanism: the German Encounter with American Culture After 1945, New York:
Berghahn Books, 2005; Matthias Kipping, Ove Bjarnar (eds.), The Americanization of
European Business: The Marshall Plan and the Transfer of u.s. Management Models,
London, New York: Routledge, 1998; Brian Angus McKenzie, Remaking France:
Americanization, Public Diplomacy, and the Marshall Plan, Oxford, New York:
Berghahn Books, 2005.
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understandings and differentlattons," it tends to follow the logic of empire in that it
studies the role of American influence in other societies.f Furthermore, Anselm
Doering-Manteuffel has introduced the broader concept of 'Westernization' and has
stressed the significance of the conditions of reception to understand American
influence." From the point of view of Westernization Julia Angster has argued that the
German Labour movement and the Social Democratic Party went through a period of re-
orientation - replacing Marxist socialist with liberal democratic values - essentially as a
result of the encounters of German Socialists with the American trade union movements
during World War 11.60 However, even though Angster focuses on transnational
networks and together with some other authors allows for the interaction of American
and European concepts." the notions of Americanization and Westernization tend to
privilege the dominance of American ideas over European domestic ideas.
The empire approach and the concept of Americanization have also had
important consequences as to the significance, which is assigned to informal policy-
57 Cf. Philipp Gassert, 'Amerikanismus, Antiamerikanismus, Amerikanisierung. Neue
Literatur zur Sozial-, Wirtschafts- und Kulturgeschichte des amerikanischen Einflusses
in Deutschland und Europa', in: Archiv for Sozialgeschichte, vol. 39 (1995), pp. 531-61.
58 See also Julia Gienow-Hecht, 'Shame on US? Academics, Cultural Transfer and the
Cold War - A critical review', in: Diplomatic History, vol. 24, no. 3 (2000), pp. 465-94,
who refers to 'American cultural transfer abroad', but essentially discusses
Americanization: ibid. p. 465.
59 Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, Wie westlich sind die Deutschen? Amerikanisierung und
Westernisierung im 20. Jahrhundert, Gottingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1999.
60 Julia Angster, Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie: Die Westernisierung von
SPD und ADGB, Studien zur Ideengeschichte der Neuzeit, vol. 13, Munich:
Oldenbourg,2003.
61 Lisa Murach-Brand, Antitrust auf Deutsch. Der EinflufJ der Amerikanischen Alliierten
auf das Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschriinkungen (GWB) nach 1945, TUbingen: Mohr,
2004; Edmund Spevack, Allied Control and German Freedom: American Political and
Ideological Influences on the Framing a/the West German Basic Law, MUnster: Lit;
Piscataway/Nl : Transaction Publishers, 2001.
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making by transatlantic networks in core Europe formation. To conceive of the
framework for post-war preference and policy formation as US-dominated entails at
least two assumptions. Firstly, it would mean that hierarchy would structure the co-
operation of US actors and European actors and European state actors were to
manoeuvre within a tightly circumscribed sphere of action. Secondly, the role of
preference formation and policy-making through informal channels therefore is not
regarded significant. Together these assumptions preclude the validity of investigating
any links between US and European state and non-state actors. As a result, the
transatlantic networks of state and non-state actors, civil servants, politicians and
academic and other policy experts have not been explored with regard to the formation
of the ECSC.
Literature that does go beyond the governmental level of analysis includes
Pascaline Winand's Eisenhower, Kennedy and the united States of Europe, in which she
partially reconstructs the' Atlantic network'. However, she neither focuses on the period
of the Truman administration (1945-53), nor on the Schuman Plan negotiatlons.f
Winand's Atlantic network evolves around one of two transatlantic key figures that are
widely acknowledged in literature, namely high-ranking French official Jean Monnet.63
Similarly, Holger Schroder and others, regard Monnet as central to informal
62 Pascaline Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the united states of Europe, New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1993.
63 Winand further developed the key role of Monnet in 'De I'usage de l'Arnerique par
Jean Monnet pour la construction europeenne', in: Gerard Bossuat, Andreas Wilkens
(eds.), Jean Monnet, l'Europe et les chemins de la paix. Actes du Col/oques de Paris du
29 au 31 Mai 1997, Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne 1999, pp. 253-72; 'European
Insiders Working Inside Washington: Monnet's Network, Euratom, and the Eisenhower
Administration', in: Kathleen Burk, Melvyn Stokes (eds.), The United States and the
European Alliance Since 1945, Oxford, New York: Berg 1999, pp. 207-38.
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transatlantic policy-making." Just like Monnet'" the second key transatlantic figure, US
High Commissioner for Germany John J. McCloy, has been the subject of various
biographies." In principle, works on Monnet and McCloy imply that there are two types
of actors, namely transatlantic key figures and advisors or policy experts. Klaus
Schwabe has introduced an alternative distinction of top rank individuals responsible for
policy-making and lower-ranking officials who were implementing policiesf" Applied
to the Schuman Plan conference, affiliations with either Monnet or McCloy would be
the only variable that helps explain why policy experts became involved. An example of
an American advisor was Robert Bowie, the general counsel to the US High
Commission for Germany (USHICOG) under McCloy. Bowie's contribution to core
Europe formation, just like that of other policy experts, has not sufficiently been
contextualized within the larger framework of post-World War II transatlantic co-
operation, however.
The notion of the 'policy entrepreneur' confirms the desirability to contextualize
different roles of actors in a wider framework. Dimitrios Christopoulos has defined
policy entrepreneurs as having the ability to 'respond to exceptional challenges and rise
64 Holger Schroder, Jean Monnet und die amerikanische Unterstutzung fur die
Europaische Integration 1950-1957, Frankfurt am Main et.a!.: Peter Lang 1994. Cf.
further Clifford Hackett (ed.), Monnet and the Americans. The Father of a United
Europe and his U.s. Supporters, Washington, DC: Jean Monnet Council, 1995.
65 Francois Duchene, Jean Monnet. The First Statesman of Interdependence, New York,
London: Norton, 1994.
66 Kai Bird, The Chairman. John J. McCloy. The Making of the American
Establishment, New York et. al.: Simon & Schuster 1993; Thomas Schwartz, America's
Germany. John McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany, Cambridge/MA,
London: Harvard University Press, 1991.
67 Klaus Schwabe, 'Do Personalities Make a Difference? Washington Working with
Europeans', in: Kathleen Burk, Melvyn Stokes (eds.), The United States and the
European Alliance since 1945, Oxford, New York: Berg, 1999, pp. 239-267, here p.
243.
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above their peers by means of their strategic forethought and ability to manipulate their
environment' .68 Further, he maintains that policy entrepreneurs are dependant on
networks in that these networks ensure that they can put their abilities into practice.
Accordingly, Monnet and McCloy shared important attributes of policy entrepreneurs
when they helped to facilitate the informal co-operation of policy experts in the
negotiations. However, at the same time the notion of the policy entrepreneur raises the
question of the structures and wider networks in which policy experts were embedded. It
is therefore necessary to assess systematically the role of actors who as part of
transatlantic policy networks and with their expertise helped shape the ECSC treaty.
Another cluster of literature has approached transatlantic networks from a socio-
cultural Cold War perspective without, however, focusing on core Europe formation.
Volker Berghahn, for example, highlights the role of the Central Intelligence Agency in
funding transnational organization in his study on the philanthropic activities of the Ford
Foundation in Europe, but does not investigate potential links to actors and networks at
the Schuman Plan conference." However, Berghahn emphasizes the significance of
exploring in greater detail transatlantic networks of bankers, other business actors, civil
servants, academics and intellectuals to develop a more nuanced picture of the social-
cultural foundations of the Cold War.70 For the 1956-57 negotiations on the treaties
establishing the EEC and the European Atomic Energy Commission (Euratom), Thomas
68 Cf. Dimitrios Christopoulos, 'Relational Attributes of Political Entrepreneurs: a
Network Perspective,' in: Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 13, no. 5 (2006), pp.
757-78, here p. 758.
69 Volker Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe, Princeton,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. This observation also refers to Giuliana Gemelli
(ed.), The Ford Foundation and Europe (1950's-1970's). Cross-fertilizatton of Learning
in Social Science and Management, Brussels: Princeton University Press, 1998.
70 Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars, p. 284.
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Gijswijt has assessed the role of the Bilderberg Group, which was founded during 1952-
54 to foster the informal information exchange between transatlantic elites." From the
perspective of the Schuman Plan conference, Berghahn's research in particular raises the
question of potentially overlapping networks and of establishing where the boundaries
of transatlantic co-operation were in the treaty negotiations in 1950-51. More generally,
this includes investigating which existing networks and institutionalized patterns of co-
operation in post-World War Europe might have facilitated the formation of networks at
the conference.
In summary, the historiographies of early European integration and post-war
transatlantic relations are characterized by a focus on state actors and reliance on the
national paradigm to explain preference formation and policy outcomes. What is
missing is the systematic assessment of the role of transatlantic policy networks of
individual and collective and state and non-state actors in the Schuman Plan conference.
To evaluate the role of these networks and therefore to help answer the central research
question it is necessary to chose the appropriate conceptual tools.
lA The network concept: utilizing a social science concept
It will be demonstrated that the network approach helps to overcome the shortcomings
of historical literature in at least two ways: firstly, it provides a conceptual tool, lacking
71 S. Thomas W. Gijswijt, 'The Bilderberg Group and the Rome Treaties: Transnational
Elites and the Debate on European Integration in the 1950s', unpublished manuscript,
presented at the Third HEIRS conference, Geneva, 16 March 2007. See also idem.,
Uniting the West. The Bilderberg Group, the Cold War and European Integration,
1952-1966, PhD, University of Heidelberg, Mikrofiche, Heidelberg 2008. For the
Bilderberg Group s. also Valerie Aubourg, 'Le groupe de Bilderberg et I'lntegratlon
europeenne jusqu'au milieu des annees 1960', in: Michel Dumoulin (ed.), Reseaux
economiques et construction europeenne, Brussels: Peter Lang, 2004, pp. 411-29.
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within the historical discipline, to assess systematically the role of individual and
collective actors in policy-making at the Schuman Plan conference. Secondly, the
network concept has the potential to overcome the focus of historiography on European
states as almost exclusive actors and the prevalence of the national paradigm to explain
policy outcomes in core Europe formation. It is therefore necessary to establish that the
network approach stands for something more than a 'trendy' catchphrase and to specify
in which way the variants that emerged out of the social science literature on network
analysis in the 1990s can in fact be utilized for a historical narrative.
Sociologist Manuel Castells regards the 'rise of the network society"? as a
consequence of the information technology revolution, which provided the material
basis for a complete change in the social structure. Accordingly, networks' ... constitute
the new social morphology of our societies, and the diffusion of networking logic
substantially modifies the operation and outcomes in processes of production,
experience, power, and culture'. 73 Against the backdrop of globalization, the EU
therefore can be described as a network polity. Political sociologist Chris Rumford in
turn has introduced the notion of the EU as a 'space of networks'. 74 Within political
science, an interest in the network approach coincided with the adoption of new
approaches to the study of European integration.P Originally developed to re-
conceptualize public policy-making in the national arena, the network concept has
72 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, vol. 1, Oxford, Cambridge/MA:
Blackwell Publishers 1996.
73 Ibid. p. 469.
74 Chris Rumford, The European Union: a Political Sociology, Oxford: Blackwell
Publishing 2002, here p. 196.
75 See Alex Warleigh, 'Conceptual Combinations: Multilevel Governance and Policy
Networks', in: Cini, Bourne (eds.), Palgrave Advances, pp. 77-95.
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become important for the analysis of policy- and decision-making within the EU and of
the process of European transnationalization." Tanja Borzel has defined a policy
network as
... a set of relatively stable relationships which are of non-hierarchical and
interdependent nature linking a variety of actors, who share common interests
with regard to a policy and who exchange resources to pursue these shared
interests acknowledging that co-operation is the best way to achieve common
goals."
Within the policy network literature, there is a variety of understandings and
applications of the concept. Firstly, policy networks are used as a metaphor signifying
that policy-making involves a large number and a variety of actors; secondly, policy
networks serve as an analytical tool to assess the relations between actors interacting
with each other in a given policy sector; thirdly, policy networks are employed as a
method of social structure analysis (quantitative or qualitative); and lastly, policy
networks may entail a theoretical claim.78
Borzel distinguishes two main trends in the policy network literature: the
'interest intermediation' or 'Anglo-Saxon school' and the 'governance' or 'German
school'v'" 'Interest intermediation' refers to the relations between the state and societal
interests. Within the interest intermediation school policy networks emerged as a new
typology to overcome the dichotomy between 'pluralism' and 'neo-corporatism'. Each
of these theories interpreted differently the nature of access to policy-making procedures
76 Karen Heard-Laureote, 'Transnational Networks. Informal Governance in the
European Political Space', in: Kaiser, Starie (eds.) Transnational European Union, pp.
36-60, here p. 37.
77 Tanja A. Borzel, 'Organizing Babylon - On the Different Conceptions of Policy
Networks', Public Administration, vol. 76, no. 2 (1998), pp. 253-73, here p. 254.
78 Ibid. p. 254-5. '
79 Ibid. pp. 255-65.
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and diverged with regard to the number of interest groups that were relevant to the
analysis. Against this backdrop, policy networks represent a broad concept that applies
to all kinds of relations between public and private actors and to different forms of
relationships between interest groups and the state. Policy networks are power
dependency relationships between the government and interest groups, in which
resources are exchanged, and they serve as a tool to examine institutionalized exchange
processes.P' Interdependency between actors facilitates the construction of policy
networks. Actors within a policy sector are dependant upon each other for resources."
One of the network models widely used in the study of EU governance is the
Rhodes model, later advanced as the Rhodes and Marsh model. 82 The model is based on
only three criteria, namely the stability or instability and fluidity of network
memberships over time; the degree of integration of members into the network (how
insular or permeable are networks); and the distribution of resources among actors
(where are the strengths and weaknesses of resource dependencies), whereby resources
include money, expertise and legitimacy. On the basis of these three criteria, the
Rhodes-Marsh model introduces a continuum of policy networks, which stretches from
highly integrated policy communities on one side of the spectrum to loosely integrated
issue networks, on the other. Membership is constant and often hierarchical in policy
communities, which means that external pressures have limited impact and actors are
highly dependent on each other for resources. At the same time, some groups are
consciously excluded. In issue networks, in contrast, membership is fluid and non-
80 Ibid. pp. 255-6.
81 Cf. Heard-Laureote, 'Transnational Networks', p. 40.
82 Rod Rhodes, David Marsh, 'New Directions in the Study of Policy Networks', in:
European Journal of Political Research, vol. 21, no. 1-2 (1992), pp. 181-205.
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hierarchical; the network is easily permeated by external influences; and actors are
highly independent.
The understanding of policy networks according to the governance school is
more ambitious since it also forwards a theoretical claim. Here, policy networks
characterize a specific form of interaction between public and private actors, namely one
that is based on non-hierarchical co-ordination. To describe this interaction the
governance school rejects the notion of hierarchy and market as the two inherently
distinct modes of governance and assumes a mechanism based on the mobilization and
subsequent dispersion of political resources between public and private actors. The
growth of networks finally represents a new form of governance. 83
To utilize rather than to apply or to advance the network concept, means it is not
necessary here to engage with the political science debate on key problems relating to
the network concept, such as the structure-agent debate; the relation between policy
networks and policy outcomes; and the possible classifications and levels of analysis, to
name only a few examples." Instead a historical narrative can build on a set of
categories and criteria as well as a sophisticated terminology, all of which help to
analyze the formation, scope, structures, functioning and, to some degree, the impact of
transatlantic policy networks. The different approaches under the policy network
therefore offer a variety of criteria that can be used to fine-tune the questions for the
analysis of archival sources and at the same time further differentiate the central
research question about the role of transatlantic policy networks in core Europe
83 Borzel, 'Organizing Babylon', p. 255
84 David Marsh, Comparing Policy Networks, Buckingham: Open University Press
1998.
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formation. These criteria include the level of institutionalization of a policy network
(how stable or instable is a network); the scope of policy-making arrangements (are
networks sectoral or cross-sectoral); the number of participants; the regulation of access
to the network (is it restricted or open); the types of participants; and the major functions
of the network.f Moreover, the network approach considers such categories as trust
between actors and their common view of the world or shared policy paradlgm.l?
Another notion is important with regard to linking the exploration of the
formation, scope, structure and functioning of transatlantic policy networks to their
impact. Policy networks stress the importance of resources, including expertise, in
structuring the relationships between actors. Advocacy coalitions and epistemic
communities, however, specifically focus on the notion of policy ideas. Whereas
epistemic communities of actors debate common sets of ideas, advocacy coalitions of
actors within the same policy domain engage in policy-oriented learning. Introduced by
Peter Haas, the concept of epistemic communities or expert networks is characterized by
a shared set of normative and principled beliefs; shared causal beliefs; shared notions of
validity; and a common policy enterprise." The epistemic community approach
therefore presents additional categories to assess the transatlantic co-operation of policy
experts. The advocacy coalition concept in tum accommodates multiple network
affiliations of actors. Advocacy coalitions form on the basis of shared beliefs and values.
The core argument is that actors and institutions that share a similar perspective, will
8S Cf. Borzel, 'Organizing Babylon'.
86 Heard-Laureote, 'Transnational networks', pp. 40-1.
87 Peter M. Haas, 'Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination, in: International Organization, vol. 46, no. 1 (1992), pp. 1-35.
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forge coalition type relationships with each other." Identifying the common cause of
actors in the source material therefore makes possible the identification or designation of
an advocacy coalition-like types of co-operation. However, even though actors might
have shared a policy paradigm, they might have differed with regard to the actual co-
ordination of policies.
CrucialIy, the network concept has the potential to overcome the national
paradigm as the sole explanation for policy outcomes and promises to advance our
understanding of how transatlantic policy networks contributed to core Europe
formation in )950-51. Thomas Risse has defined networks as transnational when ' ...at
least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national
government or an intergovernmental organization'. 89 Networks can accordingly be
considered transatlantic when they are composed of actors from both sides of the North
Atlantic. Moreover, transnational networks mobilize information, knowledge and values
across national boundaries." The use of 'policy networks' rather than 'Atlantic
networks', as suggested by Wlnand," for example, is preferable since it focuses on the
8S Ibid. p. 41. Cf. Paul A. Sabatier, Hank C. Jenkins-Smith (eds.), Policy Change and
Learnind. An Advocacy Coalition Approach, Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford:
Westview, 1993; Paul A. Sabatier, 'The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Revisions and
Relevance for Europe', in: Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 5, no. 1 (1998), pp.
98-130.
89 Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'Bringing Transnational Relations Back in: Introduction', in:
idem. (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back in: Non-state Actors, Domestic
Strcures and International Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995,
rJ'" 3-33, here p. 3.
Cf. Michele M. Betsill, Harriet Bulkeley, 'Transnational Networks and Global
Environmental Governance: The Cities for Climate Protection Program', in:
International Studies Quarterly, vol. 48, 2 (2004), pp. 471-93, here pp. 474-5.
91 Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy.
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link between actors and policy-making. This is where the network concept fits in with
the concept of cultural transfer.
1.5 Cultural transfer: combining conceptual tools
To assess the impact of transatlantic policy networks the thesis will draw on the concept
of cultural transfer. More specifically, cultural transfer serves as a methodological tool
to investigate the collaboration of transatlantic policy networks in the policy areas of the
institutional set-up and the economic (anti-trust) provisions of the treaty. Advanced
since the mid-1980s by Michel Espagne and Michael Werner in the context of Franco-
German relations in modern history,92 the concept has been adapted for cultural studies
and has been used by history, literary studies, sociology and pedagogy." Helga
Mitterbauer has attempted to systematize cultural transfer and has defined the three
components essential to the concept, namely an original culture, actors and networks
that convey their culture and a target culture." It is argued here that cultural transfer and
the network concept reinforce each other, while they challenge the idea of
92 Cf. Michel Espagne, Michael Werner, 'Deutsch-franzosischer Kulturtransfer im 18.
und 19. Jahrhundert, Zu einem neuen interdiszipllnaren Forschungsprogramm des
C.N.R.S.', in: Francia, vol. 13 (1985), pp. 502-10; idem. (eds.), Transferts. Les
relations interculturelles dans l'esoace franco-allemand (XVIIIe et XIXe steele), Paris:
editions Recherches sur les Civilisations 1988.
93 Cf. empirical contributions in Lothar Jordan, Bernd Kortlander (eds.), Nationale
Grenzen und internationaler Austausch. Studien zum Kultur- und Wissenschaftstransfer
in Europa, Communicatio. Studien zur europaischen Literatur- und Kulturgeschichte,
vol. 10, Tiibingen: Niemayer 1995; see also Katharina Middell, Matthias Middell,
'Forschungen zum Kulturtransfer. Frankreich und Deutschland', in: Grenzgange, vol. 1,
no. 2 (1994), pp. 107-22.
94 Helga Mitterbauer, 'Kulturtransfer - ein vielschichtiges Beziehungsgetlecht?' in:
newsletter Moderne, vol. 2., no. 1 (1999), pp. 23-5, here p. 23.
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Americanization." To capture the complex negotiation process at the Schuman Plan
conference, cultural transfer is a more appropriate concept than Americanization.
Firstly, as with the notion of policy networks cultural transfer emphasizes the
link between actors and policies. In line with Mitterbauer cultural transfer can be
defined as a dynamic process in which actors mediate between different original and
target cultures." At the same time, the very notion of cultural transfer denies that there
are original and target cultures. To describe what happened at the encounter of different
cultures, recent uses of the concept privilege categories such as interchange, interaction,
translation and dialogue over notions of influence or coercion. The concept therefore
draws attention to how in the course of a transfer process a multiplicity of actors
engages in re-defining various cultural practices and products that originated in different
cultures. Accordingly, the notion of transatlantic network co-operation at the Schuman
Plan conference suggests that individual and collective actors exchanged and negotiated
American and European politico-legal concepts and policy preferences in the making of
the treaty. Further, the link between policies and actors not only helps to identify the
transatlantic transfer of politico-legal concepts, but also to show the barriers to such
transfer processes.
Secondly, Matthias Middell has argued that 'processes of cultural transfer are
guided by the willingness to import rather than by the desire to export' .97 Cultural
95 For an outline of combining these two concepts see also Brigitte Leucht,
"Transatlantische Politiknetzwerke: Kulturtransfer und Schuman-Plan 1950151', in:
Comparativ, vol. 16, no. 4 (2006), pp. 200-18.
96 Ibid.
97 Matthias Middell, 'Kulturtransfer und Historische Komparatistik - Thesen zu ihrem
Verhaltnis', in: Comparativ, vol. 10, no. I (2000), pp. 7-41, here pp. 20-1. See further
for the theoretical critique of the comparative method as an important point of departure
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transfer therefore rejects an important assumption underlying Americanization namely
that the in itself heterogeneous 'American' culture prevails over 'European' culture(s).
Instead cultural transfer brings to the fore the process character inherent to policy-
making and decision-making. Approaching the Schuman Plan conference from the point
of view of Americanization one could argue that American policy experts introduced
American politico-legal concepts into the multilateral negotiations and thus influenced
the draft treaty and core Europe formation. Cultural transfer, in contrast, focuses on
processes of non-hierarchical interaction, in which American and European policy
experts mediated between politico-legal concepts of varying origins and thus arrived at
policy solutions.
Thirdly, and in further contrast to Americanization, cultural transfer stresses the
role of mediators in policy- and decision-making processea" Therefore, to study the
transatlantic co-operation on the institutional set-up and the anti-trust provisions means
to explore the role of policy networks as facilitators of transatlantic transfer of politico-
legal concepts. For example, to give attention to the actors in turn entails that it is
insufficient to assume that American actors proposed American politico-legal concepts
for the draft treaty, while French actors proposed French concepts. Such an assumption
for cultural transfer Johannes Paulmann, 'Internationaler Vergleich und interkultureller
Transfer. Zwei Forschungsansatze zur europaischen Geschichte des 18. bis 20.
Jahrhunderts', in: Historische Zeitschrift, vol. 267, no. 3 (1998), pp. 649-85; and
Wolfgang Schmale, Historische Komparatistik und Kulturtransfer.
Europageschichtliche Perspekiiven fur die Landesgeschichte. Eine Einfuhrung unter
besonderer Berucksichtigung der sachsischen Landesgeschichte, Herausforderungen.
Historisch-politische Analysen, vol. 6, Bochum: Dieter Winkler, 1998.
98 See for example Michel Espagne, 'Die Rolle der Mittler im Kulturtransfer', in: Hans-
Jurgen Lusebrink, Rolf Reichhardt (eds.), Kulturtransfer im Epochenumbruch
Frankreich - Deutschland 1770 bis 1815, Deutsch-Franzosische Kulturbibliothek vol. 9,
no. 1, Leipzig: Leipziger Universitatsverlag 1997, pp. 309-29.
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is flawed for at least two reasons: firstly, it presupposes that there are preferences, which
are shared by all state and non-state actors of a given nationality. Ideas, concepts and
policy preferences are, however, contested in domestic politics. To give an example,
even though after World War II US foreign policy planners at large were committed to
the promotion of liberal democratic values abroad, they disagreed over the means of
how to encourage other societies to subscribe to these values. As the US post-war
flagship programme, the Marshall Plan, serves a case in point in that the economic
rationale informing the policy initiative, including the emphasis on co-operation
between government, business and labour actors to achieve more productivity, was
highly contested within US domestic politics" and also within the US foreign policy
apparatus. A cultural transfer perspective would therefore draw attention to the
importance of investigating whether certain politico-legal concepts that actors proposed
at the Schuman Plan conference were perhaps domestically contested, and why. Cultural
transfer underpins the notion that sometimes actors engage in transnational or
transatlantic coalition building in order to realize policy preferences they failed to
realize in their respective domestic scenes. In this context, for example, it is significant
to understand the development of anti-trust policy in contemporary Europe to assess the
role of transatlantic policy networks at the conference in this policy area.
The assumption that actors propose concepts associated with their nationality,
secondly, is deeply ahistorical in ignoring that actors have experiences that shape their
ideas and preferences and develop over time. For example, actors, individually and
99 David Ekbladh, "'Mr. TVA": Grass-Roots Development, David Lilienthal, and the
Rise and Fall of the Tennessee Valley Authority as a Symbol for U.S. Overseas
Development, 1933-1973', in: Diplomatic History, vol. 26, no. 3 (2002), pp. 335-74,
here p. 348; Hogan, Marshall Plan, pp. 5-25.
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collectively, acquire knowledge of other cultures through experiences such as
emigration, political imprisonment in times of war, or participation in bi-Iateral
exchange programmes. Such experiences lead to the partial socialization in another
culture.l " To explain the preferences that actors express, therefore, the logic of cultural
transfer requires to some extent adopting a diachronic perspective. Crucially, this entails
going back before the divide of 1945, which was not a 'zero hour' for Europe, but
appears as such in Lundestad's empire approach and political science approaches to
explaining European integration.l'" The question of how much emphasis should be
placed on the post-1945 development and on American influence is far from resolved,
which is evidenced, for example, by the debate on the understanding of the German
version of capitalism.i'" Finally, as a result of socialization, actors can develop a variety
of patterns of identification, which are not necessarily restricted to the national pattern.
1.6 Chapter structure
The thesis first will explore the formation, scope, structures, and functioning of
transatlantic policy networks at the Schuman Plan conference, while also considering
the boundaries of such transatlantic co-operation (chapter 2). In two case studies the
100 Drawing on socialization, while conceptually indebted to Americanization and
Westernization, are Angster, Konsenskapitalismus; and Alfons Sollner, 'Normative
Verwestlichung. Der EinfluB der Remigranten auf die politische Kultur der fruhen
Bundesrepublik', in: Bude Greiner (eds.), Westbindungen, pp. 72-92.
101 Werner Abelshauser, for example, has drawn attention to such continuities in
The Dynamics of German Industry: Germany's Path Toward the New Economy and the
American Challenge, Oxford, New York: Berghahn Books 2005 [German 2003].
102 Volker Berghahn, 'Das "deutsche Kapitalismus-Modell" in Geschichte und
Geschichtswissenschaft', in: Volker Berghahn, Sigurt Vitols (eds.), Gibt es einen
deutschen Kapitalismus? Tradition und globale Perspektive der sozialen
Marktwirtschafi, Frankfurt a. M., New York: Campus, 2006, pp. 25-43.
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thesis will then investigate the impact of transatlantic policy networks in the specific
policy areas of the institutional set-up (chapter 3) and the anti-trust provisions (chapter
4). Whereas the assessment of the transatlantic policy networks draws primarily on the
network concept, the two case studies are informed by the cultural transfer concept.
Two arguments in particular support the choice of the two case studies. Firstly,
in a transatlantic context, the formation of supranational European institutions and a free
competitive market economy formed the cornerstones of US post-war policy in Europe.
Secondly, the ECSC treaty created the institutional template for European integration,
although sectoral integration through the coal and steel pool did not lead directly to
horizontal integration in the form of a customs union in the EEC in 1957-58. The
institutions that transatlantic policy networks helped to establish in 1950-51 can be
regarded as the precursors of the institutions of the contemporary EU. Transatlantic co-
operation in the policy area of the institutional set-up therefore created important path
dependencies for the European integration process. The same holds true for anti-trust
policy. The anti-trust provisions of the ECSC treaty represented the introduction of the
first supranational European anti-trust law. Even more importantly from a long-term
perspective, the competition policy of the EEC contributed to facilitating the realization
of the broader goal of (political) European unity. While the anti-trust provisions of the
ECSC treaty provided one important model for the EEC competition rules, they also
varied as a result of the different scopes of application of the two treaties. Crucially,
however, EEC competition policy ultimately came to play a crucial role in the European
integration process and in the construction of a common market.
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1.7 Source material
To demonstrate how transatlantic policy networks contributed to the drafting of the
ECSC treaty and the formation of core Europe and avoid the pitfalls of existing
historiography, the thesis is based on a multinational and multi-archival approach.
Sources from archives in France, Germany, the US as well as the Historical Archives of
the EU and the Jean Monnet Foundation, based in Italy and Switzerland, respectively,
are explored. Archival research focuses on France, Germany and the United States for
two reasons: firstly, the French government initiative highlighted the significance of
Franco-German rapprochement. Secondly, the instructions, which the US Department of
State passed on to US foreign policy officials shortly after the opening of the Schuman
Plan conference, indicated that informal arrangements with the French and German
governments should be made whereby US officials in Paris and Bonn would be
regularly informed about the proceedings as well as forwarded drafts of the treaty.103
The thesis proposes to re-examine the governmental records on the Schuman
Plan conference with new research questions informed by the network and cultural
transfer concepts. These questions will be applied equally to select private papers of
actors. In particular, the correspondence and diaries of actors have the potential to
further shed light on the links between actors that are sometimes difficult to demonstrate
on the basis of official records alone. Moreover, the private papers of additional actors,
predominantly policy experts, whose influence has not been explored in connection with
the Schuman Plan before, will be integrated, as will interviews with these actors, and
103Department of State to certain American diplomatic officers, 2 June 1950, National
Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Central Decimal Files (RG 59),
850.33/6-250.
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their autobiographical writings. An approach that focuses on the interaction between
state and non-state actors has great potential to advance our understanding of the
formation of core Europe. It is anticipated that the informality of contacts between
actors might prove challenging with respect to written sources and where appropriate,
this aspect will be discussed in the empirical chapters and will be formally evaluated in
the conclusions.
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2 Transatlantic policy networks at the Schuman Plan
conference
2.1 Introduction
This chapter analyzes the formation, functioning and scope of transatlantic policy
networks in the formation of core Europe at the Schuman Plan conference. In addition to
exploring in-depth informal transatlantic co-operation, the role of intra-European
transnational collaboration will be addressed. To understand the complex policy-making
process at and alongside the negotiations, it is essential to go beyond the analysis of
apparently cohesive entities such as 'France' and 'Germany'. It will be demonstrated
that this view is insufficient from a transatlantic and a transnational perspective that
focuses on individual and collective policy actors and considers the framework of
institutional and previously established patterns of collaboration, which provided the
framework for their operation in 1950-51. This chapter therefore contributes to
deconstructing a predominantly intergovernmental explanation of the Schuman Plan
negotiations as a bargaining process driven firstly by national or domestically derived
(economic) interests.l'"
To describe and analyze informal transatlantic co-operation at the Schuman Plan
conference it is necessary to outline the context of formal transatlantic collaboration in
post-World War II Europe. Without doubt 1945 marked a turning point in transatlantic
relations between the US government and the governments of European states.
Accordingly, the framework for the formation and operation of transatlantic policy
104 Cf. Milward, The Reconstruction.
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networks differed from that of previous periods. While the conditions after World War
II were favourable to the formation of transatlantic policy networks at the Schuman Plan
conference they did not originate in 1945. The unique circumstances of the immediate
post-war period, however, gave rise to an especially increased density of contacts
between American and European actors at a number of levels. Two factors accounted
for this density. Firstly, and most importantly, the US government committed itself to
staying involved in Europe after the end of World War II. Secondly, because of the
ongoing presence of US institutions and officials in western Europe, previously existing
relationships between individual American and European actors flourished. The US
government's commitment to staying in Europe can be tied to its broader objective to
democratize and 're-educate' European societies, in particular that of defeated
Gerrnany.l'" While the US government's involvement in propagating their politico-
economic model abroad originated in the aftermath of World War I, in the early Cold
War, growing concern with security policy was reflected in the increasing importance
attached to the promotion of a democratic and capitalist society model.l'" Accordingly,
US governmental agencies and officials in the US and Europe were engaged in
promoting democratic values and a pluralistic society model in the American style. By
IDS See for example Tony Smith, America's Mission. The United States and the
Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1994, pp. 146-76; cf. further Richard Aldrich, The Hidden Hand.
Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence, Woodstock, New York: The
Overlook Press, 2002; Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars; Michael
Hochgeschwender, Freiheit in der Offensive? Der Kongrefi fur kulturelle Freiheit,
Munich: Oldenbourg, 1998.
106 Frank Schumacher, Kalter Krieg und Propaganda. Die USA, der Kampfum die
Weltmeinung und die ideelle Westbindung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 1945-1955,
Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier, 2000, pp. 41-49.
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the same token, the US government controlled the promotion of a specific American
self-image.
Two major US policies provided an important backbone for informal
transatlantic co-operation during the Schuman Plan negotiations: the Marshall Plan and
various policies subsumed under the US occupation policy for Germany. To administer
and implement these policies, new governmental organizations were established. These
organizations in tum formed the basis for transatlantic co-operation and ultimately,
served as one important source for policy network formation at the Schuman Plan
conference. To explore the conditions for network formation it is therefore necessary to
sketch the governmental organizations that administered the Marshall Plan and US
occupation policies in Germany (2.2). Against this backdrop, one transatlantic policy
network that was centred at the US Embassy in Paris will be identified and analyzed
(2.3). To understand the role that Monnet and McCloy played for the formation and
operation for this policy network, the next sub-chapter will deal with the multiple
functions of these two transatlantic policy entrepreneurs (2.4). At the same time, this
sub-chapter provides the link between the policy network centred at the US Embassy
and further actors handling the Schuman Plan within the larger US foreign policy
system. The investigation of the US foreign policy system helps not only to identify
further US governmental actors who played a role in the negotiations and transatlantic
links, which have not been acknowledged in literature, but also to sketch the boundaries
for transatlantic co-operation and policy network formation (2.5, 2.6). A second core
policy network, composed predominantly of academic experts, was closely affiliated
with the German delegation (2.7). By focusing, in tum, on the officially designated
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conference working groups, the notion that specific forms of policy expertise were
marginalized for specific reasons will be analyzed. What emerges is a refined picture of
policy- and decision-making at the Schuman Plan conference, which lastly will be
contextualized within the broader framework of societal support for the French
government's initiative of9 May 1950 (2.8).
2.2 A framework for transatlantic policy network formation:
US agencies in post-war Europe
The Marshall Plan represented the US government's most visible and comprehensive
attempt at promoting the political and economic integration of (western) Europe. In a
speech at Harvard University on 5 June 1947, US Secretary of State George C. Marshall
first publicized the idea of a US supported European recovery programme. Marshall did
not present a ready-made plan, but emphasized that the Europeans needed to take the
initiative: to receive American aid, Europeans were to co-operate and to formulate a
joint economic programme. Marshall's call was open to all European countries.
Although the Marshall Plan focused on the economic side by providing US government
loans for European reconstruction, it contained a political component. Crucially, the US
government's economic policy initiative reflected the idea that economic co-operation
between European states would create interdependency and thus economic and political
stability. At the same time, the initiative embraced restoration on the European level and
with it the idea of European integration.!"
107 For an online transcript of the Marshall speech see
http://www.america.gov/stltexttrans-
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Two organizations were set up to administer the Marshall Plan in Europe and the
US, respectively. One can argue that each of these organizations represented a potential
source for the formation of policy networks in 1950-51. Sixteen western European states
acted on Marshall's proposal for a European recovery scheme and on 16 April 1948
established the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). The
headquarters of the OEEC were set up in Paris and French official Robert Marjolin
became the organization's first secretary general. The OEEC was instrumental in
assessing European requirements for US aid and devising a system for regular
consultation. However, as an intergovernmental organization, the OEEC did not
integrate the European economies as the Truman government had hoped and fell short
of fulfilling its aspirations to truly advance European integration. The government of the
United Kingdom (UK), in particular, was not prepared to compromise sovereignty to
create a European customs union or a federation.l'"
The partner organization of the OEEC was the Economic Cooperation
Administration (ECA). Also founded in April 1948, the ECA was based in Washington
and managed the Marshall Plan on the US side. The ECA and its chief administrator
(1948-50), Paul G. Hoffman, promoted the unification of European markets through the
OEEC as the basis for a stable western Europe:
[I]f with the help of ECA, OEEC grows into an effective instrumentality for
European economic unity during the Marshall Plan period, further integration of
english/2007/May/20070521 I53224MVyelwarCO.4675867.html (accessed 1March
2008).
108 Cf. Hogan, The Marshall Plan; Milward, The Reconstruction, chapter 3, pp. 90-125;
cf. also the comprehensive accounts of Gerard Bossuat, La France, I 'aide amertcaine et
la construction europeenne, 1944-1954,2 vols, Paris: Comite pour I'Histoire
Economique et Financiere, 1992; and idem., L 'Europe occidentale a /'heure americaine.
Le Plan Marshall et l'unite europeenne 1945-52, Paris: Editions Complexes, 1994.
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the free nations along political and defense lines, as well as economic, might
naturally follow.i'"
Another institution created within the framework of the Marshall Plan, which had the
potential to facilitate the formation of policy networks was the Office of the Special
Representative to Europe (OSR). The OSR was at the top of the ECA administration in
Europe and headed by the Special Representative to Europe (who had the rank of
ambassador), a position first held by the former US Ambassador to the Soviet Union
(1943-6) and the UK (1946) and former Secretary of Commerce (1946-8), Averall
Harriman (1948-50).
Also belonging to the administrative framework of the ECA were the individual
ECA missions in the recipient states of Marshall Plan aid. One such ECA mission came
to be particularly significant as a source for network formation at the Schuman Plan
conference: the ECA mission to France. Crucially, in France the implementation of the
European-wide recovery programme of the Marshall Plan created institutional links with
the Commissariat general du plan, the French Planning Commission. This national
agency was responsible for implementing the Plan de modernisation et d'equipement de
l'Union francaise, the French national programme for modernization and reconstruction,
which is sometimes also referred to as Monnet Plan or French Plan. The programme was
proposed in 1945 by Monnet and was implemented from 1947-52. An arrangement for
industrial modernization, the Monnet Plan concentrated on six 'basic' sectors of the
economy: coal, iron and steel, electricity, cement, agricultural machinery and
109 Letter Hoffman to Edward Weeks, Editor, Atlantic Monthly, 25 January 1949,
Personal papers Paul G. Hoffman, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Box 2.
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transport.':" Starting in 1948, the Monnet Plan was financed by capital made available
to the French government under the Marshall Plan. As a result, this funding arrangement
required regular consultations between ECA and OEEC officials with the administrators
of the French Planning Commission.
An equally important source for the formation of transatlantic policy networks
was the US occupation administration in Germany. US occupation policies for the
reorganization of the German heavy industries even provided a link to the Schuman Plan
conference. Jointly, the reorganization of the German heavy industries and the
democratization of German society formed the cornerstones of the US occupation
programme in Germany. With the reorganization of the heavy industries the US
government hoped to break the German potential for aggression, on the one hand, and to
establish the basis for a competitive market economy, on the other. The representatives
of the German heavy industries resisted these policies, however. Moreover, in early
1951, the successful conclusion of the Schuman Plan negotiations came to depend on
resolving the problem of the deconcentration and de-cartelization of the German heavy
industries. In other words, the Schuman Plan made the implementation of German
deconcentration and de-cartelization a pre-requisite for the acceptance of the draft treaty
by the negotiating parties. From the beginning on, therefore, US occupation
administration officials in Germany took an interest in the proceedings on the Schuman
Plan. In charge of the USHICOG was McCloy who in 1949 took over from General
Lucius D. Clay. The transition from military to civilian government went parallel with
110 See Philippe Mioche, Le Plan Monnet. Genese et elaboration 1941-1947, Paris:
Publications de la Sorbonne, 1987; Irwin Wall, •Jean Monnet, the United States and the
French Economic PIan', in: Douglas Brinkley, Clifford Hackett (eds.), Jean Monnet:
The Path to European Unity, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991, pp. 86-113.
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the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany on 21 September 1949. The
Occupation Statute and the Charter of the Allied High Commission for Germany
(HICOG), which governed the relationship between the HICOG and Germany, came
into force simultaneously. I I I Further, High Commissioner McCloy served as the head of
the ECA mission in Germany.112
Another institution that necessitated intergovernmental consultations between
US and European actors was the International Authority on the Ruhr (JAR). Created in
1949 to allocate the coal, coke and steel of the Ruhr region, the IAR just like the
HICOG provided a forum for interaction between state actors on questions regarding the
future economy of Germany and therefore also represented a potential source for policy
network formation. In the HICOG and the IAR, US officials co-operated with the
representatives of the French and the UK governments.
In sum, the agencies created in the aftermath of World War II underline that
1945 represented a turning point in transatlantic governmental relations. A network of
dense and intensified formal transatlantic collaboration served as the backbone for more
informal transatlantic co-operation at the Schuman Plan conference. The US
government's commitment to staying in Europe, therefore, provided a framework, in
which previously existing, partly informal relationships between individual American
and European actors were activated. To grasp what happened at the interface of formal
III I st Quarterly Report on Germany, 21 September-31 December 1949,21 September
1949, in: Erika J. Fischer, Heinz-D. Fischer (eds.), John McCloy. An American Architect
of Postwar Germany. Profiles of a Trans-Atlantic Leader and Communicator, Frankfurt
et.a!.: Peter Lang, 1994, pp. 321-324; Elmer Plischke, History of the Allied High
Commission for Germany: Its Establishment, Structure and Procedures, Bonn:
Historical Division, U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1951, pp. 1-28.
112 Schwartz, America IS Germany, pp. 40-2.
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and informal transatlantic co-operation, the following detailed analysis of the activities
of individual actors constituting a working group centred at the US Embassy in Paris is
informed by three considerations. Firstly, a number of shared experiences, including the
partial US socialization of European actors, the collective experience of World War II
and the shared professional background of actors, provided crucial incentives for
informal co-operation. Secondly, actors who had co-operated in the inter-war period and
during World War II had established various forms of 'interpersonal trust' 113 and now
were able to resume previous working relations. Finally, the commitment to advance
European integration served as a shared policy paradigm for actors at the Schuman Plan
conference.
2.3 A core policy network: the US Embassy working group
The 'US Embassy working group' was one of two transatlantic policy networks that
contributed significantly to the treaty negotiations. An informal, but highly integrated
and stable policy network, the working group was made up of individual US actors
William Tomlinson, Stanley Cleveland, Robert Bowie and George Ball and French
actors Pierre Uri, Etienne Hirsch and Paul Reuter. Among others, these state and non-
state actors directly contributed to policy-making on the institutional framework and
more importantly, the anti-trust provisions of the ECSC treaty. Accordingly, the US
Embassy working group was cross-sectoral in scope, which to some extent reflected the
113 Cf. for an introduction into the varying notions of 'trust' and the relevant social
science literature Marco Verweij, 'Four Wrongs Can Make a Right: From Stocks of
Social Capital to Competing Ways of Life', in: Politics & Policy, vol. 35, no. 3 (2007),
pp. 464-95, here esp. pp. 470-1.
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intimate connection between political and economic objectives of contemporary US
foreign policy programmes. But who were these actors and how did they become part of
the policy network?
A pivotal role in the US Embassy working group was assumed by Tomlinson.l "
Since 1948, he had represented the US Treasury in the US Embassy in Paris. At the
same time, Tomlinson was the Director of Financial and Trade Affairs for the ECA
mission to France and a financial advisor as well as a close collaborator of US
Ambassador David E. Bruce. Bruce, previously the head of the ECA mission to France
(1948-49), in a telegramme of 18 August 1950 referred to Tomlinson as the man who
' ... has been handling [the] question of [the] Schuman Plan here' .115 Cleveland, who had
started working under Tomlinson as one of the members of a combined State
Department-ECA-Treasury group in the autumn of 1949, in an interview, emphasized
that Tomlinson was able to work with everyone. 116 The involvement of Tomlinson and
Cleveland in the Schuman Plan negotiations was backgrounded by the established
working patterns between the ECA mission to France and the French Planning
Commission. As key officials in the US administration in France, Bruce and Tomlinson
collaborated with Commissioner General Monnet.
During the conference, Tomlinson was in contact with important members of the
official delegations, among them Monnet who practically headed the French
114 For Tomlinson see Sherrill Brown Wells, 'Monnet and "The Insiders": Nathan,
Tomlinson, Bowie and Schaetzel', in: Clifford Hackett (ed.), Monnet and the
Americans, pp. 198-228, here pp. 204-11.
I IS Telegramme Bruce to Secretary of State, 18 August 1950, NARA, RG 59, 850.33/8-
2450.
116 Interview Stanley Cleveland, Leonard Tennyson, 12 June 1981, USA, Fondation
Jean Monnet pour l'Europe (FJM).
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delegation; 117 the Belgian head of delegation Max Suetens; 118 and diplomat Ulrich von
Marchtaler, the Secretary to the German delegation.'!" In meetings with these European
actors, Tomlinson stressed the significance that the US government attached to the
supranational principle and the introduction of a free market economy in the area of coal
and steel. In March 1951, Tomlinson prepared two memoranda regarding the High
Authority's financial powers and the possibility to make available ECA funds to the
Schuman Plan, respectlvely.P" Once the ECSC was established in 1952, Tomlinson
worked as deputy US Special Representative to the High Authority directly under
Bruce.121 Contrary to Tomlinson, Cleveland had not co-operated with Monnet, when
they met on 9 May 1950 following the Schuman Plan declaration that Cleveland then
translated into English.122 At the negotiations, Cleveland functioned as the essential link
to the wider US foreign policy apparatus and kept Bruce informed on the progress of the
proceedings.i"
117 Note, 19 July 1950, FJM, Personal papers Jean Monnet, Le plan Schuman (AMG),
5/6/1.
118 Telegramme Bruce to Secretary of State, 9 December 1950, NARA, RG 59,
850.33/12-950.
119 Gesprachsaufzeichnung Marchtaler fUrHallstein, 13 November 1950, Politisches
Archiv des Auswartigen Amtes (PA AA), Sekretariat fllr Fragen des Schuman Plans (B
15)114.
120 Memoranda, 22 and 24 March 1951, FJM, AMG 26/3/23bis and AMG 26/3/23ter.
Cf. also the two memoranda AMG 15/4/4 and 15/4/6 in the source edition Jean Monnet,
Robert Schuman Correspondance 1947-1953, Lausanne: Fondation Jean Monnet pour
l'Europe, 1986, pp. 109-12.
121 Cf. Brown Wells, 'Monnet and "The Insiders"', p. 210. The title 'special
representative' was chosen because US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles opposed
the idea of having more' ambassadors' to Europe.
122 Interview Cleveland.
123 See for example Cleveland to the Ambassador, Report of the Conference of Six
Working Group on Wages and Social Questions, 16 August 1950, NARA, Records of
the Special Representative in Europe (RG 469), Office of the General Counsel, Subject
Files 1948-53, 1950-53, Box 30.
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Tomlinson and Cleveland co-operated closely with key members of the French
delegation Uri and Hirsch, both of whom were top officials in the French Planning
Commission. Remembering their discussions, Cleveland described Hirsch as a 'quiet,
contemplative, wise man' and Uri as 'not always wise, [but] absolutely brilliant'v" A
trained ingenieur civil des mines, or mining engineer, Hirsch had been active in the
resistance against the Vichy regime and the German occupation and first met Monnet in
1943, when the latter served as the Chairman of the Anglo-French Coordinating
Committee in London. Together Hirsch and Monnet contributed to preparing the
organization of supplies for France after the liberation.i" On behalf of the French
Supply Council, Hirsch in April 1944 accompanied Monnet to Washington.V" As head
of the technical division in the French Planning Commission (1946-49) Hirsch co-
ordinated the co-operation of the various committees, which were set up for
modernization, and was involved in drawing up the first modernization plan for France.
From 1949-52 he served as deputy commissioner general. During the inter-state
conference Hirsch provided a central link to French domestic policy-making and was
responsible for handling the French industry representatives. Among others, these
industrialists included Jules Aubrun, President of the Charnbre Syndicale de la
Siderurgie, the Coal and Steel Union, and Rene Damien of the Union siderurgique du
Nord de la France, the Northern chapter of the Coal and Steel Union. Hirsch also
124 Interview Cleveland.
125 Catherine Previti Allaire, 'Les archives d'Etienne Hirsch a Florence. Sources d'un
itineraire europeen', www.eui.eu/ECArchives/pdf/HIRSCH2.pdf(accessed 1March
2008), 1996, here pp. 3-8. See also Etienne Hirsch, Ainsi va la vie, Lausanne: Centre de
Recherches Europeennes, 1988.
126 Visa for the US, 13-25 April 1944, Historical Archives of the European Union
(HAEU), Personal papers Etienne Hirsch (EH) 65.
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collaborated with Paul Gardent, a fellow delegation member as well as member of the
Cabinet of the French Minister for Industry and Commerce Jean-Marie Louvel, in the
Hirsch-Gardent Committee. Composed of representatives of the Ministry of Industry
and Commerce, the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs and the Planning
Commission the committee in a series of meetings between December 1950 and
February 1951 explored the effects of the Schuman Plan on the French coal and steel
industry.F'
Uri had joined the Planning Commission in 1947 as an economic and financial
expert. His decision to actively contribute to the preservation of peace and prosperity
after World War II reflected a growing disillusionment with the limited impact of
academics on policy-making. Following a study visit to Princeton University.!" Uri
taught philosophy at school as well as at the University of Reims until 1940 when the
Vichy Regime issued the Decret contre les Juifs, the decree that excluded Jews from
certain professions. On losing the state permission to teach Uri took up the study of
economlcs.V" From 1947 to 1951 he held a professorship at the French School for
Public Administration. Just like Hirsch, Uri was a valued fellow worker of Monnet at
the Planning Commission. Together Hirsch and Uri were involved in drafting the
original Schuman Plan declaration in April 1950, reflecting their well-established
working relationship with Monnet.
127 Proces-verbal de la reunion, 29 December 1950, Archives nationales (AN), Archives
du Commissariat du Plan (81 AJ) 135, Folder 17; Rapport sur les traveaux du Comite
Hirsch-Gardent, 21 February 1951, ibid.
128 Pierre Uri, Penser pour l'action. Unfondateur de /'Europe, Paris: Odile Jacob, 1991,
fR·21-2.
9 Katja Seidel, 'Gestalten statt Verwalten: Der Beitrag von Europabeamten zur
europaischen Integration', in: Historische Mitteilungen, vol. 18 (2005), pp. 136-49, here
p.137.
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Moreover, through their work for the Planning Commission, Hirsch and Uri had
their own set of external contacts. In an OEEC meeting in 1948, for example, they met
with Dirk Spierenburg who at the Schuman Plan conference was the head of the Dutch
delegation.P'' Both Hirsch and Uri played a vital role in the conference working groups
that were set up to provide an effective structure for consultations among experts outside
the meetings of national delegations.!" Hirsch chaired the working group on prices,
production and investments, in which Uri also participated. Uri, moreover, was a
member of the working group on commercial policy and managed the group on salaries
and social questions. He also participated in meetings with German and US actors on the
de-cartelization and deconcentration of the Ruhr.132
Another member of the working group, Reuter, was also involved in drafting the
Schuman Plan declaration with Uri and Hirsch.J33 Reuter participated in the negotiations
on behalf of the French delegation until October 1950134 and chaired the sub-committee
of legal experts that assisted the conference working group on institutions. Reuter's
most significant contribution to the draft treaty, however, occurred during the period of
agenda setting before the opening of the conference on 20 June 1950.135 A professor of
international law at Aix-en-Provence and Paris and a legal advisor to the French Foreign
130 Groupe de travail du programme a Long Terme (France), OEEC, 7 November 1948,
HAEU, EH 9. Uri is spelled Uhry in the source.
131 Conversations sur Ie plan Schuman: Seance restreinte du mardi apres-rnidi, 4 July
1950, AN 81, AJ 131, Folder 2.
132 Cf. various documents in AN 81, AJ 137, Folder 3.
133 On Reuter see Antonin Cohen, 'Le plan Schuman de Paul Reuter. Entre comrnunaute
nationale et federation europeenne', in: Revue francaise de science politique, vol. 48,
no. 5 (1998), pp. 645-63.
134 Interview Paul Reuter, Antoine Mares, 7 August 1980, France, FJM.
135 Paul Reuter, Le schema de traite, 16 May 1950, FJM, AMG 2/4/3; idem.,
Observations sur le schema de traite, 14 June 1950, FJM, AMG 2/4/16.
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Ministry, Reuter had met Monnet in 1944 through the prominent French Christian
democrat Pierre-Henri Teitgen.l'" A former Resistance member Teitgen belonged to the
circles around Robert Schuman and was affiliated with the law faculty at Nantes. After
World War II, Teitgen became intimately involved in the drafting and the political
engineering of the European Convention of Human Rights in the Council of Europe,
which he regarded the most appropriate forum for advancing European integration.l "
Later, Reuter was in touch directly with Schuman, too.138 Whilst Reuter apparently did
not leave any personal papers, in the records explored no evidence could be found to
support the notion that Reuter either consulted academic colleagues or drew on previous
professional contacts with regard to the Schuman Plan negotiations. Moreover, in
contrast to Tomlinson, Cleveland, Uri and Hirsch, Reuter was little established in the
Paris environment of intergovernmental meetings. In October 1950, Maurice Lagrange,
a lawyer at the French Conseil d'Etat, took over from Reuter his function as a legal
expert to the French delegation. In an interview many years later Lagrange remembered
to have become involved in the Schuman Plan on 12 October 1950.139 A document,
which listed a number of documents to be composed for the French government until 23
June 1950, however, already assigned to Lagrange the institutional part.""
136 Interview Reuter.
137 Mikael Rask Madsen, 'From Cold War Instrument to Supreme European Court: The
European Court of Human Rights at the Crossroads of International and National Law
and Politics', in: Law&Social Inquiry, vol. 32, no. 1 (2007), pp. 137-59, here pp. 141-3.
138 Letter Reuter to Schuman, 30 August 1952, FJM, Personal papers Robert Schuman,
3/1/327.
139 Interview Maurice Lagrange, Antoine Mares, 28 September 1980, France, FJM.
140 Expose des motives, Documents to be written for the government until 23 June 1950,
undated, FJM, AMG 2/2/3bis.
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American lawyer Ball came to be introduced into the US Embassy working
group through his earlier and continuous collaboration with Monnet. Ball and Monnet
had first met in 1942 or 1943 when Ball was the operating head of the General
Counsel's Office of the Lend Lease administration and Monnet was working with the
British Supply Council.141 Ball's origins were in the American Midwest, in Des Moines,
Iowa, and he had obtained both his bachelor and law degrees from a Midwestern
institution, Northwestern University in Illinois. Following his attachment to the Farm
Credit Administration and then the US Treasury, where he gained first- hand experience
with the New Deal policies that he championed, Ball returned to the Midwest to practice
law. However, his friend, the lawyer and future Democratic presidential candidate Adlai
Stevenson convinced Ball to return to Washington during the war.142 In 1945, after an
assignment as a civilian member on the board of the US Strategic Bombing Survey,
whose task it was to evaluate the effectiveness of the Allied air strikes, Ball served
under Monnet as general counsel of the French Supply Council. On behalf of the French
government, Monnet retained Ball's law firm Cleary, Gottlieb, Steel and Hamilton.143 In
his memoirs, Ball recounts how he became involved in the Schuman Plan negotiations:
I felt relieved rather than surprised when Monnet telephoned me on June 18 with
his familiar request: "Be here tomorrow." Because my plane was delayed, I did
not arrive until evening at the rue de Martignac, where I found Monnet, Pierre
Uri, ." Etienne Hirsch, .. and Professor Paul Reuter.!"
141 David L. DiLeo, 'Catch the Night Plane for Paris: George Ball and Jean Monnet', in:
Hackett (ed.), Monnet and the Americans, pp. 141-169, here p. 144.
142 Cf. George Ball, The Past has Another Pattern. Memoirs. New York and London: W.
W. Norton & Company, 1982, pp. 1-68.
143 Ibid. pp. 69-83, esp. p. 77; cf. also Memorandum from Mr. George W. Ball, General
Counsel, to the President of the French Supply Council [Leon Kaplan] concerning
Export-Import Bank loan agreement, 18 Oct 1945, FJM, Personal papers Jean Monnet,
Le plan de modernisation (AMF) 3/3/12.
144 Ball, The Past, p. 84.
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18, rue de Martignac was the seat of the French Planning Commission where most
official meetings of the Schuman Plan conference took place. At the time of the
negotiations, Ball was commuting between Paris and New York on behalf of his law
firm. His correspondence and diaries indicate that Ball was involved with among others,
Hirsch, Uri and Reuter, in working on the institutional framework (July 1950) and on
the anti-trust articles (November-December 1950).145
Ball's presence at the negotiations was not officially recognized during the
earlier part of the conference. This had changed, however, by the time Ball returned to
Europe in late October 1950: 'I am here officially this time as my designation as an
advisor to the French Delegation was cleared with Mr. Schuman before my departure
from the States' .146 Contrary to Tomlinson and Cleveland, therefore, Ball was not
affiliated with the US government. However, Ball attempted to use the fact that he was
American to act as a broker for the French government. On 7 September 1950, Ball
visited Wayne G. Jackson, the State Department official in charge for UK and Ireland
Affairs, to convey the French government's concerns regarding a potential decision to
rearm Germany, which was triggered by the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June
1950. Jackson was part of the US delegation preparing the scheduled Council of Foreign
Ministers' conference in New York in September 1950 in the course of which US
145Diaries 1950, Personal papers George Ball, Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton
University,43.
146Ball to Leo Gottlieb, 28 November 1950, ibid.; Diaries 1950, ibid.
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Secretary of State Dean Acheson would indeed propose to bring a rearmed Federal
Republic into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).147
Another member of the US Embassy working group was the head of the Office
of the General Counsel of the US High Commissioner for Germany (1950-52), Harvard
law professor Robert R. Bowie. A graduate of economics (Princeton) and law (Harvard),
Bowie had decided against a Wall Street career and instead returned to his hometown
Baltimore to practice law, before in 1942 he got involved with the Legal Division of the
Pentagon, the US Defense Department. Serving under General Clay, Bowie for the first
time visited Germany in 1945-46 and after leaving the Army joined the faculty at
Harvard in 1946. He owed his appointment to the US High Commission to Ben Shute, a
member of the team of High Commissioner McCloy, who had recommended him. Shute
had been Bowie's classmate at Harvard Law School and a collaborator for the Harvard
Law Review.l'" After McCloy had approached him in August 1949,149Bowie negotiated
a leave of absence from his teaching duties at Harvard Law School and left for Germany
in early 1950.150As head of the Office of the General Counsel, Bowie was, among
others, in charge of the reorganization of the German heavy industries. As early as 30
June 1950, Bowie drafted a memorandum regarding the 24 June 1950 working
147Office memorandum Wayne G. Jackson to G.W. Perkins, 7 September 1950, NARA,
RG 59, 850.33/9-750.
148Interview Robert R. Bowie, Brigitte Leucht, 13 July 1999, Baltimore, MD, USA.
149Letter Bowie to McCloy, 16 September 1949, Personal papers John McCloy,
Archives and Special Collections, Amherst College Library, HICOG
Correspondence/+ HC5/#28.
150Dean Erwin N. Griswold to HICOG, McLain, 16 September 1949, Personal papers
McCloy, 13B/+HC5/#28; Bowie's leave of absence was in fact extended to 1 December
1951. See Associate Dean David F. Cavers to John J. McCloy, 7 August 1951, ibid. and
for the reply John J. McCloy to Associate Dean David F. Cavers, 16 August 1951, ibid.
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document the French delegation presented to the other delegations.!" According to
McCloy, Bowie returned from Paris 'after full discussion with Monnet in which
Tomlinson participated ... ' 152 Bowie contributed to the treaty by preparing a draft for the
anti-trust articles. In a letter to McCloy, George Radin, an attorney for the Deutscher
Kohlenverkauf (DKV), the agency centralizing the sales of Ruhr coal, complained about
the negative consequences for Germany of Bowie's involvement in the Schuman
Plan.153 Further, Bowie together with McCloy played a vital part in the successful
conclusion of the Schuman Plan through facilitating the resolution of the problem of
Germany's heavy industries (January-March 1951).
In summary, in the US Embassy working group US state and non-state actors co-
operated with French actors on the draft treaty. The policy network was composed
predominantly of actors who, at the time of the Schuman Plan conference, were
affiliated with governmental agencies engaged in the reconstruction of post-war Europe
and the occupation of post-war Germany. With the exception of Ball - who functions as
the group's only non-state actor - all individual actors presented here were at the time of
the negotiations working for a US or French governmental agency. While Ball had
previously worked for the US government, this was not the case in 1950-51. However,
empirical evidence on the US Embassy working group indicates the limited usefulness
of the distinction between state and non-state actors, at least for the historical analysis.
lSI Memorandum Tomlinson to Stokes, 30 June 1950, NARA, RG 469, OSR, Box 30.
152 Telegramme McCloy to Secretary of State, 3 July 1950, NARA, RG 59, 850.33/7-
350; Telegramme McCloy to Secretary of State, 9 December 1950: 'Bowie participated
informally', NARA, RG 59,850.33/12-950.
153 Letter Radin to Geoffrey Lewis, Bureau of German Affairs, 12 January 1951, and
attached copy of Letter Radin to McCloy, 11 December 1950, NARA, RG 59, 850.33/1-
1251.
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Actors might have been affiliated with a governmental agency but it would be
oversimplifying the matter to argue that they were necessarily and always acting on
behalf of these agencies. In contrast, it appears much more helpful to assert that the US
Embassy working group shared important characteristics of a distinct type of a policy
community, namely an epistemic or expert community.154 Such an assertion underlines
that individual actors became part of the policy network not only because of their
affiliation with a governmental agency, but also as a result of their expertise. For
example, it was Bowie's expertise that provided the basis for his appointment as head of
McCloy's Office of the General Counsel. The notion of the expert community is further
underscored by the fact that in 1950-51 Bowie, Reuter and Uri were affiliated with an
academic institution.
Policy expertise is one key variable that helps explain the formation and
operation of the US Embassy working group. Besides, the fact that French actors Hirsch,
Monnet and Uri, had first-hand experience in the US, where they had been partially
socialized, needs to be considered, especially with regard to the smooth operation of this
transatlantic policy network. Almost certainly, these French actors were well equipped
to negotiate with US actors although primary sources are silent on the actual advantage
or impact of this expertise in the negotiations. Lastly, that the individual actors of the
US Embassy working group collaborated and directly contributed to the draft treaty was
in part the result of the initiative of Monnet and McCloy whose role in the negotiations
will now be assessed.
154Cf. Haas, ' Introduction' .
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2.4 Policy entrepreneurs: Monnet and McCloy
At the Schuman Plan conference, Monnet and McCloy fulfilled two distinct functions.
They, firstly, acted as facilitators for the US Embassy working group by supporting the
co-operation of individual actors with policy expertise. Monnet in his wartime jobs -
with the Anglo-French Coordinating Committee in London, the British Supply Council
in Washington and the French Supply Council- had co-operated with Hirsch, Ball and
Reuter. Uri and Monnet had worked together in the French Planning Commission,
which in tum provided the institutional basis for the collaboration with Tomlinson and
Bruce. McCloy supported Bowie's involvement. Consequently, the informal policy
network owed its existence not only to the framework of US policy-making in western
Europe after 1945, but also to the leadership of Monnet and McCloy.
From a methodological perspective, it is not possible to establish the variable
that was decisive for the formation of the policy network: the policy expertise of its
participants, the framework of institutionalized patterns of co-operation between various
governmental agencies or the facilitating role of Monnet and McCloy. If one asked the
question of whether the policy network would have developed without the initiative of
Monnet and McCloy, the answer would almost certainly be in the negative. However,
the same would hold true if one replaced the initiative of the two policy entrepreneurs in
this question with either one of the other two variables. It is argued, moreover, that even
if one could identify the decisive variable or, at the least, arrive at a reliable
prioritization of these variables, this would not enhance our understanding of informal
transatlantic policy-making at the Schuman Plan conference. Instead the empirical
reconstruction of these variables has supported that the notion that policy entrepreneurs
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depend on networks to put their abilities into practicel55 is crucial to understanding the
conditions for informal policy-making.
To comprehend why Monnet and McCloy initiated the formation and sustained
the operation of the policy network one needs to consider their previous professional
association. Monnet and McCloy first met at some point after December 1924 when
McCloy, a graduate of Harvard Law School, had joined the Cravath law firm. At that
time Monnet was affiliated with the New York investment bank firm Blair and
Company and specialized in corporate reorganizations. Their professional and personal
relationship intensified when McCloy represented the Cravath firm in Paris in 1930.156
Also associated with the Cravath law firm since the 1920s, was Chester Mcl.ain,
Bowie's predecessor as general counsel.P" Links of the Cravath firm to the US foreign
policy service went back to the inter-war years, however. In fact, Paul Cravath was the
first director and vice-president of the New York-based think-tank Council of Foreign
Relations (CFRS).158 Founded in 1921 the CFRS closely collaborated with US State
Department officials in the formulation of foreign policy after World War 11.159McCloy,
too, had become a member of the CFRS in 1939.
Like Monnet, McCloy in 1950 could look back on an outstanding career. During
World War II he served as Under Secretary of War to Henry Stimson and again
collaborated with Monnet. He accompanied President Truman to the Potsdam
ISSCf. Christopoulos, 'Relational Attributes', p. 758.
156Schwartz, America's Germany, p. 172.
157 Paul Hoffman to McLain, 6 April 1950, Personal papers Hoffman, Box 2.
IS8Bird, The Chairman, pp. 63, 108.
159 Cf. Michael Wala, "'Ripping Holes in the Iron Curtain": The Council on Foreign
Relations and Germany, 1945-1950', in: Diefendorf, Frohn, Ruhpieper (eds.), American
Policy, pp. 1-20.
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Conference in July 1945. From 1947-49, he held the position of first President of the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank. When
McCloy transferred from the World Bank to the USHICOG in 1949, he had contacts to
US law firms and banks as well as the CFRS, a non-governmental organization. Among
his friends in Europe were high-ranking US foreign policy officials Bruce, Harriman
and the US Ambassador to the UK, Lewis Douglas, who was married to McCloy's
sister-in-law. Moreover, in 1944 McCloy had made the acquaintance of French official
Herve Alphand.l'" As financial attache at the French Embassy in Washington, in 1940,
Alphand had also co-operated with Monnet. 161From 1945-49, Alphand headed the
economic division in the French Foreign Ministry. In 1950, he was the French
ambassador to OEEC and NATO (until 1955) as well as a member of the French
delegation to the Schuman Plan conference, at least in its early stages.162
With his professional experience, McCloy was representative of a group of
principal foreign policy actors of the Truman administration with a background in law
practice and/or business. Prominent actors with a business background included
Hoffman, Harriman and Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett (1947-49).163 At the
least, McCloy's earlier career influenced his style as High Commissioner, especially
when contrasted with that of his predecessor General Clay: whereas Clay
160Note Herve Alphand on a conversation with A. Harriman, 15 April 1949, Ministere
des affaires etrangeres (MAEF), Direction des affaires economiques et financieres,
Service de cooperation economique 1945-1966 [DE-CE], Communaute politique
europeenne [CPE], 577, Dossier general: 1948-52.
161Interview Herve Alphand, Roger Massip, 17 June 1981, FJM.
162Alphand comes up in a list dated 22 June 1950, but no longer appears in a list of
September 1950. Cf. PA AA, B 15,53 and 57, respectively.
163Eric Sevareid, Analysis of Hoffman's success in government on the leaving of
Hoffman, CBS (transcript), 25 September 1950, Personal papers Hoffman, Box 21.
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... centralized authority under himself to a great extent and personally made
decisions on a multitude of subjects, McCloy [was] primarily an executive and
administrator, choosin~ the ablest men available, delegating to them and letting
them make decisions. I 4
The minutes of the weekly USHICOG staff conferences that McCloy chaired show few
references to the Schuman Plan negotiations. Although there were links between the
negotiations and the occupation administration McCloy did not make the Schuman Plan
a USHICOG matter. In the staff meetings on 27 February and 6 March 1951, however,
McCloy reported on the problems and progress of the separate negotiations on the
reorganization of the German heavy industries.i'" When McCloy together with Bowie
helped the conclusion of these negotiations he not only acted as a facilitator. Unlike
Monnet he also directly contributed to the draft treaty.
Through working together on a number of occasions Monnet and McCloy had
accumulated social capital between them.166 Historical literature has established that
Monnet's US socialization and McCloy's European socialization were one key to their
successful co-operation.167 Further, social scientists have recently demonstrated that
social capital and policy entrepreneurship are intimately linked.168 This link certainly
applies to the interpersonal relationship of Monnet and McCloy whose initiative with
regard to the US Embassy working group was based on accumulated social capital.
164 'McCloy's "Cabinet"', Newsweek, 15 August 1949, p. 28.
165 Extracts from HICOG staff conference meetings, 1949-1950, NARA, Records of the
US High Commissioner for Germany (RG 466), US High Commissioner, John J.
McCloy.
166 Cf. Verweij, 'Four Wrongs', pp. 466-8.
167 Schroder, Jean Monnet und die amerikanische Unterstutzung: Schwartz, America's
Germany.
168 Cf. Gunnar Lind Haase Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, The Creation and
Destruction of Social Capital. Entrepreneurship, Co-operative Movements and
Institutions, Cheltenham, Northampton/MA: Edward Elgar 2004.
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Moreover, one could argue that the relationship of the two policy entrepreneurs was
shaped through 'bonding trust', a form of trust that is also referred to as 'communal' or
'relational trust' .169 In a nutshell, actors 'bond' social capital when they regard
themselves as similar and have a shared sense of identity and community.
Besides functioning as facilitators, Monnet and McCloy also fulfilled a second
function at the Schuman Plan conference. Jointly, they acted as mediators between the
US Embassy working group and high-ranking officials who exercised political
influence. Monnet and McCloy first acted as mediators in the crucial period preceding
the announcement of the Schuman Plan declaration. More specifically, they were
instrumental in establishing the favorable reaction on behalf of the US government to
the Schuman Plan proposal. En route to the Foreign Ministers' and NATO meetings in
London Acheson arrived in Paris on 7 May 1950. Later that day, Schuman introduced
the US Secretary of State and Bruce to the idea of pooling the German and French coal
and steel industries. At first, the two Americans were not impressed with the proposal.
In line with the US policy preference for supranational European integration, the scheme
seemed to counter another US policy preference, namely that for a free, competitive
market economy. In his memoirs, Acheson recounts that only through 'the patient
coaching of Monnet and McCloy', could he and Bruce be won for the plan:
All sorts of questions at once arose. To begin with, was the plan cover for a
gigantic European cartel? We became convinced that this was not the intention
of its founders and that fcrovisions to guard against this result would be
incorporated in the charter. I 0
169 See for the following distinctions in more detail Verweij, 'Four Wrongs', pp. 470-1.
170 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation. My Years in the State Department, New
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1969, p. 383. See also Telegramme Acheson to the
President and Webb, 8 May 1950, NARA, Lot files (RG 59), 396.1 LO/5-1050, FRUS
1950 III, pp. 694-5.
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Bonding trust not only characterized the relationship between Monnet and
McCloy, however. Acheson and McCloy, too, could now make use of social capital.
When Acheson worked for the State Department and McCloy for the War Department
during World War II, the two actors teamed up frequently. Like McCloy Acheson had
studied law at Harvard and had been a lawyer of international corporate law in the
1920s, although he had chosen Washington rather than New York for his practice.l7I In
their collective biography The Wise Men political journalists Walter Isaacson and Evan
Thomas have portrayed Acheson and McCloy as two of the 'architects of the American
Century' who controlled the transformation of the isolationist US foreign policy of the
inter-war period into the internationalist post-World War II policy. Other members of
the group included Harriman, Lovett, George Kennan, the author of the 'Long
telegramme'{" and architect of the US foreign policy doctrine of containment, and
Charles Bohlen, the brain behind the Marshall Plan. While Issacson and Thomas have
been criticized for their undifferentiated treatment of the Democrats' foreign policy
development and for their insufficient consideration of the latest diplomatic history
Ilterature.I" they demonstrate convincingly the scope of a network' ... connecting Wall
Street, Washington, worthy foundations, and proper clubs,.174 In any case, Acheson did
play a significant part in shaping the positive official response of the Truman
171 Walter Isaacson, Evan Thomas, The Wise Men. Six Friends and the World They
Made, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986, p. 125.
172 For excerpts of the 'Long Telegramme' see George Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950,
Boston: Little Brown, 1967, pp. 547-59.
173 Walter A. McDougall, 'Our Periclean Age: The Cold War as Collective Biography',
in: Reviews in American History, vol. 15, no. 4 (1987), pp. 686-90, here p. 689.
174 Ibid. p. 29.
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administration to the Schuman Plan proposal. That Acheson decided to go along with
the Schuman proposal was even more remarkable considering that the US Secretary of
State was a known Anglophile!" and the Schuman Plan proposal with its supranational
design highly unlikely to attract the support of the UK government. In sum, social
capital enabled McCloy and Monnet to provide the link between the US Embassy
working group, here Hirsch, Reuter, and Uri who were responsible for drafting the
declaration, and Acheson.
What is more, Monnet and McCloy's mediating function between political
decision-makers on the one hand and actors who directly contributed to the treaty on the
other suggests that there was a connection between the function of actors in the
conference and their age and/or career stage. While McCloy and Monnet were born in
1895 and 1888, respectively, the actors making up the US Embassy working group were
with the exception of Hirsch, who was born in 1901, all born after 1909: Ball and Bowie
were born in 1909, Reuter and Uri in 1911, and Tomlinson in 1918. In contrast to
Monnet and McCloy, therefore, none of these actors was old enough to have served or
even to have remembered World War I, for example. World War II on the contrary may
have provided a varied yet shared experience for all actors, were they facilitators or part
of the working group. However, since they were born in 1909 or later, younger actors
could only have progressed to a certain stage in their career development by 1950,
which determined their role in the negotiations as much as their longer-standing careers
shaped the role of McCloy and Monnet. In short, while actors at the early stages of their
careers were likely to contribute directly to the treaty, which confirms that policy
175 Ibid. pp. 133, 136.
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expertise was crucial for them to get involved in the negotiations, actors at the peak of
their careers were more likely to have facilitating and mediating functions, like Monnet
and McCloy, or to have considerable political authority like Acheson. Essentially, the
notion of the link between age, career stage and function in the Schuman Plan
conference sheds further light on the relationship between policy entrepreneurs and the
networks they depended on.
Whilst in the literature Monnet, McCloy and the individual actors of the US
Embassy working group have not been analyzed sufficiently within the wider context of
US foreign policy-making in post-World War II Europe, the significance of other actors
within the US foreign policy system has remained substantially unanalyzed and their
contribution to the positive response of the Truman administration little acknowledged.
In addition to showing the framework accounting for the prominent role of the US
Embassy working group in the conference it is necessary therefore to trace the links to
US foreign policy representatives outside this policy network.
2.5 Boundaries for transatlantic policy network formation:
civil servants and the US guidelines on the Schuman Plan
An analysis of the communication structures within the US foreign policy system sheds
new light on the formation of transatlantic policy networks. More specifically, such an
analysis promises to show how, where and by whom boundaries for the formation of
transatlantic policy networks were drawn. The development of the official US guidelines
on the Schuman Plan serves a significant case in point to explore which additional
governmental actors were handling the Schuman Plan. In response to the Schuman Plan
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declaration and the acceptance of the plan by the US government, foreign policy
officials simultaneously established necessary channels of communication and
responsibilities for implementation. From the very beginning, the US Embassy in Paris
functioned as a vital node within the foreign policy communication system.
That US representatives were well informed during all stages of the Schuman
Plan conference, including the period of agenda setting, was the result of well-
established communication between Monnet and high-ranking representatives of the US
foreign policy apparatus in Europe. In the initial period of the negotiations, moreover,
Alphand, informed US officials on the British position on the Schuman Plan.176
Alphand's role in transatlantic communication became less important when his attention
shifted to the question of German rearmament and the subsequent proposal for a
European Defence Community (EDC), which resulted from the onset of the Korean
War.I?? These events also explain why Acheson, who gave the Schuman Plan ample
personal attention at its inception, increasingly focused on defence matters rather than
European integration. Judging from his official journal the US Secretary of State did not
follow in detail the proceedings in Paris.178 Throughout the period of the negotiations,
however, Acheson met regularly with French and UK foreign ministers and mutually
relating officials such as Alphand and Bernard Clappier, Schuman's cabinet director and
member of the French delegation, in the context of the Council of Foreign Minister and
176 Telegramme Bruce to Department of State, 23 June 1950, NARA, RG 59, 850.33/6-
2350.
177 In fact, Alphand did not remember his role in the early stages of the Schuman Plan
negotiations. He recalled, however, having played a part in the EDC negotiations. Cf.
interview Alphand. Alphand's diaries do not provide any additional information. See
Herve Alphand, L 'etonnement d'etre, journal 1939-1973, Paris: Fayard, 1977.
178 See the Memoranda of conversation, 1949-53, here January-July 1950, Personal
papers Dean G. Acheson, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Box 66.
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NATO meetings. While at these meetings high-ranking officials had to juggle the
Schuman Plan next to NATO, for US officials at large there were no overlapping
portfolios between Schuman Plan and NATO.
US Embassy officials, most importantly Bruce, Cleveland and Tomlinson!"
regularly informed their colleagues in the State Department, the Treasury and the ECA
as well as the USHICOG and other US embassies in Europe about the proceedings. The
24 June 1950 working document presented by the French delegation, for example,
which Bruce forwarded to Acheson, was further distributed to State Department official
Jackson (Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs), McCloy,
Hoffman and the US Ambassadors to London, Rome, Brussels and The Hague.180
Bohlen, who was not only the charge in France, but also an intimate friend of Acheson
and McCloy's also occasionally reported on the Schuman Plan. More importantly,
however, Bohlen provided the link to French Foreign Ministry officials in military and
defence affairs. Among others, Bohlen informed the State Department about the
announcement of the French government's initiative to establish a EDC.181 Additional
units within the State Department that were informed about the Paris negotiations
included the Office of European Affairs (George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs and Roswell H. Whitman, Officer in Charge for Economic Affairs);
the Bureau of German Affairs (Director Henry Byroade); and the Office of International
Trade Policy (Raymond Vernon and John Leddy).
179 Telegramme Paris Embassy to Secretary of State, 30 December 1950, NARA, RG
59,850.33/12-2950.
180 French Working document, 24 June 1950, Distribution of the translated document:
Telegramme [6], NARA, RG 59, 850.33/5-2450, FRUS 1950 Ill, pp. 728-38.
181 Telegramme Bohlen to Secretary of State, 15 October 1950, NARA, RG 59,
762A.5/l 0-1550, FRUS 1950 Ill, pp. 377-80.
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Assigning responsibilities for handling the Schuman Plan went hand in hand
with developing the US government policy. A thorough debate among US
administrators at a number of levels preceded the joint release of the official instructions
to all US diplomatic officers on 2 June 1950. At the London Conference of Foreign
Ministers, an Advisory Committee, composed of Under Secretary of State James E.
Webb, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs Willard Thorp, Policy Planning Staff
Director Paul Nitze and others, emphasized the 'immediate need to ensure that ECA
works closely with the Department' .182 In explicitly stressing the need of these two
organizations to co-operate, the Advisory Committee called for the prevention of
differences within the US foreign policy system. Such differences had developed, for
example, with regard to the ECA plans to initiate a European payments union. As
former ECA official Richard M. Bissell recalled, the policy to encourage Europeans to
lower trade and foreign exchange barriers among themselves without, having at the
same time, to make their currencies fully and freely convertible into dollars had led to
collision with the Treasury and to some extent, the economic division in the State
Department. This policy only became an agreed strategy after Hoffman gave his widely
published speech on European integration to the OEEC Council on 31 October 1949.183
182 Summary notes on the meeting, 16 May 1950, NARA, RG 59, 396.1 LO/5-1650. The
'Under Secretary of State' is the principal deputy and chief assistant to the Secretary of
State. Acting Secretary of State in the Secretary of State's absence was James E. Webb,
1949-1952.
183 Interview Richard M. Bissell, Melbourne Spector, 11 September 1990, Georgetown
University Library.
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After 9 May 1950, ECA officials directly discussed with State Department
officials the Schuman Plan proposal.l'" As head of the ECA, Hoffman was informed just
like the high-ranking officials in the State Department, such as Perkins.18s Further, the
ECA Administrator communicated the official ECA position from Washington to the
OSR in Paris and expressed concerns resembling those Acheson and Bruce had voiced
in the very beginning, namely that the Schuman Plan would establish an international
cartel. 186 Contrary to Acheson and Bruce, however, Hoffman could not rely on the
mediation of Monnet and McCloy for reassurance. Although Hoffman and Monnet
knew each other, the personal papers of Hoffman contain no evidence of the two actors
being in contact with each other during the Schuman Plan conference. The head of the
Marshall Plan abroad, Harriman, in contrast, discussed the Schuman Plan with, among
others, Monnet in London and Hirsch in Paris."? Additional OSR officials engaged in
developing the US directives included Deputy US Special Representative in Europe
Milton Katz and I.N.P. Stokes, the Special Assistant for Operations.l" Also contributing
to the debate was Tomlinson.l'" What is remarkable, however, is that the development
of the US guidelines was not restricted exclusively to US administrative circles, but also
encompassed individual French and British civil servants.
184 Telegramme Webb to Acheson, IIMay 1950, NARA, RG 59, 396.1 LO/9-1150,
FRUS 1950 III, p. 697.
185 Telegramme Bruce to the Secretary of State, 24 June 1950, NARA, RG 59, 850.33/6-
2450, FRUS 1950 III, pp. 727-29.
186 Telegramme Hoffman to OSR, 19 May 1950, NARA, RG 469, OSR, Box 30.
187 Telegramme Harriman to Acheson, 20 May 1950, NARA, RG 59, 850.33/5-2050,
FRUS 1950 III, pp. 702-4, here p. 702.
188 Memorandum Stokes to Bonsai et.al., 19 May 1950, NARA, RG 469, OSR, Box 30.
189 Office memorandum Cleveland to Stokes, 17 May 1950, ibid.
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In the end, the US government would not be represented at the Schuman Plan
conference. The question of introducing a US observer was addressed, however, in the
preparation of the instructions. Subsequent to McCloy's proposal to appoint an official
in the ECA mission to Germany as informal observer and advisor.l'" Monnet, in a
special HICOG meeting discussed the Schuman Plan with McCloy, French Deputy High
Commissioner for Germany Armand Berard and Economic Adviser to the British High
Commissioner for Germany Gordon Nevil Macready. When Macready championed the
idea of a HICOG observer to the negotiations Monnet and Berard opposed the
suggestion, arguing that finally, the HICOG would have an opportunity to approve the
treaty and that it would not help creating the impression Germany was being pressured
in the conference. Further, French government representatives could keep the HICOG
informed."! which affirmed the significance of the USHICOG as a second node, next to
the Paris Embassy, within the US foreign policy communication system. The incident
also demonstrates, however, that Monnet and French official Berard contributed to
shaping the guidelines of the US government. Besides, it shows that, although their
proposals were not always realized, UK officials through their affiliation with the
HICOG participated in the agenda setting for the conference, too. In the end, the US
instructions specified that to assure maximum acceptance of the plan by the 'European
peoples' the US government would restrict their public statements to reaffirming their
general position. Therefore, the 'US will not be a party to [the] negot[iation]s and will
190 Telegramme Harriman to Acheson, 20 May 1950, NARA, RG 59, 850.33/5-2050,
FRUS 1950 III, p. 702-4, here p. 704.
191 Telegramme US Secretary on the Allied High Commission for Germany (HICOG)
General Secretariat (Frankfurt), Joseph E. Slater to Acheson, 23 May 1950, NARA, RG
59, 850.33/5-2350, FRUS 1950 Ill, pp. 705-9.
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have no official association or observers at present stage, either on behalf [of] US or US
repr[esentative] on HICOM,.192 The guidelines further stated that it
[m]ay be useful at early stage [to] make participants aware, informally, of
direction of US thinking ... Also believe possible that situation will develop in
which strong US influence sh[ou]ld be exerted to avoid watering down of
I 191proposa ...
Lastly, US officials were going to make informal arrangements with the French and
German governments whereby US administrators in Paris and Bonn would be regularly
informed about the proceedings as well as forwarded drafts of the treaty. As late as 28
December 1950, when the negotiations on the economic provisions reached a critical
stage, the option to introduce an ECA advisor to the conference came up again.
However, Bruce and Katz both 'recommended strongly against it' .194
In summary, the debate on the official guidelines is instructive for two reasons.
Firstly, while friction or divergent policy assessment did arise within the US foreign
policy system, with regard to the Schuman Plan, it did not occur between State
Department and ECA. Rather divergent policy evaluation developed between US
officials in the Paris Embassy on the one hand and Washington-based State Department
and ECA officials, on the other. US foreign policy actors directly affiliated with the
Paris Embassy either were part of the working group or, like Bruce, they relied on the
mediation of Monnet and McCloy. Washington-based officials, in contrast, could not
access the mediators directly and hence lacked faith in the coal and steel project. This
trend, first evident in May 1950, continued when, for example, in September 1950, State
192 Telegramme Department of State to certain American diplomatic officers, 2 June
1950, NARA, RG 59, 850.33/6-250.
193 Ibid.
194 Note Miriam Camps to George Perkins, NARA, RG 59, 850.33/12-2850.
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Department and ECA issued a series of telegrammes that addressed concerns regarding
the departure of the delegations from the competitive principle.!" Cleveland in his
recollections confirmed that while the State Department remained sceptical as to the
competitive basis of the Schuman Plan, the US Embassy in Paris continued to favour the
plan.196
Secondly, the specific debate on the question of an ECA or HICOG advisor to
the conference shows that, to some extent at least, the development of the official US
policy resulted from a transatlantic debate. Tracing the emergence of the guidelines
therefore highlights not only the frictions within the US foreign policy system but also
indicates where the system was open versus closed to transatlantic input and co-
operation. One could argue that input from outside the US foreign policy system was
welcomed and even encouraged if it came from a trusted actor such as Monnet who
bonded with key US foreign policy officials and whose policy preferences regarding
European integration were deemed to match those of the US government. At least for
the post-World War II period, the emergence of the US guidelines therefore
corroborates the insufficiency of the national paradigm to capture policy-making
processes. To sketch further boundaries to transatlantic policy network formation,
however, it is desirable to identify additional key actors within the US foreign policy
organizations involved and assess their role in the negotiations.
195 Telegrammes Acheson to Paris Embassy, 7 September 1950, NARA, RG 59,
850.33/9-750.
196 Interview Cleveland.
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2.6 Boundaries for transatlantic policy network formation:
unexploited policy expertise
Mainly responsible for the Schuman Plan in the ECA administration in Washington was
Bissell. Bissell had been working as an Assistant Professor of Economics at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), when, in 1948, he was invited to join the
Harriman Commlttee.l'" Chaired by Harriman, the group officially designated the
President's Committee on Foreign Aid drew up the blueprint for realizing the Marshall
Plan. Through collaborating on the committee Hoffman and Bissell had developed
social capital, which explains why Hoffman later recruited Bissell for his ECA team.198
As Assistant Deputy Administrator, Bissell was directly responsible to William Foster,
Hoffman's deputy, who became the new Administrator on Hoffman's resignation from
the ECA on 30 September 1950.199Bissell was in touch with Katz200and dealt directly
with Tomlinsorr'" who he knew from co-operating on the scheme for a European
payments union.202Besides reaffirming the significance of the competitive principle,203
Bissell was involved with OSR officials in considering potential US government
197Interview Bissell.
198Alan Raucher, Paul G. Hoffman. Architect of Foreign Aid. Lexington, KY: The
University Press of Kentucky, 1985, p. 66.
199Letter Hoffman to Walter Lippman, 31 October 1950, Personal papers Hoffman, Box
3.
200Telegramme for Katz from Bissell, 27 December 1950, NARA RG 469, OSR, Box
30.
201Handwritten note attached to telegramme Katz to Acheson, 2 June 1950, NARA RG
469, OSR, Box 30.
202Interview Bissell.
203Telegramme Bissell to OSR, Paris, 10 October 1950, NARA RG 469, OSR, Box 30.
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funding for the Schuman Plan.204 A member of the CFRS, Bissell participated in the
monthly meetings of the Study Group on the Marshall Plan. Among other issues, the
Schuman Plan was on the agenda of the meeting on 20 November 1950.205 Contrary to
Washington-based Bissell another US official in Paris, Leon Goldenberg, did have
transatlantic contacts.
ECA administrator Goldenberg in fact provided the vital link between the ECA
mission to France and the French industrialists. Following consultations on 27 June
1950 of representatives of the French government and the French industry on the
Schuman Plan, for example, Goldenberg participated in preliminary conversations with
leading steel industrialists and officials, among them Alexis Aron, a technical consultant
to the Coal and Steel Union, as such a collaborator of Aubrun, and an expert to the
French delegation to the Schuman Plan negotiations; and Albert Denis, the
representative of the Iron and Steel Division in the French Ministry of Industry and
Commerce.i'" Further, in a luncheon on 21 December 1950, Goldenberg, Tomlinson
and Aron debated the position of the French iron and steel industry regarding
comperition.i'" The French steel producers tended to be critical of the Schuman Plan.
However, Matthias Kipping has emphasized that the industrialists were not unified in
204 Telegramme Bissell for Katz, Bruce, Parkman, McCloy, Cattier, 13 April 1951,ibid.
205 19th meeting, 20 November 1950, Archives of the Council on Foreign Relations,
Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton University, Box 44, Folder Volume XXXI: 1948-51,
File 1.
206 Telegramme Bruce to Secretary of State, 3 July 1950, NARA, RG 59, 850.33/7-350.
Cf. chapter 4.
207 Tomlinson to Department of State, NARA, RG 59, 850.33/12-2150.
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their opposition to the project.208 A case in point was the President of the Syndicat
General des Industries Mecaniques et Transformatrices des Metaux, the Metal
Manufacturing Syndicate Jean Constant who endorsed the proposal and actively sought
contact with the Paris ECA mission. In July 1950, Constant informed an ECA mission
representative of his support for the proposal and effort to organize a new association of
steel users to assist Monnet in realizing the Schuman Plan. Allegedly Monnet had
' ... urged [the] active support on part of [the] steel users to counterbalance [the] growing
opposition of [the] Steel Syndicate'. Predictably Constant's initiative did not meet the
approval of Coal and Steel Union President Aubrun who subsequently even refused to
meet with him.209
While a special 'Working Group on the Schuman Plan' was established within
the OSR, the organization's officials seemed to have only few transatlantic links and a
limited impact on policy development.i'" However, Katz who was in Paris at the time of
the negotiations may have played a part in the negotiations. Although there is no direct
evidence to support this, circumstances are highly suggestive that this was the case. In
the 1930s, Katz had gathered ample experience in the New Deal administration and was
intimately involved in the development and enforcement of anti-trust law. Among
others, he served with the National Recovery Administration (NRA, 1933-35), and the
US Department of Justice, where alongside the head of the Antitrust Division, Thurman
208 Matthias Kipping, Zwischen Kartellen und Konkurrenz Der Schuman-Plan und die
Ursprunge der europaischen Einigung 1944-1952, Schriften zur Wirtschafts- und
Sozialgeschichte, vol. 46, Berlin: Duncker&Humblot, 1996, pp. 203-6.
209 Telegramme Bruce to Secretary of State, 20 July 1950, NARA, RG 59, 850.33/7-
2050.
210 For example Memorandum Hollis B. Chenery to Stokes, 11 October 1950, NARA,
RG 469, OSR, Box 30.
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Arnold, he worked for the US Attorney General (1938-39).211 For instance, Katz was
collaborating with Arnold and others on amending the Clayton Act,212which Congress
had passed in 1914 to amend the original US anti-trust law, the Sherman Act of 1890.
In 1939, Katz became a lecturer of law at Harvard University and he was
appointed a professor the following year. During the war he served with the War
Production Board (1941-43), the Combined Production and Resources Board (CPRB,
1942-43) and last, the Office of Strategic Services (1943-44). In 1946 he returned to the
faculty at Harvard Law School. An enthusiastic law professor, Katz together with Bowie
and other colleagues was involved in 1947 in producing a study on reforming the legal
educational system.213Having initially joined the ECA as general counsel in 1948, Katz
soon became the Deputy US Special Representative to Europe (1949), before in August
1950 he succeeded Harriman as the US Special Representative to Europe. Preparing his
transfer to Paris, Katz re-established contact with Monnet who, apparently, he had last
talked with in 1943 in the offices of the CPRB in Washington.i" While it is difficult to
determine precisely the role of Katz in the Schuman Plan conference, at the least, he was
informed about the proceedings. Again it was Tomlinson who linked the US Embassy
working group to the wider US foreign policy apparatus.i"
211Personal papers Milton Katz. Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, NRA: Boxes 2-
5; Attorney General: Boxes 9-12; further, see for the role of Katz among the 'liberals'
around Harvard law professor and Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, who also
promoted Acheson and McCloy, Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform. New Deal
Liberalism in Recession and War, New York: Vintage Books, 1996, p. 55.
212Folder Attorney General. Monopoly Study, Proposals for Legislation, Personal
rapers Katz, Box 10.
13Committee on Legal Education, 1947, Personal papers Katz, Box 20.
214Letter Katz to Monnet, 13 May 1948, Personal papers Katz, Box 18.
21SMemorandum Eric E. Oulashin to Katz, 'Control and Distribution of Material on
Schuman Plan Negotiations, 23 June 1950, NARA, RG 469, OSR, Box 30.
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One question that arises out of Katz' professional background is why he was not
drawn into the US Embassy working group. Katz shared important professional
experiences with Ball - the New Deal administration before World War II; with Ball,
Bowie and McCloy - the experience in the Washington administration during the war;
and with Bowie - teaching at Harvard University. For Bowie and Katz as well as for
MIT-based Bissell, their academic association paired with their experience in
Washington during the war resulted in their affiliation with the US post-World War II
administration in Europe. Perhaps one explanation for Katz' minor visibility in informal
transatlantic policy-making at the Schuman Plan conference was his appointment as
Harriman's successor. Arguably, when confronted with new professional challenges,
Katz may have lacked time to devote his energy to the Schuman Plan. However, a high-
ranking position in the US post-war administration and an active role in the Schuman
Plan conference were not mutually exclusive, as is evidenced by McCloy. Having said
this, McCloy's portfolio overlapped significantly with the agenda for the future ECSC
treaty with regard to the reorganization of the German heavy industries. At the least,
Katz' case demonstrates that sometimes it was not enough to know Monnet, be part of
the Paris network of transatlantic contacts and have policy expertise to become part of
the policy network in the US Embassy.
Katz is not the only case in point for unexploited policy expertise, however.
Shortly after he took over from Harriman, Katz asked Hoffman to secure the temporary
assistance of Clarence B. Randall to survey the 'internal organizational and personnel
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problems, with particular reference to the new emphasis on rearmament' _216As
President of Inland Steel and former ECA Steel Consultant (1948-50), Randall regarded
it his duty to keep the US steel industry informed about European steel problems.
Randall traveled England, France and Germany in the summer of 1948 as a consultant
and knew French industry representatives Aron and Albert Bureau, the French Chairman
of the Allied Steel Control Group217as well as Denis and Hirsch.i" When he returned to
Paris in 1950, Randall met with, among others, Monnet, Katz, and Bissell who
'Iet ... [him] read the recent cables on the Schuman Plan,.219 Although impressed with
Monnet's personality Randall was suspicious of the potential of the Schuman Plan to
create a cartel and remained one of the Schuman Plan's most fervent American critics.
Randall objected the (official) US government policy to 'observe' rather than
'intervene' in the negotiations and disapproved, in particular, of Tomlinson, in his
words, a 'starry-eyed and altogether dangerous young New dealer' _220Expressing his
criticism of the Schuman Plan Randall published a number of articles in the Atlantic
Monthll21 that accompanied his discussion of the Schuman Plan with, among others,
Ball in a radio debate222 and German head of delegation Walter Hallstein in
216Prologue, 12 September 1950, Personal papers Clarence B. Randall, Seeley G. Mudd
Library, Princeton University, Box 1, ECA Paris 1950.
217Memo No. 12, pp. 31-33, 13 July 1948, Personal papers Randall, Box 1, ECA
Europe 1948.
218Memo No.7, p.I, 7 October 1950, Personal papers Randall, Box 1, ECA Paris 1950.
219Memo No. I, p. 3, 28 September 1950, ibid.
220Memo No.5, 2 October 1950, ibid.
221See, for example, Clarence Randall, 'European Steel: Monopoly in the Making', in:
Atlantic Monthly, October 1951, pp. 34-8; idem. 'Free Enterprise is not a Hunting
License', in: Atlantic Monthly, March 1952, pp. 38-41.
222The University of Chicago Roundtable, The Steelmen Look at the Schuman Plan, An
NBC Radio Discussion by George W. Ball, Clarence B. Randall and Theodore W.
Schultz, 20 January 1952, Personal papers Ball, 150.
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correspondence.i'" Clearly, Randall's unfavourable evaluation of the coal and steel pool
was based on his experience with the European steel industry rather than a rejection of
the idea to advance European integration. However, it shows that not every American
actor who participated in the transatlantic debate on the Schuman Plan supported it, not
even when in contact with Monnet himself. Here policy network formation did not
materialize because Randall's professional experience prevailed over the paradigm of
advancing European integration which was shared by so many other actors of all levels
of policy-making, ranging from Acheson, Hoffman, McCloy and Monnet to the
members of the US Embassy working group and beyond. A significant role in the
negotiations, however, was exercised by another more clearly distinguishable academic
expert network focusing on American and German actors, which also led to the US
Embassy working group via mutually relating actors such as Bowie.
2.7 An expert network: the transatlantic university network
An informal network of legal experts with an academic affiliation, the 'transatlantic
university network' contributed significantly to the negotiations. This expert network
partly overlapped with the German delegation and comprised American law professor
Heinrich Kronstein; German law professors Hallstein, Hermann Mosler and Hans-
Jurgen Schlochauer; and German official and honorary law professor Carl Friedrich
Ophuls, While Hallstein was the primary delegate and Mosler, Schlochauer and Ophuls
were experts of the German delegation, Kronstein had no institutional affiliation that
could have accounted for his role in the conference. The transatlantic university network
223 Letter Hallstein to Randall, 19 October 1951, AN 81, AJ 157.
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collectively and individual actors within the network fulfilled three distinct functions.
Firstly, the actors making up the network directly contributed to the draft treaty, most
importantly regarding the institutional set-up and the anti-trust provisions. This function
resulted from the fact that they became involved in the conference because of their
recognized legal expertise. Secondly, the transatlantic university network fulfilled a
particular function of transnational policy networks, namely to mediate between
different socio-economic, political and cultural contexts. At the Schuman Plan
conference, these legal experts functioned as mediators between American and
European politico-legal concepts. The mediating function is crucial to conceptualizing
this network as transatlantic, even more so than the fact that Kronstein, an American
non-state actor, albeit with a German background, co-operated informally with actors
who were part of the German delegation. Thirdly, through their professional affiliation
the members of the network facilitated links to a wider circle of academic actors and
initiated the collaboration of legal experts.
Essential to the formation of the transatlantic university network was the
nomination of Hallstein as German head of delegation. Appointed Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs in the Federal Chancellory on 25 August 1950224 and later, on the
realization of the EEC treaty, the first president of the European Commission, Hallstein
was not the initial choice of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Only five years after the end
of the war and in light of the acrimonious Franco-German relationship, the appointment
of the German chief negotiator was a delicate political question. To some extent,
224 Diary entry, 25 August 1950, BA, Personal papers Herbert Blankenhorn (N 1351), 4.
Until the establishment of the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs in March 1951 the
office of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was part of the Federal Chancellory.
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Hallstein got appointed because other potential German negotiators had held highprofile
positions during the National Socialist years. From this perspective, the consultations
between top-level French and German officials and then between Adenauer and his
confidants, which preceded Hallstein's appointment, serve a prism through which to
view the problem of continuity in administrative and financial circles from the inter-war
years to the post-World War-II period.
In a meeting with Adenauer in Bonn on 23 May 1950 Monnet addressed the
question of the German head of delegation. Monnet acted as a messenger for Schuman,
which meant that while the French foreign minister technically served as the head of the
French delegation, he entrusted Monnet with the presidency and day-to-day operation of
the conference.225 However, Schuman, far from being removed from the negotiations
altogether, was kept abreast by Monnet in writing about significant developments,
especially difficulties with the German delegation arising, for example, after Acheson in
September 1950 had invited Germany into NAT0_226 In his meeting with Adenauer on
23 May, Monnet was accompanied by Clappier who according to Marjolin ' ... played a
major role as an intelligent and convinced intermediary' between Schuman and
Monnet. 227 Further participating in the meeting were French Deputy High Commissioner
Berard and Herbert Blankenhorn, a career diplomat, the head of the Verbindungsstelle,
the linking agency to the Allied High Commission in the Federal Chancellory, as well as
Adenauer's foreign policy advisor. According to Hans-Peter Schwarz, Adenauer
225 Raymond Poidevin, Robert Schuman, Paris: Beauchesne, 1988, p. 105.
226 See, for example, 22 December 1950, Letter Monnet to Schuman, AN 81 AJ 137;
Jean Monnet-Robert Schuman Correspondence 1947-1953, Lausanne: Fondation Jean
Monnet pour I' Europe, 1986, pp. 90-1.
227 Robert Marjolin, Architect of European Unity: Memoirs 1911-1986, London:
Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1989, p. 272.
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benefited from the intimate knowledge and the understanding of American affairs
Blankenhorn had obtained when serving at the German Embassy in Washington from
1935_39.228 A leading Christian democrat, Blankenhorn also became part of the German
delegation.
Initially, Adenauer proposed the deputy manager of the Kreditanstalt, the
German Financial Institute for Reconstruction, Hermann Josef Abs, as head of
delegation. This suggestion did however raise concerns with Monnet who advocated a
'completely independent' candidate and warned of the unfavorable reaction of the
French public to the nomination of Abs.229 Within German domestic politics Abs'
integrity remained untouched, which is evidenced by a description of the banker that
Blankenhorn recorded in October 1949: 'Once again, Abs really impressed me today.
Not only does he master economic problems, but he also understands foreign policy and
like no other German, he has psychological sensitivity, which is so important' .230 The
financier, who was a quarter-of-a-century Adenauer's junior, shared with the chancellor
his Catholic and Rhineland background and probably would have found acceptance
within the German government.
Abs' role during the years of the National Socialist regime could have given rise
to criticism in France, however. In his biography of Abs, Lothar Gall has treated in
detail the contested role of Abs and more generally, that of the banks, in the Third
228 Hans-Peter Schwarz, Adenauer der Staatsmann: 1952-1967, Stuttgart: Deutsche
Verlags-Anstalt, 1991, pp. 565-6.
229 Diary entry, 24 May 1950, BA, N 1351,3.
230 Diary entry, 8 October 1949, BA, N 1351, 1.
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Reich.231As a member of the board of directors of the Deutsche Bank (1937-45), Abs
became a member of the supervisory committee of LG. Farben, among others. The
company was intimately involved in the National Socialist system of forced labour and
developed Zyklon B, which was used to execute detainees in the Auschwitz
concentration camp. Even before February 1948, however, when he was declared
innocent ('Unbelasteter in Katgorie V') after he had appeared as a witness in the I.G.
Farben case at the Nuremberg trials, Abs advised UK and later also US occupation
officials.232 Notably, although Abs did not even become a designated member of the
German delegation to Paris, he continued to play an important role in German domestic
policy-making. In fact, the banker featured prominently in the especially appointed
German expert committees on the Schuman Plan: he presided over the committee for
investments and credits and participated in the committee on production.i" Similarly,
Wilhelm Grewe, previously a member of the National Socialist party, who allegedly had
used his party membership to advance his academic career,234served as a legal expert to
the domestic German legal committee on the Schuman Plan. When Grewe was
appointed head of the German delegation to the negotiations on the abdication of the
Occupation Statute in May 1951, his past affiliation with the National Socialist regime
did not represent a barrier to taking a leading role in multinational negotiations.
231 Lothar Gall, Der Bankier Hermann Josef Abs. Eine Biographie, Munich: C.H. Beck,
2004, here esp. pp. 100-33.
232Ibid. pp. 121-41.
233Verzeichnisse der Mitglieder der AusschUsse, 1 September 1950, BA,
Bundesministerium fur den Marshallplan (B 146),277.
234Letter Erich Kaufmann to Grewe, 12 (or 17) March 1952, PA AA, Personal papers
Wilhelm Grewe, 63. While Kaufmann's letter may reflect personal dislike, there is
strong evidence of Grewe having been not only career-driven, but also obsessed to the
point of absurdity with formal professional recognition, which is evidenced, for example
in a letter Grewe wrote to Adenauer on 13 January 1954. Ibid.
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In the end, Adenauer did not insist on nominating Abs although the former
Secretary in the German Finance Ministry (1930-32) and emigre to Sweden, Hans
Schaffer, who would have been another potential nominee for the head of delegation,
also supported Abs' nomination. Adenauer's willingness to compromise shows that the
chancellor deemed an effective relationship between Monnet and his German
counterpart essential to the success of the Schuman Plan conference. At this stage,
Adenauer did not know Monnet personally, but could rely on Schaffer's advice.235 One
could argue that because Schaffer knew Monnet he 'bridged trust' between Adenauer
and Monnet. In contrast to bonding trust, the notion of 'bridging', 'instrumental' or
'exchange trust' maintains that actors' behaviour is driven by calculation rather than
actual trust. Actors who offer bridging trust do not share a sense of community, like
those who offer bonding trust, but instead differ from each other with respect to an
important sociodemographic feature, for example, age, class, or in this case, the status in
the political hierarchy.i" What is relevant here is that actors like Schaffer accordingly
had the potential to link different networks with each other. Moreover, Adenauer's
flexibility with regard to the German chief negotiator reflects the functioning
interpersonal relationship between the chancellor and Schuman that had been an
important precursor to the drafting of the Schuman Plan deciaration.237 While the two
political leaders probably first met in 1938,238 they only could accumulate social capital
235 Cf. Hans Schaffer, 'Konrad Adenauer und der Schuman-Plan. Ein Quellenzeugnis',
in: Schwabe (ed.), Die An/tinge des Schuman-Plans, pp. 131-40, here p. 135 [originally
published by Eckhard Wandel in: Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, vol. 20 (1972),
fR' 197-203].
6 Verweij, 'Four Wrongs', pp. 470-1.
237 Kaiser, Christian Democracy, chapter 6, pp. 191-252.
238 Schaffer, 'Konrad Adenauer', p. 133; Kaiser, Christian Democracy, p. 212.
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after World War II. In the words of Jean-Claude Demory, 'the two men often met and
did so in a spirit of mutual understanding and appreciation'. 239 Especially important to
building up social capital between French and German Christian democrats were the
informal meetings of leading European Christian democrats, where even before the
Schuman Plan declaration a crucial political consensus was developed, namely to
advance European integration through the coal and steel pool and without the
participation of the UK.240
Finally, arguing that 'he had the psychological ability necessary to deal with
foreigners' economist Wilhelm Ropke recommended Hallstein as a 'first or second chief
delegate'<" to Adenauer. Ropke also assumed a bridging function in this context.
According to Ernst Steindorff, a young academic lawyer and Hallstein's Secretary for
the main part of the conference, the mutually respectful relationship between Hallstein
and Monnet indeed proved vital to the success of the negotiations.242 This was especially
significant since the two actors had not previously co-operated and could not rely on
established social capital between them. The constructive character of their
collaboration was evident, for example, in a joint meeting with US Ambassador Bruce
in November 1950, when the negotiations had reached a critical stage resulting from the
demands the German government promoted to object the ongoing occupation policy.
239 Jean-Claude Demory, Georges Bidault 1899-1983, Paris: Editions Julliard, 1995, p.
297.
240 Kaiser, Christian Democracy.
241 Diary entry, 4 June 1950, BA, N 1351,4. See also Wilfried Loth, William Wallace,
Wolfgang Wessels (eds.), Walter Hallstein.The Forgotten European?, Basingstoke,
London, New York: Macmillan, St. Martin's Press, 1998 [German 1995], pp. 1-13, here
p. 5. Ropke was teaching at the Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales,
Geneve, See Milene Wegmann, 'Neoliberale Europa-Foderationskonzepte 1918-1945',
in: Journalfor European Integration History, vol. 8, no. 1 (2002), pp. 11-35, here p. 13.
242 Interview Ernst Steindorff, Brigitte Leucht, 9 November 2005, Munich, Germany.
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After Hallstein had presented Adenauer's preferences regarding the removal of
occupation regulations, which included the termination of the IAR, ' ... Monnet and
Hallstein agreed to ask their technicians to prepare a draft of a letter on this subject
which Schuman would send to [the] German Government on [the] day that [the] treaty
[would be] completed'. Moreover, ' ... Monnet stated very firmly that he was in full
sympathy with Hallstein,.243 While Hallstein and Monnet might have differed on
questions regarding the institutional framework as well as the anti-trust provisions, they
were dedicated to the overall goal of European integration that provided their shared
policy paradigm and the basis for their joint action.
Hallstein was an academic with an established record in the promotion of
international education but little formal diplomatic experience. In addition to serving as
dean to the School of Law and Economics, he headed the Institute for Comparative Law
at the University of Frankfurt whose faculty he had joined in 1941. Further, Hallstein
served in the supervisory committee of the Society for Comparative Law, set up in 1950
under the auspices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organlzation.r" At the Schuman Plan conference Hallstein fulfilled all three functions
assigned to actors within the transatlantic university network. The German head of
delegation not only proved a skilled diplomat and negotiator, but he also comprehended
in full the topics under discussion and contributed significantly to the emerging
institutional framework. Central to Hallstein's role as mediator between different
243Telegramme Bruce to Secretary of State, 21 November 1950, NARA, RG 59,
850.33111-2150.
244Letter Hans Dolle, Gesellschaft fur Rechtsvergleichung to Hallstein, 5 September
1950, BA, N 1266, 1718.
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politico-legal concepts and a facilitator for network formation were his time as a
prisoner of war in 1944-45 and his academic background, respectively.i"
Hallstein made the most of his time as a prisoner of war in a military camp in
Como, Mississippi and with the support of the University of Chicago established a camp
university. Among others, he taught anti-trust law, comparative law and Anglo-
American private law.246 In a letter of 22 May 1945 to the dean of the University of
Chicago Hallstein even asked unsuccessfully for permission to continue his studies at
the reknown institution before returning to Germany. Arguing that the great legal
challenges of the day could only be solved through co-operation of the diverse legal
traditions within the Euro-American cultural sphere, he emphasized the significance of
American legal thought for the evolution of European law.247 Even further, Hallstein
expressed the belief that to really understand a foreign legal system one had to gain first-
hand experience in the respective society, which applied in particular, to German law
professors teaching American law. As a prisoner of war in the US, Hallstein had
supplemented his longstanding academic interest in foreign legal systems with in-depth
study of the American legal system, the appreciation of which he deemed crucial to the
future of European law. Matthias Schonwald has suggested that Hallstein's view on the
245 Excellent for 'Hallstein's American years' is Matthias Schonwald, 'Hinter
Stacheldraht - vor Studenten: Die "amerikanischen Jahre" Walter Hallsteins, 1944-
1949', in: Ralph Dietl, Franz Knipping (eds.), Begegnung zweier Kontinente: die
Vereinigten Staaten und Europa seit dem Ersten Weltkrieg, Trier: Wissenschaftlicher
Verlag Trier, 1999, pp. 31-54; see also Laura Hannemann, 'Gesandte in Fesseln?
Kulturtransfer in Kriegsgefangenenlagern des Zweiten Weltkrieges', in: Comparativ,
vol. 16, no. 4 (2006), pp. 179-99.
246 2. Zwischenkursus, 2 July-22 Sept 1945, BA, N 1266, 1620; Undated notes, BA, N
1266, 1622, Fiche 3.
247 Letter Hallstein to the Dean of the Faculty of Law, University of Chicago, 22 May
1945, BA, N 1266, 1620.
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unity of American and European law indeed only emerged during his time as a prisoner
of war in the US. Schonwald's proposition is based on a contrast between beliefs, such
as the one referred to here, expressed by Hallstein in 1945 and one letter, written in
1938, in which Hallstein emphasized the role of German legal thought for the distinctly
European legal tradition.248 Schonwald acknowledges, however, that to date, there is no
comprehensive study of Hallstein during the Third Reich249 and thereby invites re-
interpretation of his proposition. What is crucial here is that Hallstein's conduct at the
Schuman Plan conference supports an interpretation that emphasizes his partial political
socialization in the US and his high regard for the American legal system.
In the summer of 1945, Hallstein further participated in the Administrative
School in Fort Getty, Rhode Island. Only selected prisoners of war who demonstrated
that they rejected National Socialist beliefs and were committed to the reconstruction of
Germany were eligible for participation in this re-education programme, which was set
up by the US Department of War. Among the teaching personnel were a number of
German emigres now employed by American universities.25o After his return to
Germany, Hallstein stayed in touch with other 'Getty graduates', who even organized
reunions in Germany.251 Hallstein returned to the US in 1948-49, this time voluntarily
and with an academic exchange programme between the University of Frankfurt and
Georgetown University. During this period he made the acquaintance of Kronstein who
248Schonwald, 'Hinter Stacheldraht' , p. 42, note 54.
249The contributions in Loth, Wallace, Wessels (eds.), The Forgotten European? also
leave out the period before the Schuman Plan conference.
250Schonwald, 'Hinter Stacheldraht', pp. 40-1.
251Ibid. pp. 44-5.
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when meeting Hallstein was convinced to have discovered 'the best qualified man to
build bridges to German universities' .252
Born in Germany Kronstein practiced law as an attorney before at the age of 39,
in 1936, he emigrated to the US with his family.253 In the US, Kronstein went back to
law school and pursued a legal master's degree at Columbia Law School and in 1940,
completed his doctorate at Georgetown University, where in the same year he became a
professor of law. Kronstein's research broadly dealt with questions of economic
organization in free and democratic societies, which included anti-trust law. Kronstein
knew Franz Bohrn, one of the founders of the influential Freiburg School of Ordo-
liberalism, who was a close friend of Kronstein's brother Max.254Here it is sufficient to
say that ordo-liberalism shared with US anti-trust law the notion that competition was
vital to the maintenance of a liberal and democratic society. Further, Kronstein took the
bar exam in the District of Columbia and served as an expert within the US Department
of Justice before he was appointed Special Attorney in the Antitrust Division in 1940. In
252Heinrich Kronstein, Briefe an einen jungen Deutschen, Munich: C.H. Beck, 1967, p.
248.
253For Kronstein see especially Eckard Rehbinder, 'Heinrich Kronstein (1897-1972)"
in: Bernhard Diestelkamp, Michael Stolleis (eds.), Juristen an der Universitat Frankfurt
am Main, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1989, pp. 253-67; see also Introduction to
Hallstein, Georgetown University News Service, 12 March 1952, BA, N 1266, 134;
Letter Hallstein to Kronstein, 1 July 1949, BA, N 1266, 1864; and Personal History of
Heinrich Kronstein, undated resume, ca. 1946, Personal papers Heinrich Kronstein,
Lauinger Library, Georgetown University.
Unfortunately, at the time of the archival visit (2005), Kronstein's personal papers were
not catalogued and were not made available for examination. A number of interesting
links could not be pursued therefore. They included a potential meeting with Bowie
through Kronstein's involvement in the US occupation as well as the question whether
perhaps informally, Kronstein recruited other colleagues at Georgetown University for
the Schuman Plan negotiations.
254Cf. Rudolf Wiedholter, Franz Bohm (1895-1977), in: Diestelkamp, Stolleis (eds.)
Juristen, pp. 208-52, here p. 219.
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the latter part of 1945 Kronstein headed the section German Agencies in the Economic
Branch of the US Military Government to occupied Germany, where he specialized in
the problem of foreign-held corporations. In 1949 Kronstein accepted an invitation by
Hallstein and visited Frankfurt University under the auspices of the exchange
programme between Georgetown and Frankfurt.255
Kronstein held no offical position within the US administration in 1950. He
continued to advise US governmental agencies on anti-trust policy, however. Moreover,
Kronstein proved a vital mediator within the transatlantic university network. As for
Hallstein, personal and professional experiences provide the key to appreciate this
specific role. One case in point is provided by Kronstein's observations about German
society during his exchange visit at Frankfurt. Later, these observations served as the
basis for a memorandum Kronstein drafted on the need for a public information
programme to explain the US de-cartelization policy in Germany. In early 1950
Kronstein forwarded his memorandum to the State Department and subsequently was
invited to discuss his ideas with the USHICOG officials directly responsible for de-
cartelization policy, Grant Kelleher and Sidney Willner, who both served under
Bowie.256
Another example for Kronstein's role as a mediator was his involvement in an
ECA programme to promote the introduction of laws safeguarding competition in
European countries. Evidence for Kronstein's role first was found in the personal papers
of Schlochauer, a law professor at the University of Cologne and an official in the
255 Brief Hallstein an Kronstein, 1 July 1949, BA, N 1266, 1864.
256 Memorandum Buttles to Baker, 23 January 1950, NARA, RG 59, 862A.054/1-2350.
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Federal Ministry of Justice.257 In the summer of 1950, a commission of academic
experts and practitioners from various German ministries, led by Bohm and including
Schlochauer, travelled to the US to get a first-hand impression and to deepen their
knowledge of American anti-trust law. Among other venues, the German committee
attended lectures at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the US government agency
that was set up in 1914 to promote free and fair competition in inter-state commerce.
The Germans met with American academics, politicians and practitioners who were
engaged in the formulation and administration of competition policy. Also on the
agenda of the German commission was a meeting with Kronstein,z58 The involvement of
Kronstein, on the one side, and Bohrn and Schlochauer on the other, of the ECA
programme in 1950 evokes two interrelated arguments. Firstly, it highlights and
confirms the links between Marshall Plan, US policy in occupied Germany and
Schuman Plan, which has been central to the analysis of the US Embassy working group
and the US foreign policy system at large. Notably, the study trip of the German
commission to the US served the preparation of a German anti-trust law, not the anti-
trust provisions of the Schuman Plan. Secondly, this suggests that networks of actors
developing national, here German, anti-trust legislation and European anti-trust
legislation, respectively, to some degree overlapped.
Against this backdrop, Kronstein at the Schuman Plan conference continued to
mediate between American and German approaches to safeguarding competition and
moreover attempted to interpret their respective societal contexts. In November 1950 he
257Vorlaufiger Bericht der deutschen Kommission zum Studium von Kartell- und
Monopolfragen in den Vereinigten Staaten, BeiJage zum Bundesanzeiger Nr. 250,29
December 1950, PA AA, B 15, Personal papers Prof. Dr. Schlochauer, 340, Fiche 3.
258Cf. also Kronstein, Briefe, pp. 248, 254.
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explained to Raymond Cheseldine of the Bureau of German Affairs the German
elections. In a letter to Hallstein on 6 January 1951, in tum, he translated the official
position of the US government on vertical integration.259 Kronstein wrote to Cheseldine
a couple of days later and referred to a 'Hallstein letter' _260 In this intervention, which
resembled Ball's effort to broker for the French government in September 1950,
Kronstein addressed the '[d]ifficulties between our officials in Europe and the German
Schuman Plan delegation' .261 Only little successful were Kronstein's efforts to facilitate
contacts between select members of the German delegation and US officials in Paris.
When he congratulated Hallstein on his appointment as head of delegation in July 1950,
Kronstein declared he had mentioned Hallstein as well as Mosler to his 'very dear
friend' Robert Terrill of the US Embassy in Paris.262 In early October 1950, Kronstein
again encouraged Hallstein to get in touch together with Mosler with his friend
Terrill.263 There is no evidence that Hallstein and/or Mosler acted on Kronstein's
attempts to facilitate informal co-operation. Hallstein probably saw no necessity to do so
since he was aware of the activities of the US Embassy working group through regular
consultations with Monnet and the talks on the deconcentration and de-cartelization of
the German heavy industries with, among others, McCloy and Bowie. Finally, in late
259 Memorandum Cheseldine to Byroade, 21 November 1950, NARA, RG 59,
740.00/11-2150; Letter Kronstein to Hallstein, 6 January 1951, BA, N1266, 1864.
260 Letter Kronstein to Cheseldine, 12 January 1951. Following a typo in the date in the
Kronstein letter (' 1950' instead of' 1951') the letter is filed under NARA, RG 59,
850.3311-1250.
261 Ibid.
262 Letter Kronstein to Hallstein, 7 July 1950, BA, N 1266, 1864.
263 Letter Kronstein to Hallstein, 3 October 1950, ibid.
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January 1951 Kronstein informed Hallstein that he was in touch with Ball who had
allegedly phoned him.264
One of the first instances that saw Hallstein facilitate policy network formation
came in June 1950, when he recruited Mosler as a legal expert for the German
delegation. Hallstein had no difficulty convincing Adenauer that Mosler, who came
from a Rhenish family of lawyers, was the right man for the job. In fact, the chancellor
could even remember Mosler's father Karl, who had served as the President of the
Landesgericht, the Regional Court, in Bonn until the National Socialists dismissed
him.265 Mosler succeeded Hallstein as a visiting professor to Georgetown University in
1950. Hallstein, Kronstein and Mosler, shared their affiliation with the bilateral
exchange programme and their involvement in the Schuman Plan conference. While
academic exchange had provided the framework for Hallstein and Kronstein to intensify
their contacts with US actors and German actors, respectively, it had served as a first
introduction to the American university legal system for Mosler.266 When he joined the
German delegation in Paris in July 1950 Mosler did however draw on previous
experience as a legal advisor. As a lawyer and from 1946 on as a Privatdozent, a lecturer
affiliated with the University of Bonn he had assessed the consequences of the Allied
dismantlement policy for the German heavy industries for clients such as the
Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen- und Stahlindustrie.i'"
264 Letter Kronstein to Hallstein, 28 January 1951, ibid.
265 Letter Hallstein to Mosler, 17 June 1950, Personal papers Hermann Mosler, Archiv
der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft Berlin (MPG-Archiv/III.Abt./ZA 139), Kasten 2.
266 Letters Mosler to Kronstein, 5, 19 December 1949, MPG-Archiv/IlI.Aht.lZA 139,
Ordner 5.
267 Cf. Materials, 1946-1948, MPG-Archiv/lII.Abt.lZA 139, Kasten 28.
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At the Schuman Plan negotiations, Mosler contributed to questions concerning
the relationship between the Schuman Plan and the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) as well as the institutional design, especially the court.268 Embedded in
academic networks Mosler informally drew on the expertise of other legal experts who
were not linked to the negotiations. He actually discussed the question of the court
within the institutional system with Karl Bilfinger, the Director of the established Max-
Planck Institute for Public and International Law in Heidelberg and, according to
Mosler, an expert of federal systems.269 Starting in late August 1950, however, Mosler
expressed concerns regarding the efficiency of his co-operation with Ophuls, the other
legal expert of the delegation, and asked Hallstein to be relieved of his duties at the
conference.i" Ophuls had been appointed honorary professor for patent law and Anglo-
American law at the University of Frankfurt in 1949 and in the same year had joined the
Federal Ministry of Justice.27I Unlike Hallstein, Mosler and Schlochauer, OphOls had no
firsthand US experience or contacts. As a result of Mosler's complaint, he was replaced
with Schlochauer in early October 1950.272 Mosler and Schlochauer first had been in
touch in 1947 when Schlochauer had invited his colleague to contribute an article to a
journal he had co-founded.i" An interdisciplinary publication not restricted to
268 Letter Mosler to Hallstein, 27 August 1950, MPG-Archiv/III.Abt.lZA 139, Kasten 2;
Copy letter Mosler to Ophuls, 3 December 1950, PA AA, B 15, Personal papers
Schlochauer, 355, Fiche 2.
269 Ibid. and Mosler to Bilfinger, 16 September 1950, PA AA, B 15, 54.
270 Letter Mosler to Hallstein, 28 August 1950, MPG-Archiv/lII.Abt.lZA 139, Kasten 2.
271 Cf. the curriculum vitae from the description ofPA AA, Personal papers Carl
Friedrich Ophuls.
272 Kurzprotokolle der Sitzung des Juristischen Sachverstandigen-Ausschusses, 4 and 5
October 1950, PA AA, B 15, 19.
273 Letter Schlochauer to Mosler, 3 February 1947, MPG-Archiv/III.Abt.lZA 139,
Kasten 8.
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academia, Europaische Foderation aimed to ' ... identify with scholarly objectivity the
foundations for the development and structure of Europe and those states outside of
Europe, whose spiritual and political origins lie within on the old continent,.274
Schlochauer's academic career had been interrupted when in 1933 he was excluded
from the University of Frankfurt because of his father's Jewish origins.275 As one
representative of the Federal Ministry of Justice in an Interministerial Committee,
especially appointed in June 1950 to deal with the Schuman Plan and managed by an
official of the Federal Ministry of Economics, Schlochauer also featured importantly
within German domestic policy-rnaking.f"
To sum up, the transatlantic university network suggests at least four main
observations. Firstly, the academic exchange programme between Frankfurt and
Georgetown and previously existing intra-German academic networks both contributed
significantly to the formation and operation of the transatlantic university network.
Although unfortunately, primary sources explored have not been sufficiently conclusive
to trace fully the scope of the network, it is safe to say that this group of legal experts
was informally engaged in transatlantic consultations. Consultations qualified as
transatlantic mainly because they involved actors who were familiar with both contexts
to mediate between American and European politico-legal concepts.
Secondly, Hallstein's reflections on European and American law produced as a
result of his stay in the US evidence a sophisticated approach to the mediating position
274 Europaische Foderation, vol. 1, no. 1, (1947).
275Lebenslauf, 10 January 1951, MPG-Archiv/IIl.Abt./ZA 139, Ordner 28.
276Interministerielle Besprechung zur Frage des Schuman Plans im
Bundesjustizministerium, 3 July 1950, protocole dated 5 July 1950, PA AA, Personal
papers Ophuls, 92. Cf also: Einleitung Findbuch, PA AA, B 15, Dr. Petsch, 1987.
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he would assume in the Schuman Plan conference. Kronstein and Mosler in turn
demonstrated a less reflected but more pragmatic approach to mediation. While
Hallstein was a particularly strong proponent of European integration and Mosler and
Kronstein, too, were in favour of European integration, it was Schlochauer who, through
editing the Europaische Foderatlon, pursued an academic strategy to bringing about
closer co-operation within Europe. Experts shared a commitment to advancing European
integration and a common world-view. It does not surprise therefore that Kronstein
wrote of his first meeting with Hallstein: 'We were dedicated to collaborating closely
and co-ordinating our future ideas and plans. With regard to our world-views, we were
somehow prepared for each other' . 277
Thirdly, primary sources have indicated the multiple network affiliations of
select actors within the group, which reveals a number of overlaps between different
networks. To start with, apart from Hallstein, actors who belonged to the transatlantic
university network as well as the German delegation, namely Ophuls and Mosler, and
later Schlochauer, also participated in the intergovernmental sub-committee of legal
experts that closely co-operated with the working group on institutional questions. This
conference group in turn comprised the six heads of delegation and therefore
Hallstein.278 Another overlap occurred when in September and October 1951 select
actors who had been involved in the German Schuman Plan delegation participated in
the negotiations on the treaty to replace the Occupation Statute. In the negotiations,
which also comprised the deconcentration and de-cartelization of the German heavy
277 Kronstein, Briefe, p. 248.
278 See Kurzprotokolle der Sitzung des Juristischen Sachverstandigen-Ausschusses,
Oktober 1950, PA AA, B 15, 19.
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industries, Hallstein, Mosler, OphUls as well as Grewe and representatives from the
federal ministries again bargained with leading USHICOG official Bowie.279
Lastly, like the US Embassy working group, the transatlantic university network
provides evidence for the significant role academic and other experts played at the
Schuman Plan conference. However, whereas the German actors presented here were
university lecturers of law and legal experts, for the US Embassy working group this
only applied to Bowie and Reuter. Uri's teaching portfolio encompassed philosophy and
economics. Beyond the scope of these informal transatlantic networks, however, policy
experts also featured prominently within the more formal consultation structures
established at the conference, which will be addressed next.
2.8 Marginalizing diverging policy preferences and forging
transnational coalitions: why the Schuman Plan
materialized
Expertise and knowledge have been identified as vital elements in accounting for
informal transatlantic co-operation. This raises the question as to what other forms of
expertise and knowledge existed at the Schuman Plan conference and if and how these
forms of expertise were utilized or marginalized at the negotiations. On 4 July 1950
working groups were established to provide an effective structure for consultations
among experts outside the meetings of national delegations. These specifically designed
expert groups were expected to deal with particular problems in the already specialized
279 For example Auswartiges Amt, Delegation fUrdie Ablosung des Besatzungsstatuts,
Tgb. Nr. 111/51: Kurze Niederschrift tiber die 1. Besprechung des Unterausschusses fur
die Allgemeine Vereinbarung am 24. Oktober 1951, PA AA, Personal papers Grewe,
57.
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area of coal and steel policy,z8o Working groups were set up to address the institutional
questions; commercial and tariff policy; nomenclature (definition of coal and steel);
production, prices and investments; salaries and social questions; and information. The
introduction of the working groups reinforced the significance of experts at the
conference. While these working groups have been acknowledged in the Iiterature,281
the notion and impact of the differentiation of various forms of policy expertise has not
been addressed.
The working group model is conventionally attributed to Monnet who allegedly
set up a similar model in the French Planning Commission.282 The model should,
however, really be ascribed to Hirsch. The deputy commissioner general had been
inspired by his collaboration during World War II with wartime British Minister for
Aircraft Production Stafford Cripps who had introduced him to this specific working
mode in London.i'" More importantly, the working methods practiced by leading
officials in the French Planning Commission complemented Schuman's preferences for
the inter-state negotiations. Monnet addressed the rationale behind setting up the
working groups in the same meeting with Adenauer on 23 May 1950, in which they
discussed the question of the German head of delegation. The planning commissioner
280 Conversations sur Ie plan Schuman: Seance restreinte du mardi apres-rnidi, 4 July
1950, AN 81 AJ 131, Folder 2.
281See for example Charles Barthel, 'Das Streben der Stahlhersteller nach einer
Gangbarmachung des Schuman-Plans. Einige Betrachtungen aus der Sicht Luxemburger
Regierungs- und Industriearchive (1950-1952)', in: Gilbert Trausch, Edmee Croise-
Schirtz, Martine Nies-Berchern, Jean-Marie Majerus, Charles Barthel, Le Luxembourg
face a la construction europeenne, Luxembourg: Centre d'etudes et de recherches
europeennes Robert Schuman, 1996, pp. 203-52.
282For Monnet's working methods see Francois Duchene, 'Jean Monnet's Methods', in:
Brinkley, Hackett (eds.), pp. 184-209.
283Previti Allaire, 'Les archives', p. 11.
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presented to the chancellor Schuman's preferences for the conference and stressed that
Adenauer, like Schuman in France, should remain in charge of the proposed plan in the
Federal Republic. To safeguard the political goals of the plan it would be important to
exclude two groups of actors. On the one hand, the national ministries concerned were
only to be involved once the political questions had been resolved. On the other hand,
the participation of the industry representatives should be limited. Monnet added that
instead, delegates should be people less directly interested with a broad political and
economic overview, such as professors and academics.i"
With their strategy to exclude specific forms of expertise, Schuman and Monnet
attempted to shape the parameters for the inter-state conference and ensure that the
political goal of advancing European integration through the coal and steel pool would
be realized. By identifying and hence trying to exclude civil servants, industrialists and
trade unionists Schuman and Monnet anticipated where domestic opposition to the
French government's initiative would come from. At the same time, they mapped a
strategy of how to fill the gap in expertise created by their exclusions by including
academic and other experts. In this context, not only the conference working groups, but
even more informal transatlantic co-operation contributed to providing the desired
policy expertise. Transatlantic policy networks fulfilled a specific function of policy
networks in helping at least to marginalize, actors who did not share the policy
preferences for supranational integration and a competitive market economy in the coal
and steel pool.
284 Schaffer, 'Konrad Adenauer', p. 135.
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But how successful was Schuman's and Monnet's strategy? In the case of
France, Schuman and Monnet succeeded in marginalizing the main bulk of the French
industry representatives who did not share their policy preferences. The French
producers in particular objected to not being part of the policy-making process.285
Further, Coal and Steel Union President Aubrun in a letter to French Prime Minister
Rene Pleven protested against the exclusion of the unions and the lack of co-operation
between his union and the French delegation.r" Charles Barthel has stressed that
Monnet continued to express discontent about the presence of industry 'technicians',
however.287 In late November 1950, he even expelled Luxembourg industrialist Jean-
Baptiste Henckes from a conference meeting. Henckes, however, was not only an
industry representative, but also a designated member of the delegation of Luxembourg,
which led their head of delegation, Albert Wehrer, to protest in writing against such
conduct.288 Bruce also observed that the Belgian and Luxembourg delegates' ... appear
to be subject to more effective pressure from industrial interests than [the] others' .289
In the case of Germany, Monnet in his meeting with Adenauer had successfully
contributed to shaping the parameters for the appointment of the German chief
negotiator. Monnet could not prescribe for Germany or, for that matter, the other
participating states how their delegations should be composed, nor how to run their
domestic consultation processes. Among the German delegation members were Walter
Bauer, the German observer at the IAR and the official responsible for the
285Barthel, 'Das Streben', p. 205.
286Letter Aubrun to Pleven, 16 November 1950, AN 81 AJ 135.
287Barthel, 'Das Streben', p. 217.
288Ibid.
289Telegramme Bruce to Secretary of State, 9 December 1950, NARA 850.33/12-950.
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deconcentration of the Southern German coal branch; Hans Boden, member of the board
of the Allgemeine Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft, a private electronics company; and Hans
vom Hoff, member of the board of Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB), the German
Trade Union Congress. For reasons that will be discussed in chapter 4, the powerful
DGB and the social democrat unions in other European countries supported the
Schuman Plan, at least until the introduction of the anti-trust articles in November
1950.290 Crucially, none of the German members of delegation represented the coal and
steel industries.!" Notably, Adenauer had tried previously to foster co-operation with
industrialists, which is supported by the fact that the chancellor as early as 1948 had
attempted to enlist the support of industrialist GUnter Henle for Franco-German
industrial co-operation, a notion that will be further discussed in chapter 3.
Moreover, a formal and hierarchical framework for consultation was established
in Germany. The newly established committees included the Cabinet Committee
composed of the Federal ministers for economics, Marshall Plan affairs, finances and
labour - in other words, the representatives of the ministries and the economic areas
affected by the Schuman Plan. This committee was presided over by the chancellor and
was responsible for providing the delegation with formal lnstructions.i" Further
agencies included the Interministerial Committee; the Secretariat for Questions of the
Schuman Plan, which was founded on 3 July 1950 in the Department for Foreign Affairs
290 Cf. Declaration of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (lCFTU),
DUsseldorf, 23 May 1950, AN 81 AJ 131.
291 While the participants lists are not complete and do not reflect the changes in the
composition of the delegations over the period of the conference, see for a first
introduction Hans Dichgans, Montanunion. Menschen und Institutionen, DUsseldorf,
Vienna: Econ Verlag, 1980, pp. 58-75; for the industry representatives see esp. pp. 67-8.
292 Sitzung des Bundeskabinetts, 16 June 1950, PA AA, B 15, 7.
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of the Chancellory to fulfil a co-ordinating function between the delegation and federal
institutions; and various German expert committees that were formed in line with the
policy areas of the conference working groups in Paris and provided the representatives
of the German industries with an opportunity to participate in the policy-making
process.293 In short, ministry officials and industry representatives were included at
different levels in domestic policy-making. Further, German delegates travelled back
and forth between Paris and Bonn to keep abreast the relevant committees in Germany
about the proceedings for the entire period of the conference. While this is somewhat
speculative, one could argue that the inclusion of a variety of interests in the domestic
policy-making process reflected the German government's attempt to convey their
commitment to the concept of a plurality of interests and transparency of policy-making.
To take these notions seriously may have seemed important to the Adenauer government
in the context of US occupation, in particular, and the wider foreign policy goal of
establishing the Federal Republic firmly within the US-led western alliance.
Evidence suggests that policy-making was largely concentrated in Paris. Despite
the existence of an elaborate consultation structure in Germany, Herbert Kraus, a law
professor at the University of Gottingen and a member of the German expert committee
for legal questions, in a letter to Adenauer asked to be relieved of his duty arguing that
the German committee would not be integrated sufficiently in the policy-making
process: 'Evidently, the legal work has moved to Paris ... I am convinced that the expert
committee for legal questions indeed is dead' .294 In fact, the legal sub-committee Kraus
293 For example letter Bundesvorstand des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes to
Adenauer, 1 July 1950, PA AA, B15, 15.
294 Letter Kraus to Adenauer, 6 October 1950, PA AA, B 15, 54.
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referred to did meet at least four times in early October 1950.295 However, Kraus'
observations, while they represent an individual testimony and should therefore not be
overemphasized, demonstrate frustration with the perceived lack of results from
participating in the policy- and decision-making process. One could argue that perhaps
because they were more tangible, formal consultation structures were more likely to be
controversial than the informal activities of transatlantic policy networks. At least until
the temporary breakdown of the inter-state conference in December 1950, which
resulted from the pending resolution of restructuring the German heavy industries,
Schuman, Monnet and Adenauer succeeded in concentrating policy-making largely in
Paris and at the same time excluded alternative expert advice.
Thus, Monnet's and Schuman's strategy to exclude certain types of experts was
mostly successful. While some national delegations may not have fitted their parameters
ideally, the establishment of working groups contributed to a fragmentation of
knowledge at the conference. Only few actors were aware of how the entire treaty,
rather than a specific segment of it, was developing. According to Barthel, this process
of fragmentation meant that only Monnet, the 'conductor of the Paris conference'F", had
the overall picture. In line with the previous assessment of Monnet as a policy
entrepreneur, however, this claim needs to be modified. Certainly, Monnet did have an
overall view of the negotiations, but so did other key actors, including Hallstein, Hirsch
and Uri. In fact, like Monnet, these actors each fulfilled a number of criteria that have
been identified as a pre-requisite to having a holistic view of the emerging treaty. One
295 Cf. Kurzprotokolle tiber die Sitzung des Pariser juristischen
Sachverstandigenausschusses, 4, 5, 12, 13 October 1950, PA AA, B15, 19.
296 Barthel, 'Das Streben', p. 217. For the significance of fragmentation see ibid. pp.
217-8.
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condition was sufficient access to informal transatlantic policy-making. Secondly, actors
were more likely to develop a holistic view on the basis of multiple working group
affiliations, which applied specifically to both Hirsch and Uri. Thirdly, these actors
participated in, or were affiliated via mutually relating actors, with the working group on
institutional questions and the sub-committee of legal experts.
The working group on institutional questions was responsible for designing the
institutional framework for the coal and steel community rather than negotiating
technical details. Reflecting its political mandate the group differed from the other
working groups with regard to its composition and included all heads of delegation,
which next to Hallstein, Monnet and Wehrer comprised Spierenburg for the
Netherlands, Max Suetens for Belgium and Paolo Emilio Taviani for Italy. While
Spierenburg, Suetens and Wehrer were diplomats, Taviani was also a leading Christian
democrat politician, who had been socialized along with Adenauer and Schuman in the
informal meetings of the European Christian democrats after World War II. He was very
close to the Italian Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi.297 Further taking part in the
meetings of this group were select members and legal experts of the delegations,
including for example, Blankenhorn, Mosler and Ophuls for the German delegation and
Clappier, Reuter and Foreign Ministry official and legal expert Lucien Hubert for the
French team_298The working group for institutional questions relied on the policy
expertise of the sub-committee oflegal experts.
Jointly, these two groups indicate a twofold flexibility of the policy-making
process at the conference. Firstly, following what was basically the conclusion of the
297 Kaiser, Christian Democracy, pp. 233-4.
298 List September 1950, PA AA, B 15, 57.
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negotiations of the institutional provisions before the summer break on 10 August 1950,
the working group for institutional questions in late August adapted its mandate and as
the Cornite restreint, or Reunion restrainte, the co-ordinating committee, synchronized
the mandates of the different conference working groups_299These working groups,
which had acted largely independently from the heads of delegation until the summer
break, now had to adjust their agendas. In early September 1950, for example, the co-
ordinating committee instructed the working group on commercial and tariff policy to
change their mandate and 'propose definite texts' for specific treaty articles.30o
Secondly, flexibility also pertained to the membership in the legal sub-committee, which
was not fixed. While OphUls, for example, participated in the group for the entire period
of the negotiations, Schlochauer came in for Mosler and Lagrange slowly replaced
Reuter. Lagrange, the lawyer at the Conseil d'Etat struck an impressive figure, which
both Bowie'?' and Steindorff recalled half a century later.302 On the one hand, the
participation of Mosler, Ophuls and Schlochauer in the sub-committee points to an
overlap of the legal sub-committee with both the transatlantic university network and the
German delegation. Reuter, on the other hand, provided the link to the US Embassy
working group and the French delegation.j'" These multiple affiliations of actors
strongly suggest that even in the crucial area of the institutional framework, the heads of
299Note Sahm to the Federal Chancellory, 5 September 1950, PA AA, B15, 99.
300 Reunions Groupe de travail politique commerciale et tarifaire, 5, 7 September 1950,
AN 81 AJ 144.
301 Interview Bowie.
302 Interview Steindorff. In the words of Steindorff who contrasted the rather non-
descript Reuter with the charismatic Lagrange: 'Everyone would turn when he entered
the room'.
303 Kurzprotokoll tiber die Sitzung des Pariser juristischen Sachverstandigenausschusses,
6 September 1950, PA AA, B15, 18.
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delegation did not have an exclusive and firm grip on decisions, but rather that there was
room for informal transatlantic policy-making.
In general, Schuman's and Monnet's preference to give a leading role to
academic and other experts at the inter-state conference materialized. One important
dimension of their gate-keeping function vis-a-vis socio-economic actors was the
admission and utilization of transatlantic policy networks. As a result of the
fragmentation and informal transatlantic policy-making, even if industry representatives
were included in domestic policy-making, they were marginalized in the negotiations. It
was in this spirit that Schuman expressed satisfaction with the role of experts and the
progress of the conference in a luncheon in New York on 20 September 1950.304
Having discussed Schuman's and Monnet's exclusion strategy it is noteworthy
that in principle, industrialists also shared the political goal of European co-operation.l"
More contested than the constitutional dimension of the treaty was its economic
framework. Crucially, with the exception of the French and Italian Metal Manufacturing
Syndicates, which regarded the access to raw materials at most favoured conditions as
an advantage for small and medium sized businesses,306 representatives of the heavy
industries did not share the preference for a competitive framework for the coal and steel
pool. While the main bulk of the industrialists, namely all those who did not share this
economic preference, were marginalized at the inter-state negotiations, the German
industrialists did playa major role in the separate bi-Iateral negotiations with Bowie and
304Cf. Schuman Luncheon, ACUE, Box 1, Folder 5.
305Barthel, 'Das Streben', p. 205.
306See for the Italian case Ruggero Ranieri, 'The Italian Steel Industry and the Schuman
Plan Negotiations', in: Schwabe (ed.), Die Anfange des Schuman-Plans, pp. 345-56,
here p. 347.
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McCloy on the deconcentration and de-cartelization in late 1950 and early 1951. In
contrast to the inter-state conference, which was supposed to advance Franco-German
relations and help the Federal Republic to achieve a greater degree of equality in the
international community, the Adenauer government could not marginalize industrialists
from these deliberations that directly concerned their enterprises. Further, the
introduction of the anti-trust articles into the draft treaty and the attempts to resolve the
pending reorganization of the German heavy industries resulted in the temporary
withdrawal of trade union support for the Schuman Plan, which will be addressed in
chapter 4.
These observations regarding the industrialists and trade unions draw attention to
the interface between policy-making at the inter-state conference and domestic politics
in the future member-states, particularly Germany and France. The remainder of this
sub-chapter therefore addresses the broader framework of political and societal support
for the Schuman Plan. This analysis is informed by the notion that the activities of
transatlantic policy networks alone do not account for why the French government's
initiative was translated into a treaty, which subsequently was ratified in the six
member-states. Instead, the supranational institutional framework for core Europe on the
one hand, and the anti-trust provisions for the coal and steel pool on the other, were
supported by transnational coalitions of different individual and collective actors. While
these actors shared the policy preferences for a supranational and competitive Europe,
they sometimes needed to align diverging core beliefs and values, which were
underlying these policy preferences. In short, this broader contextualization is essential
to understanding why the Schuman Plan materialized. Lastly, while key aspects of the
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advocacy structures will be addressed here, further reference regarding their significance
for policy development will be made in the following chapters.
At the time of the Schuman Plan negotiations, Christian democratic parties were
the dominant political force in all six future member-states. Crucial political support for
the French government's initiative drew on transnational social capital and consensus
reached through informal co-operation of Christian democratic politicians. Informal
meetings proved important to preparing early Franco-German rapprochement and took
place in the Nouvelles Equipes Internationales (NEI), which was created in 1947 and a
distant forerunner of the European People's Party, and the secret high-level meetings of
leading Christian democrats, including Adenauer, Schuman and Taviani, in the Geneva
Circle. From 1947-50 European Christian democrats established vital political
consensus on advancing European integration through Franco-German co-operation in
the coal and steel sectors and without the participation of the UK.307 Kaiser has shown
that deep-rooted beliefs and concepts were responsible for the Christian democrats'
embracing of supranational integration, which provoked the sel f-exclusion of the UK.
Accordingly, the political concept of supranationality shared similarities with the
organization of the Catholic Church with its 'supranational' centre in Rome. Further,
supranationality was tied to the notion of European integration served as a tool to restore
western civilization within the boundaries of the Carolingian Empire but on democratic
foundations. Lastly, the delegation of authority from the national to the supranational
European level also matched the principle of subsidiarity from Catholic social teaching,
307 Kaiser, Christian Democracy, chapter 6, pp. 191-252.
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which embraced the dispersion of authority across different societal levels.30sCrucially,
transnational Christian democracy had devised a concrete action plan to advance
supranational integration.
Christian democrats with their supranational approach went beyond the general
notion that European political co-operation was desirable, which was evidenced by the
existing intergovernmental co-operation in the Council of Europe and the OEEC.
Although many socialists particularly in France and Belgium had strongly federalist
preferences, they did not share the ideological beliefs underlying the supranational
preference of transnational Christian democracy. What was more, they did not favour
advancing European integration without the UK, which was still under a Labour
government. While the French socialists highlighted the significance of Franco-German
reconciliation and the potential of establishing public authority for the basic industries in
their endorsement of the Schuman Plan,309they only fully supported the coal and steel
pool after the British Labour party issued a 'Eurosceptic' policy document excluding the
possibility of UK participation in the arrangement.l'"
Kurt Schumacher, the leader of the German social democratic party initially also
embraced the French government's initiative at European co-operation and the socio-
political potential of the plan. From the beginning, however, Schumacher cautioned that
the acceptance of the Schuman Plan would confirm the separation of Germany and
constitute a barrier to reunification should the coal and steel pool be realized.
Ultimately, Schumacher's nationalist preference formed the basis of his argument
308 Ibid. 228-9.
309 Telegramme Bonbright to Department of State, 13 May 1950, NARA 850.33/5-1350.
310 Kaiser, Christian Democracy, p. 246.
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against the emerging treaty during the negotiations and even more fervently, in the
ratification debate."! Since the German social democratic party was internally divided-
high-ranking social democrats indicated their preference for western integration - and
the trade unions came down in support of the Schuman Plan, Schumacher's opposition
to the coal and steel treaty represented no real threat to core Europe formation. Further
opposition to the Schuman Plan originated with the French Communists as well as
Charles de Gaulle's Rassemblement du Peuple Francais that 'denounced the plan as a
sellout to ... capitalists, the Germans, or faceless supranational bureaucrats (or all
three),.312 Lastly, in Italy, Alcide de Gaspari needed to enlist the support of his partners
in the coalition government against opposition to the treaty from the communists, some
socialists, monarchists and neo-fascists.i"
The Christian democrats' preference for supranational integration resonated with
that of the US government. The Truman administration had since the inception of the
Marshall Plan promoted European integration beyond intergovernmental co-operation.
Because of ideological differences the Democrats of the Truman government did not
regard European Christian democratic parties as preferred allies to realize supranational
integration and initially tried to foster co-operation with social democratic and left-
liberal groups. However, as a result of a learning process, not the least in occupied
Germany, the US government came to regard Christian democrats as suitable political
allies on the issue of European integration. Acheson's diverse first encounters with
311Kurt Klotzbach. 'Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie und der Schuman-Plan', in:
Schwabe (ed.), Die Arfange des Schuman-Plans, pp. 333-44, here pp. 335-6; cf. also
Kaiser, Christian Democracy, p. 220.
312Craig Parsons, A Certain Idea of Europe, Ithaca and London: Cornell University
Press, 2003, p. 57.
313Haas, The Uniting of Europe, p. 140.
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Adenauer and Schumacher in 1949 illustrate this development. Deeply impressed with
the German chancellor, Acheson was 'struck by the imagination and wisdom of his
approach=!" to the question of integrating Germany into western Europe. In contrast,
Acheson remembered that Schumacher 'combined a harsh and violent nature with
nationalistic and aggressive ideas'. 315 Moreover, State Department officials began
encouraging the French government to take the lead in initiating European integration
from 1949 onwards.?" In October 1949, Acheson in a letter to Schuman, following up
on their recent encounter.i'" spelled out US policy. In the context of the division of
Germany and the 'east-west split,3IS, the occupying powers, according to Acheson,
should determine the future course of the Federal Republic: 'Now is the time for French
initiative and leadership of the type required to integrate the German Federal Republic
promptly and decisively into Western Europe. Delay will seriously weaken the
possibilities of success'r'" Acheson further proposed that French leadership should
focus on promoting Germany's participation in international organizations rather than
imposing policies on the German government. Just after the announcement of the
Schuman Plan, John Foster Dulles, then a consultant to Acheson, acknowledged that the
policy proposal fitted in with larger US foreign policy objectives: 'This proposal is
along the lines which Secretary Marshall and I thought about ... in 1947 but which we
314Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 341.
315Ibid.
316Cf. Klaus Schwabe, 'The Origins of the United States' Engagement in Europe, 1946-
1952', in: Heller, Gillingham (eds.), N.A. T.O: the Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and
the Integration of Europe, pp. 161-92, here pp. 177-8.
317Cf. interview Clappier.
318Letter Acheson to Schuman, 30 October 1949, Fond Robert Schuman de la
Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, 3/1/4.
319Ibid.
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did not believe the French would ever accept'. 320 Even more, during the period of
agenda setting, high-ranking US foreign policy officials actively supported the Christian
democrats' preference to exclude the UK government. Following discussions with
Hirsch, Monnet and McCloy, Harriman, for example, guarded against appointing an
official of the ECA mission in Germany to participate in the negotiations on the grounds
that 'to do so would invite British participation that might be obstructive' .321
Although leading US foreign policy officials and Christian democratic
politicians shared the preference for supranational European integration, they differed in
their appreciation of the beliefs and values underlying this preference as will be
demonstrated. As the incident of Monnet and McCloy's joint coaching to secure
Acheson and Bruce's endorsement of the Schuman Plan corroborates, US officials and
European Christian democrats also differed in their assessment of the suitability of the
choice of the coal and steel sectors was to advance European integration. To bridge the
ideological gap and to secure the ongoing support of the US government, Schuman
relied on Monnet's role as a transatlantic mediator. To explain the co-operation of
Monnet and Schuman as part of coalition building for a supranational Europe, two
further observations are important. Firstly, the planning commissioner did not share
Schuman's Catholicism or party affiliation, but needed to forge a coalition with the
French foreign minister to realize his own preference for 'functional' western European
integration beyond intergovernmental co-operation. Monnet sought to profit from
Schuman's transnational political capital to realize the policy proposal, co-written by
320 John Foster Dulles to the Secretary of State, 10 May 1950, 740.5/5-1050, FRUS
1950 III, pp. 695-6.
321 Telegramme Harriman to Acheson, 20 May 1950, 850.33/5-2050, FRUS 1950 III,
pp. 702-4, here p. 704.
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Hirsch, Reuter and Uri, and to escape his 'double-marginalization' within the Council of
Europe and French domestic politics. As a member of the French state elite and
bureaucracy Monnet had not participated in the Congress of The Hague, where national
bureaucratic elites crucially were excluded from the policy-making process.322 Probably
Monnet would have been unlikely to recruit sufficient support for his policy preference
for supranational sectoral integration among the variety of federalist movements at The
Hague. Ironically however, Monnet was also isolated within the French bureaucracy that
by and large did not share his preference.V' Secondly, an alliance with Schuman also
required trade-offs for Monnet. As a consequence of attaching himself to the policy
preference of the European Christian democrats, Monnet was forced to part with his
personal preference of including the UK government in some form in the Schuman
Plan.324 Realistically, Monnet may have well anticipated the 3 June 1950 announcement
of the UK government that they would not join the inter-state conference.f" The intense
negotiations that took place between Hirsch, Monnet, Uri and UK officials in London
from 14 to 19 May 1950326 however, indicate that it was a preference Monnet only gave
322 Antonin Cohen, 'Constitutionalism without Constitution: Transnational Elites
Between Political Mobilization and Legal Expertise in the Making of a Constitution for
Europe (1940s-1960s)', in: Law and Social Inquiry, vol. 32, no. I (2007), pp. 109-35,
herep. us.
323 Kaiser, Christian Democracy, p. 224.
324 On Monnet's preference see Gilbert Trausch, 'Der Schuman-Plan zwischen Mythos
und Realitat, Der Stellenwert des Schuman-Planes', in Trausch, Croise-Schirtz, Nies-
Berchem, Majerus, Barthel (eds.), Le Luxembourg, pp. 45-65, here pp. 50-1.
325 Cf. Summary of the Anglo-French Discussions, May, June 1950, Parliamentary
Publication, FO 371, 85849; Schroder, Jean Monnet und die amerikanische
Unterstutzung, p. 115.
326 See for example the notes of a meeting held at the Hyde Park Hotel between Monnet,
Roger Makins, Edwin Plowden, E.A. Hitchman (Treasury), 16 May 1950, HAEU,
Foreign Office Files for Post-War Europe Series One: The Schuman Plan and the
European Coal and Steel Community, 1950-55, Part I: 1950-53 (FO), Microfilm, FO
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up reluctantly. In sum, transnational coalition building required compromising policy
solutions, while at the same time it represented a necessary pre-requisite to safeguard the
political acceptance of the ECSC treaty.
The acceptance of the anti-trust provisions relied on another transatlantic
advocacy coalition formed by a number of actors who shared their policy preference for
a competitive market economy and consumer protection. Among the industry
representatives only the French and Italian Metal Manufacturing Syndicates supported
the anti-trust provisions, whereas the trade unions, particularly German trade unionists,
at least guaranteed sufficient permissive consensus. Opposition to the anti-trust
provisions carne not only from the industrialists, but also from the German social
democrats, who favoured traditional socialist economic policies including the transfer of
the heavy industries to public ownership and comprehensive planning.327 Important
partners in the advocacy coalition for a competitive framework for the coal and steel
pool were domestically marginalized political forces in both Germany and France, who
had campaigned for the introduction of national anti-trust laws with the support of and,
sometimes in co-operation with, US officials. Their policy preference only could be
realized through the use of transnational political and expert capital. Against this
backdrop, the following chapters will examine in detail how transatlantic policy
networks contributed to shaping the negotiations on the institutional framework and the
anti-trust provisions.
371/85841; note for record, meeting Hitchman with Monnet, Hirsch, Uri, 17 May 1950,
ibid.
327 Klotzbach, 'Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie'.
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3 The institutional framework
3.1 Introduction
This chapter demonstrates how transatlantic policy networks contributed to the shaping
of the institutional framework of the ECSC. Comprising a High Authority, a Special
Council of Ministers, a Common Assembly and a Court of Justice, the institutional
system combined the supranational principle with a federal structure. Literature has
portrayed the emergence of the institutional system as the result of a bargaining process
of domestically derived and more or less coherent policy positions, in which the French,
German and Dutch delegations feature as the main players.328 Accordingly, 'the French',
under the leadership of Monnet, set the agenda by introducing the supranational
principle and the idea of central government into the coal and steel treaty. These notions
were adjusted mainly to accommodate various proposals by 'the Dutch' and other
Benelux governments to integrate the member-state governments in the institutional
architecture. By the same token, 'the Germans' were responsible for introducing the
notions of federalism and separation of power into the ECSC treaty. In contrast, it will
be demonstrated that these policy positions were less coherent. A much more nuanced
picture of the genesis of the institutional system will be portrayed by developing a long-
term transatlantic perspective and integrating informal policy-making processes.
The chapter is structured around five stages in the genesis of the institutions
emerging from the Schuman Plan conference. In the first sub-chapter, the Schuman Plan
328 Cf. Kusters, 'Die Verhandlungen tiber das institutionelle System'; Lappenkuper, 'Der
Schuman PIan'; idem., Die deutsch-franzosischen Beziehungen 1949-1963, vol. 1;
Spierenburg, Poidevin, The History of the High Authority, pp. 9-40.
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declaration will be introduced as a point of departure for the period of agenda setting
and the inter-state negotiations and will be contextualized broadly within earlier
initiatives to unite Europe; to establish a European federation; and to pool the western
European heavy industries (3.2). The purpose here is to sketch the scope and depth of
the multi-facetted debate on European integration and to address the transatlantic
element to this debate rather than to illustrate how actors drafting the Schuman Plan
declaration or later, the institutional provisions, drew on specific previous schemes.
Against this background, the next sub-chapter discusses the core institutional feature of
the proposal of the French government, namely the high authority and the problem of
accountability. Particular emphasis will be placed on the role of the drafters of the
proposal as mediators between different constitutional and administrative traditions
(3.3). Internal French policy papers show that the initial institutional preferences were
partially adjusted even before the formal beginning of the inter-state negotiations. Only
after the opening of the conference, however, did the concept of a central or unitary
institutional system give way to a federal system with four institutions and separation of
powers. This development is the subject of the following sub-chapter, which also
highlights the influence of both the US Embassy working group and the transatlantic
university network during the early days of the negotiations (3.4). The fifth sub-chapter
addresses the changed setting for transatlantic policy-making after the summer break.
While in principle the attention of the US Embassy working group had shifted from the
institutional to the economic, more specifically, the anti-trust provisions of the treaty,
the ongoing discussion about supranationality and the development of the court show
the role of transatlantic policy networks during this period (3.5). The last sub-chapter
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will summarize the decisions the Conference of Foreign Ministers took in April 1951 on
the political questions the negotiating parties had left open. Finally, the immediate
impact of transatlantic policy networks on the ECSC institutional framework and their
long-term impact on institutional designs for core Europe will be evaluated (3.6).
3.2 'Bold, constructive'J", but not unique: the Schuman Plan
declaration
At least three perspectives of the Schuman Plan declaration moulded the point of
departure for the negotiations on the institutional framework. Firstly, the initiative of the
French government can be contextualized within a series of proposals for European
unity that can be traced back as far as Greek antiquity. These proposals have remained
an integral element of political theory and discourse ever since the formation of the
modem state system in Europe.330 In the period after World War I concepts to unite
Europe flourished.l" This time such concepts were no longer tied to the pursuit for
hegemony of one of the European great powers, but proposed European integration as
an alternative to the diverse and aggressive assertion of power through nation-states.332
329 Cr. chapter 12, A Bold, Constructive Act (1949-1950), in Jean Monnet, Memoirs,
London: Collins, 1978, pp. 288-317.
330 Denis de Rougement, Europa. Vom Mythos zur Wirklichkeit, Munich: Prestel-Verlag,
1962.
331 See for example Carl H. Pegg, Evolution of the European Idea, 1914-1932, Chapel
Hill, London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1983; Derek Heather, The Idea of
European Unity, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1992, chapter 6; for the
perspective of the Weimar Republic see also Reinhard Frommelt, Paneuropa oder
Mitteleuropa. Einigungsbestrebungen im Kalkul deutscher Wirtschaft und Politik 1925-
1933, Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahreshefte fUrZeitgeschichte, vol. 34, Munich: R.
Oldenbourg, 1977.
332 Wilfried Loth, Der Weg nach Europa: Geschichte der europaischen Integration
1939-1957, Gottingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1996, p. 9.
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Motives to integrate Europe included: safeguarding peace; finding joint solutions to the
production problems of national industries, especially against the backdrop of rising
competition from the US; and, defending the existing political and social system against
Soviet Communisrn.P' The emergence of plans for integrating Europe was further
helped by the fact that the newly established League of Nations, which attempted to
replace the balance-of-power-system between the states with an international system of
collective security, proved ineffective during the political and economic crises of the
1920s and 1930s. The League of Nations also served the starting point for a specific
group of movements to promote European unification.334
A second perspective of the Schuman Plan declaration relates to the preference
for a federal system of government, which represented an integral part of many
proposals for European unity. The complexity of the federal heritage and the attached
political ideas and strategies necessitate that the following remarks are cursory at best. A
basic definition of federalism maintains that authority is exercised on at least two
different levels, usually the central and the regional level of govemment.335 The
division of power between different levels of government is laid down in a constitution.
Further, regional representation is an important part of the central government. 336 One
advantage of federalism is to prevent the concentration of governmental power. A
federal system of government, therefore, functions as a safeguard for democracy and
333 Ibid. p. 10.
334 See Pegg, Evolution of the European Idea. chapter 18, pp. 157-65.
335 Andrew Heywood, Key Concepts in Politics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2000, pp. 240-2.
336 Keith S. Rosenn, 'Federalism in the Americas in Comparative Perspective', Inter-
American Law Review, vol. 26, no. 1 (1994), pp. 3-50, here pp. 5-6.
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against tyranny,337 particularly the rise of autocratic and totalitarian regimes. This core
feature helps to explain the ongoing appeal of the federalist system of government.
Moreover, the democratic dimension of federalism gives one good reason for the
popularity and model function of the US system of government, in particular. A
transatlantic viewpoint on the Schuman Plan declaration and the federal perspective
requires that four observations regarding the American model be addressed briefly.
Firstly, the US set a federal constitution precedent. In the former British
colonies, a modern federal system was for the first time realized on the basis of the
written constitution of 1787 and the federal Bill of Rights - the first ten amendments to
the constitution - of 1791. Replacing the Articles of Confederation the federal
Constitution of the United States of America was ratified by the people and thus
represented the break-through of the principle of popular sovereignty.l" Its
constitutional basis coupled with the ratification process distinguished American
federalism from historic predecessors such as the Swiss federation. From a
contemporary perspective one has to concede that the US at their founding did not fulfil
core criteria for democracy since participation in the political process was severely
restricted and excluded major portions of the population on the basis of race and
gender.339 Having said this, American federalism anticipated the advance of truly
representative democracy. And the democratic dimension persisted even though the
337Ibid. p. 7.
338For interpretations of the American Revolution see Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological
Origins of the American Revolution, Cambridge/MA, London: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1992 [1967]; Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic
1776-1787, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969; and more recently
idem., The Radicalism of the American Revolution, New York: Random House, 1993.
339Cf. also Robert Alan Dahl, How Democratic is the American Constttutton", New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2001.
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balance between the central government and the states changed dramatically in the
course of the 19th and zo" centuries, notably following the Civil War and later, the Great
Depression. A cornerstone in this development came with the US Supreme Court's 1947
decision in Adamson versus California.t'" In his dissenting opinion, Justice Hugo Black,
proposed a new reading of the 14th amendment, one of the so-called Civil War
amendments (amendments 13, 14 and 15 to the constitution). According to Black, the
Federal Bill of Rights, the catalogue of fundamental rights of the federal constitution,
should not only be applicable to the federal level, but also to the states. Crucially,
Black's interpretation triggered a debate in American constitutional law that ultimately
led to a shift of authority away from the states to the federal government. 341
Secondly, the American model has a utopian dimension. Since Europeans first
started to settle in the New World, America simultaneously served as an experiment to
create a better world and a mirror for the future of the Old World. In practical terms,
studies of the American political system were embedded in a larger intellectual tradition,
which preceded the institutionalization of US federalism in the late 18th century and
entailed travelling to America. These journeys promised the travellers an insight into the
future of Europe by crossing the Atlantic. Claus Offe has contextualized the famous
journeys of French aristocrat and political philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville (1831-32),
German sociologist Max Weber (1903) and German theorist and emigrant Theodor
Adorno (1938) to America within:
340 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
341 For an introduction cf. William E. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment: From
Political Principle to Judicial Doctrine, Cambridge/MA, London: Harvard University
Press, 1988.
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... a tradition in European social theory going back to the late seventeenth
century, for which the nature of European problems and the range of possible
solutions were to be understood through their reflection in the realities of
America.342
Thirdly, with its utopian and democratic dimension, American federalism
differed from alternative federal models that originated in the 19th century and served as
potential points of reference for federalist thought and rhetoric. Important cases in point
were the Zollverein, the German Customs Union, of 1834 and the North German
Confederation of 1866, an alliance under Prussia's leadership. As a result of the
particularity of the US model, ever since the late 18th century the debate on federalism
has included a transatlantic element. The US has functioned as a model for political
theorists and practitioners exploring alternative systems of government in Europe and
elsewhere.
Fourthly, American federalism has attracted particular attention in times of
political and economic turmoil and change such as the inter-war years and the post-war
period. While American federalism induced positive associations of stable and liberal
democratic government, this went hand in hand with a deep-rooted socio-cultural
opposition to American materialism. Conservatives of the right and left political forces
rejected what they perceived as the American way of life and American-style society,
most importantly mass consumerism. For European societies after 1945 Richard Kuisel
has summarized the ambiguity of the American model: 'postwar America appeared as
both a model and a menace' .343 As a result of this tension, US federalism, rather than
342 Claus Offe, Reflections on America. Tocquevil/e, Weber and Adorno in the United
States, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005 [German 2004], p. 3.
343 Kuisel, Seducing the French, p. 3.
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serving as a model, provided terms and concepts that intellectuals and politicians
utilized in the European discourse. A case in point for the semantic application of
American federalism in the inter-war period that resonated well into the post-World War
II era was Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi's scheme for a 'Pan-European' union, first
published in 1923, in which he called for the formation of the 'United States of
Europe' .344 Here, the tribute to the US fulfilled the specific function of giving a sense of
direction to the Pan-European project.345 References to the 'US of Europe' were also
frequent after 1945, as evidenced, for example, by former British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill's speech in Zurich in September 1946.346 Even in 1955, after he had
left the office of president of the High Authority of the ECSC, Monnet drew on an
American federal concept when he founded his' Action Committee for the United States
of Europe' .347
In the European context of expressions of federal preferences, a number of
proposals and trends helped to set the stage for the Schuman Plan declaration. One of
the celebrated federal proposals from the inter-war period is the initiative presented by
French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand and the French delegation to the League of
Nations' General Assembly on 5 September 1929.348 As a matter of fact the Schuman
344 Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europa, Wien: Pan-Europa Verlag, 1923.
345 Cf. Vanessa Conze, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi. Umstrittener Visionar Europas,
Gleichen: Muster-Schmidt, 2004; Frommelt, 'Paneuropa oder Mitteleuropa'; Anita
Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, Botschafter Europas. Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi
und die Paneuropa-Bewegung in den zwanziger und dreifJiger Jahren, Vienna, Cologne,
Weimar: Bohlau, 2004.
346 Winston Churchill, Speech at the University of Zurich, 19 September 1946,
http://www.ena.lul(accessed 20 February 2008).
347 Cf. Monnet, Memoirs, chapter 16, pp. 405-30.
348 Discours pour I'Union Europeenne, 5 September 1929, in: Achille Elisha, Aristide
Briand. La paix mondiale et I 'union europeenne, Louvain-Ia-Neuve: Academia Brylant,
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Plan declaration referred to the Briand Memorandum of I May 1930, which
substantiated the earlier speech: 'By making herself for more than twenty years the
champion of a united Europe, France has had as her essential objective the maintenance
of peace,.349 Certainly, parallels between the texts of 1930 and 1950 can be detected,
among them the motivation to safeguard peace, the notion of the interdependency of
nations and the idea that a federal union could only be achieved gradually.l" With
regard to the point of departure of the Schuman Plan conference, however, it seems
more important to note that the drafters of the Schuman Plan declaration chose to place
their plan in the context of the earlier proposal although it did not materialize.
According to Monnet, Clappier, who helped with the final revision of the text, inserted
the reference as 'homage to Aristide Briand'."! One could argue that in addition to
fulfilling a rhetorical function, the reference echoed the constitutional dimension of the
Briand memorandum. In 1930, this aspect of the memorandum was remarkable in
privileging political over economic integration and laying out 'a first institutional
architecture for a European legal and political order'. 352
World War II gave rise to a growing popularity of forms of co-operation
between European states, including federalist solutions. Still relevant in this context are
2000 [2nd revised ed.], pp. 259-68; cf. also for a detailed assessment Pegg, Evolution of
the European Idea, chapters 13-18.
349Declaration officielle du gouvemement francais, 9 May 1950; Bonbright to Acheson,
9 May 1950.
350Cf. Jules Hermans, L 'evolution de la pensee europeenne d'Aristide Bland, Nancy:
Idoux, 1965.
351Monnet, Memoirs, p. 300.
352Mikael Rask Madsen and Antoine Vauchez, 'European Constitutionalism at the
Cradle: Law and Lawyers in the Construction of a European Political Order (1920-
1960)" in: Jettinghoff, Alex, Schepel, Harm (eds.),ln Lawyers' Circles. Lawyers and
European Legal Integration, 's-Gravenhage: Red Business Information, 2004, pp. 15-
34, here p. 18.
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the attempts of Lipgens to write the history of post-war European integration. While
Lipgens' approach was characterized by a distinctly normative direction, which
reflected his belief in a federalist system,353 he has crucially demonstrated the scope and
the depth of plans for unifying and federating Europe.354 Among the concrete schemes
that emerged during the wartime period was the joint confederation established by the
Polish and the Czechoslovak exile governments in London in 1942.355Another scheme,
which anticipated key elements of the Schuman Plan declaration, was that of a western
European regional federation.P" This policy solution presented itself in a number of
variants. Paul Van Zeeland, for example, the former president of the Belgian National
Bank and prime minister, who served as foreign minister at the time of the Schuman
Plan conference, had promoted a western European customs and monetary union since
the 1930s.357 A limited form of western European regional co-operation first
materialized in 1943, when the exile governments of Belgium and Luxembourg, whose
economic union was created by treaty in 1921 and established in 1922,358 signed a
monetary agreement with the Netherlands to co-operate in exchange rate management
353Kaiser, "'Oberzeugter Katholik'".
354Lipgens, Europa-Foderationsplane; and idem., Die Anfange der europaischen
Einigungspolitik.
355Lipgens, Europa-Foderationsplane, pp. 451-53.
356These remarks are guided by Loth, Der Weg nach Europa, p. 17.
357Cf. Vincent Dujardin, Michel Dumoulin, Paul Van Zeeland 1893-1973, Brussels:
Editions Racine, 1997.
358James E. Meade, The Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union, 1921-1939. Lessons
from an Early Experiment, Essays in International Finance vol. 25, Princeton: [Princeton
University Press], 1956.
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and mutual credit supplies. In 1944, the three governments signed the agreement for the
Benelux customs union, which was established in 1948.359
Furthermore, in 1943, while working with the French Committee of National
Liberation in Algiers for the post-war reconstruction of France, Monnet discussed with
Hirsch and Rene Mayer, who had been involved in the modernization and co-ordination
of the French railways into a single system, the idea of a federation of European states
coupled with the joint organization of their heavy industries."? As Michael Burgess has
pointed out, Monnet never attached himself to any federalist group, but believed ' ... that
by forging specific functional links between states in a way which does not directly
challenge sovereignty the door to federation will gradually be opened'. 361 Instead of
trying to establish a causal link between earlier federal proposals and the Schuman Plan,
it needs to be stressed that as a consequence of a transnational debate on federal
schemes, these schemes were Europeanized during the war. From this viewpoint, the
endorsement of a shared policy preference by the resistance and federalist movements
created the basis for the later permissive consensus within the societies of the six future
ECSC member-states that made possible the realization of core Europe in 1952.
A third perspective of the Schuman Plan declaration further shaped the point of
departure for the negotiations on the institutional framework, however. This was the
idea of improving Franco-German relations through the creation of a coal and steel pool,
359 Wendy Asbeek Brusse, Tariffs, Trade and European Integration, 1947-1957. From
Study Group to Common Market, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997, p. 54.
360 Monnet, Memoirs, p. 293. Cf. also excerpts from Jean Monnet, note de reflex ion, 5
August 1943, in Gerard Bossuat, Lesfondateurs de I'Europe, Paris: Belin, 1994, p. 87.
361 Michael Burgess, Federalism and European Union. Political Ideas, Influences and
Strategies in the European Community, 1972-1987, London, New York: Routledge,
1998, p. 52.
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which had important precursors. As early as 1923, at the height of the crisis between
France and Germany over the Ruhr, Konrad Adenauer, then the mayor of British-
occupied Cologne, proposed the establishment of a 'Rhenisch Republic' within a
heavily de-centralized Germany.362 Crucially Adenauer argued that peace between
France and Germany relied on western European industrial integration.363 In line with
the prevalent view during the inter-war period, the problem of European integration
accordingly required economic rather than legal tools and concepts.i" Indeed, in 1926,
the twofold notion of industrial co-operation and Franco-German reconciliation
materialized when, following the initiative of the Luxembourg industrialist Emile
Mayrisch, European steel industrialists formed the International Steel Cartel (lSC), the
first tangible project at European inregration.i'" As noted above, in 1943, Monnet, too,
proposed the fusion of the heavy industries. After World War II Adenauer galvanized
the crucial support of the concerned industries for the advancement of relations with
France through industrial co-operation, when he encouraged German industrialist Henle
to come up with a proposal for collaboration. As a result, Henle produced a
memorandum on 'The Ruhr area and European co-operation'<" in October 1948, in
362 For a detailed, if biased account see Henning Kohler, Adenauer und die rheinische
Republik: der erste An/auf, 1918-1924, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1986.
363 Hans-Peter Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer. A German Politician and Statesman in a
Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, vol. 1: 1876-1952, Providence and
Oxford: Berghahn Books 1995 [German 1986], pp. 171-94.
364 Rask Madsen and Vauchez, 'European Constitutionalism at the Cradle', p. 18.
365See Ulrich Nocken, 'International Cartels and Foreign Policy: the Formation of the
International Steel Cartel 1924-1926', in: Clemens Wurm (ed.), Internationale Kartelle
und Aussenpolitik, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden Gmbh, 1989, pp. 33-82.
366GUnter Henle, 'Ruhrgebiet und europaische Zusammenarbeit', 26 October 1948,
Klockner-Archiv, Nachlass Henle, Privat, Reden, quoted by Werner Buhrer, Ruhrstahl
und Europa. Die Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen- und Stahlindustrie und die Anfange der
Europaischen Integration 1945-52, Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahreshefte fur
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which he argued, amongst others, that German resources were essential to meet the
demand for steel anticipated by the Marshall Plan.367 Importantly, it was a major
industry representative rather than a foreign policy official who actually tied the
projected Franco-German industrial collaboration to the Marshall Plan's objective to
advance European co-operation. Finally, in March 1950, the German chancellor
suggested to Bidault the idea of co-operation in the two industries'" and in two
interviews with the International News Service, an American news agency, once again
advocated the idea ofa Franco-German union.369
Adenauer's statements in particular suggest two observations. Firstly, while
these interviews did not lead to a concrete policy initiative by the German government,
they underline that the idea of a Franco-German industrial pool was not unique in the
post-war period.37o Secondly, the chancellor's remarks indicate that the German
government was prepared to endorse a proposal for improving Franco-German relations
and, therefore, further substantiate the claim that leading Christian democrats in the two
states had reached political consensus on advancing European integration.i" These
observations escape the attention of political scientist Craig Parsons. In his recent
monograph Parsons argues that the Schuman Plan was 'the first postwar initiative to
envision a Europe centred on a Franco-German partnership,.372 Parsons' perspective
results from focusing primarily on French domestic politics and the role of the French
Zeitgeschichte, vol. 53, Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1986, p. 127. Cf. ibid. pp. 126-37 for a
discussion of industrial initiatives.
367Ibid. p. 128.
368Kaiser, Christian Democracy, p. 247.
369Kusters, 'Die Verhandlungen tiber das institutionelle System', p. 74.
370Ibid. and in more detail Kaiser, Christian Democracy, pp. 226-7.
371Cf. Kaiser, Christian Democracy, chapter 6, pp. 191-252 and chapter 7, pp. 253-303.
372Parsons, A Certain Idea, p. 37.
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government and state elite in policy formation.373 To be fair, however, Parsons is not
alone in overstating the role of French politics and actors in initiating the Schuman Plan
declaration. To support this claim, the following sections will discuss the literature
concerning two main areas of explanation, namely the (partially self-ascribed) role of
Monnet and the French state elite in developing and prompting the Schuman Plan
declaration and the foreign policy and economic necessities responsible for its adoption
by the French government.
One of the major voices in the canon of literature emphasizing the predominant
role of Monnet and his team on the Schuman Plan declaration belongs to Monnet
himself. In his memoirs, Monnet provides a personal, slightly melodramatic version of
how he arrived at the idea of the coal and steel pool in the spring of 1950. On long walks
in the Swiss Alps, Monnet apparently pondered on the problem of how France should
deal with Germany to safeguard peace in Europe.374 Monnet argued firstly, that the
solution to prevent future wars in Europe was to achieve European unity. Secondly, the
solution needed to ' ...put French industry on the same footing as German industry, while
freeing the latter of the discrimination born of defeat ... ,375 As they represented the joint
resources of France and Germany, the coal and steel industries should be the foundation
of Franco-German reconciliation and, therefore, would be transformed from a symbol of
war, used to forge weapons of war, into a guarantee of peace.376 On the basis of the
simple formula of Franco-German reconciliation through fusing the coal and steel
industries, Monnet prompted Reuter, Hirsch and Uri to prepare a policy paper the
373 Ibid. pp. 55-9.
374 Monnet, Memoirs, pp. 288-98.
375 Ibid. p. 292.
376 Ibid. p. 293.
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French government could present to the Allied western foreign ministers at their
upcoming conference in London.377
In line with Monnet's reasoning a significant body of literature has
contextualized the emergence of the Schuman Plan declaration within 'a very specific
bureaucratic segment of the French state elite,378, consisting of Monnet and a small
group of civil servants who initiated and drafted the proposal. 379Such interpretations
emphasize in particular the role of Monnet's thought in generating the proposal.
Schroder"? and Franserr'", for example, each study the evolution of Monnet's ideas to
account for his alleged role in initiating European integration. Due to their biographical
approach, these works at the same time subordinate the political objectives and material
interests of the French and other governments to Monnet's ideas. The merit of
intellectual biographies of Monnet is that they recognize a transatlantic perspective
within European integration historiography, mainly through identifying Monnet's regard
for the American political system and his contacts to US actors. These works, however,
unduly limit the transatlantic angle to the experiences of one actor.
On the other end of the spectrum are publications focusing on the foreign policy
and economic necessities that led the French government to forward the Schuman Plan.
Milward bases his argument that the French government proposed the Schuman Plan to
defend the Monnet Plan on the analysis of the economic challenges the French
377Ibid. pp. 294-8.
378Cohen, 'Constitutionalism Without Constitution', p. 115.
379See for example Pierre Gerbet, 'La genese du plan Schuman', in: Revue francoise de
science politique, vol. 6, no. 3 (1956), pp. 525-53.
380Schroder, Jean Monnet und die amerikanische Unterstiitzung.
381Frederic 1. Fransen, The Supranational Politics of Jean Monnet: Ideas and Origins of
the European Community, London and WestportJCT: Greenwood Press, 2001,
especially chapter 4, pp. 88-113.
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government faced in the spring of 1950. Accordingly, French governmental planning
had relied on the idea that the demand for steel would be continually growing. Now that
German steel output was limited through Allied restrictions, other European states could
take over the former German export markets. By 1950 it had become clear, however,
that the USHICOG failed to enforce the production limits. Germany, therefore, in fact
surpassed French domestic steel production.i'" At the same time, the French government
saw unrestricted access to the coal and coke resources of the Ruhr as critical to enable
France to become a major steel producer. In the negotiations on the establishment of the
Federal Republic in 1949, the French government and the US occupation authorities
disagreed on where the authority over the Allied Coal and Steel Control Boards should
rest. While the French government argued the Boards should now be transferred into the
JAR, US occupation officials maintained that they should remain under the authority of
the Allied High Commlsslon.l'" Against this backdrop, the French government feared
that the US and the UK governments would expect them to approve a relaxation of the
German steel production quotas at the May ]950 foreign ministers' conference.
According to this interpretation, a combination of economic concerns and foreign policy
objectives of the French government triggered the co-operation of Monnet and Schuman
and were ultimately responsible for the Schuman Plan.
Giving his account a slightly different turn, Wall has portrayed the Schuman
Plan as a follow-up to the Monnet Plan.384 In fact, Reuter's recollection of having
382 Milward, The Reconstruction, pp. 362-3.
383 Ibid. 388.
384 Irwin Wall, 'Jean Monnet, the United States and the French Economic Pian', pp. 86-
113.
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suggested to Monnet to draft 'a Monnet Plan for the border regions,385 early on during
the consultations on the coal and steel proposal seems to support such an argument.
Frances Lynch has shown that in 1946-47 the French government's foreign economic
goals in Europe, especially vis-a-vis Germany, were more important than domestic
economic necessities in the acceptance of the Monnet Plan as the single plan to guide
French economic recovery. Accordingly, the French government considered unrestricted
access to the coal and coke resources of the Ruhr together with Germany's economic
weakness vital to the successful restoration of France's economic and political strength
in Europe.386
Milward, Wall and Lynch successfully integrate French domestically derived
material interests in the genesis of the Schuman Plan declaration but downplay the role
of ideas and values that were shared by actors across national boundaries. Indeed, the
foreign policy and economic concerns of the French government help to explain why the
French foreign minister chose to present the policy initiative against the background of
the London Conference of Foreign Ministers in May 1950. In contrast, to account for
why the Schuman Plan proposal materialized it is important to highlight that it met two
related crucial criteria that take account of ideas as well as material interests, on the one
hand, and surpass French domestic politics, on the other. As has been argued in chapter
2, the fact that leading European Christian democrats provided necessary political
385Paul Reuter, La naissance de I 'Europe communautaire, Lausanne: Centre de
recherches europeennes, 1980, p. 19.
386 Frances Lynch, 'Resolving the Paradox of the Monnet Plan: National and
International Planning in French Reconstruction,' in: The Economic History Review,
New Series, vol. 37, no. 2 (1984), pp. 229-43, here esp. pp. 232-3,237, 242-3.
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backing and the US government declared their support for the French government
initiative safeguarded the realization of the proposed coal and steel pool.
3.3 A core institution and the notion of democracy: the 'high
authority'
The term 'supranational' is strangely absent from the Schuman Plan declaration.387
Preceding statements and the declaration itself, however, leave no doubt as to the
desired political objective of the coal and steel pool. A first reference to a 'joint high
authority' operating on a 'supranational' level,388can be found in one of the nine drafts
for the policy proposal dated 24 April 1950. Uri, in a memorandum of 3 May 1950,
which he drafted to argue that the coal and steel pool was different from a cartel,
highlighted the supranational nature of the high authority: the 'projected organization
will acquire an authority which will impose itself even on governments. This is its
political significance' .389Finally, the Schuman Plan declaration itself introduced the
idea to place the French and German coal and steel production under a 'joint high
authority' .390 Contrary to earlier references to the high authority, this was now part of a
published policy proposal by the French to the German government. The high authority
387Declaration officielle du gouvernement francais, 9 May 1950; Bonbright to Acheson,
9 May 1950.
3884eme projet, 24 April 1950, folder 'Genesis 9 May 1950 proposal', 16 April to 6
May 1950, AN 81 AJ 152. Identified as the first mentioning by Reiner Schulze,
'Anfange und Ausbau der europaischen Integration - zu den Konzepten der fruhen
funfziger Jahre, in Rudolf Hrbek and Volker Schwarz (eds.), Vierzig Jahre Romische
Vertrdge: Der deutsche Beitrag. Dokumentation der Konferenz anlafilich des 90.
Geburstags von Dr.h.c. Hans von der Groeben, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998, pp. 91-
101, here p. 96.
389 London to Secretary of State: Text of anti-cartel note, 12 May 1950, 396.1 LOI5-
1250. FRUS 1950 Ill. pp. 700-1, here p. 701.
390Declaration officielle du gouvernement francais, 9 May 1950; Bonbright to Acheson,
9 May 1950.
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was conceived as a core executive institution, whose mandate it was to organize the
common coal and steel market.
The declaration sketched the key characteristics of the institution. Firstly, as a
consequence of establishing a coal and steel 'community of production' and 'a new high
authority whose decisions will be binding on France, Germany and the other
[participating] countries', the declaration would create 'the first concrete foundation for
a European federation' .391 With its emphasis on establishing a 'concrete foundation' for
an 'economic community', the high authority was conceptualized the vehicle of
functional and regional integration. As Dirk Stikker, the Dutch foreign minister,
described in a frequently quoted journal article from 1951, functional integration
involved a series of practical steps, whereby the integration of one policy area triggered
further integration of other policy areas.392 Secondly, regarding the composition of the
high authority, the declaration stipulated that it should comprise 'independent
personalities chosen on a basis of equality by the governments'r'l" At the top of the high
authority would be a president, elected by the governments of the member-states. The
decisions of the president in turn were to be enforceable in the member-states. Here, the
policy proposal acknowledges the supranational principle. An appeal mechanism against
the decisions of the high authority was introduced, but not specified.
391 Ibid.
392 Dirk Stikker, 'The Functional Approach to European Integration', in: Foreign
Affairs, no. 29, vol. 3 (1951), pp. 436-44, here pp. 438 and 440.
3 Declaration officielle du gouvernement francais, 9 May 1950; Bonbright to Acheson,
9 May 1950.
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According to Reuter, the high authority was indebted to the American system of
government.i'" One source of inspiration consisted of the 'inter-state authorities', which
were set up by the New Deal programme in the early 1930s. The launch of the New
Deal coincided with the inauguration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt as US President in
March 1933. Highlighting the importance of Roosevelt and his era Alan Brinkley writes:
The New Deal he constructed, and which changed the landscape of American
public life for the rest of the century and beyond, reflected the urgency of the
crisis he inherited in 1933 and the accumulated legacy of nearly half a century of
rising reform sentiment. 395
Drawing on the US inter-state authorities, Reuter allegedly even proposed to Monnet the
use of the term 'authority' for the supranational core institution of the coal and steel
production community.F'' In an interview, Reuter drew parallels with the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA).397A regional development programme originally conceived in
1933 against the backdrop of the Great Depression to modernize the American South,
the programme shaped US foreign aid programmes worldwide, not least the Marshall
Plan. In a nutshell, the TVA exemplified a 'multipurpose development'<", which
incorporated the notions of modernization, applied technology, scientific management
and regional planning. The programme blended these ideas with attempts to increase the
participation of people affected by the programrne.i" Based on the notion that in a
country as large and diverse as the US, regional and local knowledge could easily be lost
394Cohen, 'Le plan Schuman', p. 647.
395Alan Brinkley, Liberalism and its Discontents, Cambridge/MA, London: Harvard
University Press, 1998, p. 2.
396Bossuat, L 'Europe des Francais, p. 167.
397Interview Reuter.
398Ekbladh, "'Mr. TVA"', p. 336.
399Ibid. p. 337.
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to bureaucracies centred in the capital Washington, proponents of the programme
emphasized the significance of de-centralization: '[a] decentralized administration of
federal functions could overcome the dangers of a top-heavy and overcentralized
bureaucracy' .400 In its actual operation, the TVA fell short of its aspirations. Crucially,
however, the ' grass-roots TVA model picked up a cross-section of domestic and
international adherents who largely overlooked any shortcomings within the
organization'i''?' One of the supporters of the TVA was Monnet, who in 1946 organized
for David Lilienthal, the central figure of the programme, to visit France. Although the
visit did not materialize, French Planning officials eventually met Lilienthal in the
US.402 In 1949, Monnet declared the TVA was 'a possible object-lesson for France and
for Europe' ,403 which corroborates that Reuter was inspired by the TVA, in particular.
The inter-state authorities incorporated the idea of the devolution of authority
between the central and the federal or regional levels of government and accordingly,
carried democratic potential. If Reuter's claim of how he derived the term is to be
believed however, it is noteworthy, that the element 'inter-state', which contains the US
federal and regional connotations, gave way to the qualifier 'high'. Arguably, to the
drafters of the Schuman Plan, 'inter-state' might have implied 'intergovernmental' in the
European context and, therefore, would have contradicted the objectives of the proposal.
After all, the advocacy coalition that initiated and secured the political acceptance of the
Schuman Plan was disillusioned with the progress of European integration achieved by
the intergovernmental Council of Europe and OEEC. In other words, 'inter-state' would
400 Ibid. p. 341.
401 Ibid. p. 346.
402 Fransen, The Supranational Politics, p. 82.
403 Monnet, Memoirs, p. 276.
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not have expressed adequately the push for supranational integration. Although 'high'
also resonated with existing intergovernmental institutions, such as the Allied High
Commission for Germany, the adjective did not draw attention to its intergovernmental
set-up. In contrast, Pierre Gerbet has argued that the IAR served a model and provided
the rationale for the high authority.r'" At the least, the JAR shows that 'authority'
represented an integral component of contemporary intergovernmental relations. In sum,
however, one could argue, that the proposed high authority of the coal and steel pool in
its name did not carry the federal and democratic promise that the US inter-state
authorities represented.
Further, Reuter claimed that the American system served a source of inspiration
for the idea to assign a key political role to independent actors in the operation of the
high authority.405 During talks in London in May 1950, Monnet stressed to British
officials that the independent personalities of the proposed high authority would not
represent the industries affected by the Schuman Plan.406 Independent meant that the
actors serving the high authority would be neither accountable, nor subject to pressures
by economic interest groups, nor the participating governments, nor be drawn from
professional backgrounds in the participating industries. Regarding the notion of
independence, Reuter and planning officials probably drew on the US independent
regulatory commissions, especially given the affinity these officials repeatedly
404Pierre Gerbet 'Les origins du plan Schuman. Le choix de la methode communautaire
par le gouvernement francais', in: Raymond Poidevin (ed.), Histotre des debuts de la
construction europeenne, mars 1948-mai 1950, Brussels: Bruylant, 1986, pp. 199-222.
405Paul Reuter, 'Aux origines du Plan Schuman', in: Melanges Fernand Dehousse, vol.
2, La construction europeenne, Paris, Brussels: Fernand Nathan, Ed. Labor, 1979, pp.
65-8, here p. 66.
406Notes ofa meeting held at the Hyde Park Hotel, 16 May 1950, FO 371/85841.
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expressed for key New Deal policies. The 1930s saw an increase in establishing and
empowering public organizations that were to regulate and control the activities of
corporate institutions in different economic policy areas. By the end of the decade, the
powers of the only two commissions that preceded the New Deal, namely the Interstate
Commerce Commission and the FTC, had been substantially expanded. In addition, four
new agencies had been founded: the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal
Communications Commission, the National Labour Relations Board and the Civil
Aeronautics Authority.t'"
The US independent regulatory commissions perform quasi-legislative, quasi-
executive and quasi-judicial functions. These varied functions do not fit in properly with
the separation of powers and checks and balances, the 'twin doctrines,408 of the
American constitution, and therefore have subjected the commissions to criticism in the
US. Domestic criticism has focused, in particular, on the problem, whether the
independent regulatory commissions had not in fact 'become the captives of the
industries which they ... [were] supposed to be controlling,.409 In highlighting the
potential to subvert democratic scrutiny and process, however, such criticism challenges
the very foundations of democracy. More specifically, disapproval of the commissions
has evolved around the notion that they stand for a neo-corporatist type of government,
whereby organized interests are granted privileged and institutionalized access to policy
407Brinkley, The End of Reform, pp. 62-3.
408MJ .C. Vile, Politics in the USA, London, New York: Routledge, 5th ed. 1999 [1970],
p. 6. For an introduction into the original debate on checks and balances in 1787-8 see
Wood, The Creation, pp. 547-53.
409Brinkley, The End of Reform, pp. 62-3.
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formulation, rather than a pluralist democracy."? At the same time, the commissions are
technically independent of the President, who does however playa role in appointing the
members of the board with the approval of the Senate."!' Independence of the executive
links to another legal predecessor of the high authority, which former member of the
German delegation Ophuls identified. According to Ophuls, the conception of the high
authority resembled the 'corporation sole' of English public law. Explaining this
reference, English law recognizes the concept of the corporation aggregate, derived
from Roman law, which designates organized groups of men. In addition, the English
common law concept of the coporation sole has acknowledged that 'the king could
make, and sometimes did make, a corporation out of a single man or out of that man's
official character' .412 Crucially, this legal construct allowed for granting to a legal
personality recognized by English public law 'a will of its own - which is really distinct
from the several wishes of its members' .413According to Ophuls, the high authority
would thus administer the newly established policy domain permanently and
independently of the member-states' governments, who only were to playa role in
establishing the treaty and in appointing the members of the high authority.l'"
4IOCf. 'Corporatism', in Heywood,Keyconcepts, pp. 164-8.
411Alan Grant, The American Political Process, London, New York: Routledge, 7th ed.
2004 [1979], p. 118.
412Frederic Maitland, 'The Corporation Sole', in: Law Quarterly Review, vol. 16 (1900),
pp. 335-54; idem., State, Trust, and Corporation, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press,2003.
413Maitland, 'The Corporation Sole'.
414Ophuls, 'Zur ideengeschichtlichen Herkunft', p. 391.
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A first scheme of the treaty, dated 16 May 1950, which Reuter allegedly drew up
in only forty-eight hours,4lS confirms the characteristics identified by OphUls. The first
of two sections (art. 1-12) of the scheme deals with 'principles', focusing on the Franco-
German coal and steel pool, its organizational features and the notion of the transition
period. The second section (art. 13-38) maps the 'development' of the joint coal and
steel market. The scheme treats separately organizations required to manage the coal
and steel industries. Each would require a superior council, presided by a director; study
committees; management committees; secretariat and directorate staff (art. 9). The
superior council would be composed of independent personalities, which the French and
the German governments were to nominate in equal numbers (art. 10), and the study and
management committees would consist of the representatives of the professional
associations (art. 12). Further, the scheme proposes a college arbitral superieur, an ad-
hoc court of appeals, composed of the secretary general of the United Nations (UN), the
president of the International Court of Justice and the director of the International
Labour Organization. It is noteworthy firstly, that Reuter in this draft treaty refers to the
superior council rather than the high authority. Secondly, the scheme already presents
the study and management committees, the later consultative committees. Thirdly, while
the notion of a parliamentary assembly is completely missing from the scheme, it
introduces the notion of the right to appeal to a court. Conceived as an ad-hoc
institution, the court does not contribute to a separation of powers based on check and
balances on the superior council or high authority. Although the early conception of the
court therefore bears only little resemblance to what eventually became the court of
415 Scheme for the treaty, Paul Reuter, 16 May 1950, AMG [Ie plan Schuman] 2/4/3;
accompanying letter Reuter to Monnet, ibid. Cf. for the same documents AN 81 AJ 152.
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justice, the idea that the decisions of the high authority could be challenged via judicial
procedure is already there. Lastly, with regard to its planned composition, the court
seems to express the desire to put the coal and steel production firmly within the web of
international agreements that emerged after World War II. The International Court of
Justice represented an integral part of the UN Charter, entered into force on 24 October
1945.416 Cross-referencing to other international organizations, moreover, reflected
contemporary practice, which is evidenced, for instance, by the 1947 GATT. According
to the GATT, the secretary general of the UN would hold the original copies of the
GATT and 'furnish certified copies thereof to all interested govemments,.417
As to the proposal to institutionalize the co-operation of the members of the high
authority with committees composed of industry representatives, this was closely linked
to the importance attached to the independence of the members of the high authority.
One could argue that together, these two features were expected to contribute to
safeguarding the effective policy formulation and implementation for the coal and steel
sector, regardless of any political questions impacting on the Franco-German
relationship. The proposed study and management committees represented a key
organizational feature of the Monnet Plan, which again was informed by US
organizational practices. Drawing on the administrative and institutional practices of the
New Deal, Hirsch and Monnet in 1946 introduced the collaboration of the central
Planning Commission with committees of the representatives of affected economic
416For the statute see Edmund Jan Osmanczyk, The Encyclopedia of the United Nations
and International Agreements, Philadelphia, London: Taylor and Frances, 1985, pp. 40-
2.
417GATT article 26, 3 (accessed 23 November 2007):
http://www.wto.orglenglish/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#gatt47
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sectors. French officials, thereby, selectively implemented a specific American
organizational model. Applying the tools of cultural transfer, this means that
representatives of the French 'target culture', rather than the American 'original
culture', steered the process. The claim that French civil servants drove the process,
whereby American administrative and institutional concepts were adjusted to the needs
of post-war France, in tum, contests the logic of Americanization. In envisaging the co-
operation of the high authority and the committees, Reuter merely continued the
selective incorporation of American organizational features that French Planning
officials had first developed in the national context.
Literature has acknowledged the link between the Monnet and the Schuman
Plans in institutionalizing the collaboration of public and private actors. While only
based on literature rather than archival sources, Featherstone has rightly stressed that the
French Planning Commission was indebted to a corporatist style of government.t" If
one adds the American origins of the institutionalized co-operation to this observation,
this suggests three arguments. Firstly, although the drafters of the 9 May proposal and
the 16 May 1950 treaty scheme were French, Reuter's references, in particular, show
that they approached the task of sketching the institutions, which were to manage the
coal and steel pool, with a transatlantic dimension. As the case of the Monnet Plan
418 See for example Kevin Featherstone, 'Jean Monnet and the "Democratic Deficit" in
the European Union', Journal of Common Markel Studies, vol. 32, no. 2 (1994), pp.
149-70, here p. 155; for an introduction into models of accountability and a partially
source-based analysis see Berthold Rittberger, 'Original Meanings. Ideas About
Representation in the Making of Europe's First Community', unpublished manuscript,
presented at the Connex (Network of Excellence on 'Efficient and Democratic
Governance in a Multi-level Europe') Thematic Conference on Accountability, Florence,
29-30 June 2007. For a current multi-disciplinary perspective on democracy in the EU
see Beate Kohler-Koch, Berthold Rittberger (eds.), Debating the Democratic Legitimacy
of the European Union, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007.
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demonstrates, moreover, the knowledge and interest of the actors involved in utilizing
the US system predates the inter-state negotiations on the Schuman Plan and the co-
operation of French and American actors in the US Embassy working group. Crucially,
therefore, the initial period of agenda setting for the Schuman Plan conference confirms
that French academics and civil servants mediated between American and European
politico-legal concepts.
Secondly, the references to the US model did not underline the democratic
nature, but instead drew attention to the ambiguity of the democratic potential of the
coal and steel pool. In fact, in the context of the Monnet Plan and the Schuman Plan,
French officials drew on organizational features that in the US were regarded as a
challenge to the democratic system of government. Why then, one might ask, did the US
government co-fund the Monnet Plan? And why did American agencies and foreign
policy officials realizing their mandate to help trigger the formation of a democratic
western Europe, approve of the Schuman Plan? Two factors help provide an answer, the
first of which concerns the value system of the 'Marshall Planners'. While they did not
promote a neo-corporatist type of government, foreign policy officials involved in the
Marshall Plan administration shared an affinity with the socio-economic objectives and
the strategies proposed by key New Deal legislation. Therefore, although the TVA
model remained domestically contested, it did influence the Marshall Plan. From this
perspective, the Monnet Plan, a national programme responding to the immediate need
to restore France, did not appear objectionable. This argument probably also informed
the attitude of US foreign policy officials regarding the Schuman Plan. Here, a second
factor played a role, however, namely the 'Monnet factor'. US diplomatic records show
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that the French Planning Commissioner was regarded as the person responsible for the
Schuman Plan declaration. Because of his US contacts, Monnet crucially represented a
democratic guarantor to American officials eager to see a democratic and supranational
western Europe materialize against the backdrop of the incipient Cold War.
Monnet's position of trust, however, does not invalidate the claim that, thirdly, to
some degree, the high authority symbolized an anomaly in contemporary post-war
Europe, where the prospect for European unity was discussed from transatlantic, federal
and democratic perspectives. Criticism of the high authority regarded its neo-corporatist
features, on the one hand. At the inter-state conference, Dutch and Belgian delegation
members, in particular, would follow this line of argument. In post-World War II
Europe, neo-corporatism evoked the reminiscences of recent experiences with the
corporatist solutions realized by some Fascist and Catholic authoritarian regimes. As
Kaiser has demonstrated, Catholic politicians in British and American exile had already
parted with their initial corporatist preferences during the war. Politicians who
emphasized the necessity to separate the organization of politics and economics
included the liberal Catholic Belgian politician Van Zeeland, among others.419However,
the desire to avoid returning to the state corporatism of the 1930s was also shared by
social democrat politicians. A case in point is a statement of expertise by German social
democrat Gerhard Weisser,420who in principle favoured planning,421 but was concerned
419Wolfram Kaiser, 'Co-operation of European Catholic Politicians in Exile in Britain
and the USA during the Second World War', in: Journal of Contemporary History, vol.
35, no. 3 (2000), pp. 439-65, cf. p. 455.
420Gerhard Weisser, 'Bemerkungen zum Schuman-Plan', 17 July 1950, PA AA, BI5,
67.
421Anthony Nicholls, Freedom With Responsibility: the Social Market Economy in
Germany, 1918-1963, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, pp. 138-9.
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with the prevalent role the working document presented by the French delegation on 24
June assigned to experts. According to Weisser, to give experts a leading role in both the
high authority and the regional associations would undermine the democratic principle
of the Schuman Plan since 'the tendency to form an expert autonomy is closely related
to the tendency to establish a corporate state' .422 Weisser's observations regarding the
importance to uphold the democratic principle demonstrate that these concerns were not
exclusive to US officials engaged in the realization of US occupation policy in Germany
but instead were shared by German actors. On the other hand, criticism evolved around
the notion of privileging functional integration over the immediate establishment of a
federation. European federalists, in particular, could not reconcile the Schuman Plan
with their preferences. The Italian Socialist Altiero Spinelli, for example, a fervent and
life-long advocate of federalism, who was instrumental in the founding of the Council of
Europe, and later served as a Commissioner in the European Community (1970-76) and
as a member of the European Parliament (1976-86t23, disapproved of the French
government's initiative because of its functional approach.f"
Do these three arguments imply that the drafters of the Schuman Plan opted for
an undemocratic policy to initiate European integration? Perhaps, the question is based
on a false dichotomy. It was not a choice between functional and federal integration.
The phrasing and terminology of the proposal point to the long-term goal of establishing
a federated western Europe. More importantly, its drafters as well as the advocacy
coalition for supranational European integration, which backed the proposal, shared (a)
422 Letter Weisser to Blankenhorn, 18 July 1950, Statement of 17 July attached to letter,
PA AA, B 15,67.
423 Burgess, Federalism, p. 44.
424 For a synthesis between Monnet's and Spinelli's legacies see ibid. pp. 58-9.
154
the belief that functional integration was a necessary pre-requisite to realize a federation
and (b) a democratic world-view. In sum, as a result of the experiences of the Monnet
Plan and its support by the Marshall Planners, the drafters of the French government's
initiative perhaps did not anticipate the criticism that would arise from the notion of an
independent executive, which was not accountable to the electorate and, therefore,
considered undemocratic. The conflicting values, which were inherent in the initial
conception of the high authority, foreshadowed conflicts at the inter-state conference as
well as one of the ongoing debates of the coming decades, namely the debate on the
democratic deficit. In this light, the French government's initial policy preference for the
institutional design for the coal and steel pool created a path-dependency for the
European integration process.
In the period of agenda setting, it became clear that the powers of the high
authority needed to be checked. Criticism of the core institution originated with the
Dutch and Belgian governments, in particular. The future head of the Dutch delegation
to the inter-state conference, Spierenburg, for example, argued that the high authority
would in fact establish a dictatorship over the coal and steel industries, which lacked any
accountability. The Benelux governments agreed on restricting the supranational
character of the high authority on 2 June 1950.425 They stressed, however, that contrary
to the UK government they agreed, in principle, on the need to partially abnegate
sovereignty.f" Literature acknowledges the impact of the Benelux governments on
policy formation during the agenda setting-period. At the same time, the efforts of the
425 Based on the relevant government sources in The Hague and Brussels is Kusters,
'Die Verhandlungen tiber das institutionelle System', p. 79.
426 For Spierenburg see for example Hallstein to Blankenhorn, Fernschreiben vom 12.
Juli 1950, PA AA, B15, 83.
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French and the German governments to align their policy positions before the opening
of the conference are downplayed. From such a viewpoint, Kusters describes the section
of his chapter, which treats the conference opening, with the sub-heading 'a first
exchange of opinion' .427 Nothing could be further from the truth, however. French,
German and British officials, for instance, debated the Schuman Plan in the HICOG on
12 June 1950 and raised a catalogue of questions regarding mainly the competences of
the high authority, which the Director for Economics and Finances at the French
HICOG, Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, forwarded to Monnet.428 Shortly after, Leroy-Beaulieu
visited Adenauer in Rhondorf to discuss the French government's initiative with the
chancellor and Blankenhorn.429 In short, informal Franco-German consultations on the
Schuman Plan continued throughout the period of agenda setting.
Before the opening of the inter-state conference, a number of internal French
policy papers addressed institutional questions. While it is not possible to establish a
direct causal link between either the criticism of the Benelux governments or Leroy-
Beaulieu's list of questions and specific policy papers, they show not only a growing
concern with the accountability of the high authority, but also develop responses to the
problem. On 7 June 1950, Uri developed a treaty scheme.43o Uri appears to have drafted
the scheme by taking into account Reuter's proposal of 16 May, which Hirsch, Monnet
and Uri perhaps received only after their return from London and probably used
427 Kusters, 'Die Verhandlungen', p. 80.
428 Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, Questions posees a propos du plan Schuman, 12 June 1950,
AN 81 AJ 154.
429 Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, Plan Schuman, Entretien avec Ie Chancelier, 16 June 1950,
ibid.
430 Uri (name handwritten, authorship very likely, but not 100 per cent certain), Schema
de traite, 7 June 1950, AN 81 AJ 152.
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internally. Uri's scheme no longer proposes two separate organizations for coal and
steel. Instead, the scheme introduces a threefold structure for the treaty focusing in turn
on the objects of the treaty; the high authority; and the modes of action. Some articles,
as for example on the composition and decision-making within the high authority (art. 3-
5) are developed, whereas other articles contain only headings, but are not spelled out
(art. 9 and 10). Arguably, Uri's proposal develops further ideas of how to hold the high
authority accountable as a result of the reservations expressed by the Belgian and Dutch
governments. Firstly, to realize the treaty objectives, the high authority would publish an
annual report, which then was to be scrutinized, 'for example, by the assembly of the
European union,.431 Circumstantial evidence suggests that Uri referred to the assembly
of the Council of Europe here, which served an important institutional cross-reference
for participants in the early days of the inter-state negotiations.432 While the scheme
refrains from proposing the establishment of a parliamentary body, the idea of
accountability vis-a-vis a parliamentary assembly is clearly presented. Secondly, the last
of the three sections is entirely concerned with the question of appeals. Accordingly,
governments and concerned interests, the latter comprising enterprises and labour
unions, could each under certain conditions appeal against the decisions of the high
authority and require a second reading. With regard to the supranational principle it is
significant that the draft grants the right to appeal to individual enterprises, not merely
431 Ibid. p. 3.
432 See for example Kurzprotokoll tiber die Sitzung des Ausschusses fur die
institutionellen Fragen, 12 July 1950, PA AA, B 15, 102.
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the member-state governments. Only in a subsequent draft on appeals, dated 12 June
1950, does Uri introduce the notion of taking an appeal to court.433
Another internal paper for the French inter-ministerial committee of the same
date blends and further develops earlier ideas.434 Appeals, firstly, were to be directed to
the high authority to require reconsideration of a decision through a second reading. The
paper then distinguishes between juridical appeals concerning the high authority's
excess of power, on the one hand, and appels sur Ie fond, substantive appeals, the other.
The former could be directed at the International Court of Justice, whereas the latter
were to be resolved by the three-member-tribunal, which Reuter first envisaged in his 16
May treaty scheme. The paper, secondly, re-emphasizes the need that the high authority
be composed of personalities independent of both governments and interests, adding that
'it was clear that the responsibility of the high authority ... needed to be embedded in a
democratic procedure' .435 Crucially, the paper envisages parliamentary control to fulfil
this responsibility. A committee of members of the national parliaments, appointed each
year specifically for this purpose, is charged with examining the high authority's
annually published report. If this parliamentary body disapproves of the report, the high
authority may be dismissed. While no other concrete decision-making powers are
bestowed on the parliamentary body, it is seen as 'the first concrete gathering of the
European federation, as anticipated in the proposal of 9 May'. 436 Later, Monnet recalled
the significance of both judicial review and parliamentary control of the 12 June paper
433 Uri (name handwritten, authorship highly likely, but not 100 per cent certain),
Schema du traite, Recours contre les decisions de la Haute Autorite, 12 June 1950, AN
81 AJ 152.
434 Note pour Ie Cornite interministeriel, 12 June 1950, AN 81 AJ 131.
435 Ibid. p. 5.
436 Ibid. p. 5.
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in his memoirs.437 Thirdly, the paper embarks on the necessity of co-operation between
the high authority and the consultative committees.
Finally, in a policy paper dated 14 June and entitled 'Observations on the treaty
scheme,438, Reuter organizes some ideas of the paper for the inter-ministerial meeting.
The first five articles deal with the appointment and term of office of members and
president of the high authority and their respective responsibilities; article 6 deals with
the college de rnediateur, the arbitration college, whose recommendations could not
overrule the decisions of the high authority, however; and articles 7-11 specify further
the functions of the annual ad-hoc parliamentary assembly: its control function over the
high authority (art. 7-8); its duty to establish commissions that require the high authority
to explain the annual report (art. 9); and its right to vote the members of the high
authority out of office, if necessary (art. I0). The consultative committees are not
addressed in these observations. Given the prominent role Reuter and Monnet assigned
to the committees, however, this was certainly not a deliberate omission, but reflected
what arguably might have been the double purpose of the paper: to systematize previous
ideas and to focus specifically on adjusting those features of the scheme that, in their
eyes, endangered the acceptance of the French government's policies by the other
conference delegations. In summary, French internal policy papers and treaty schemes
developed further the accountability of the high authority by maintaining the notion of
judicial control and introducing basic parliamentary checks. Control functions assigned
to an ad-hoc judiciary and an ad-hoc legislative were therefore already present. At the
same time, none of these proposals challenged the high authority in arguing for an equal
437Monnet, Memoirs, p. 321.
438Paul Reuter, Observations sur Ie schema de traite, 14 June 1950, AMG 2/4/16.
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dispersion of authority across permanent supranational institutions of the coal and steel
pool.
3.4 Checks and balances: an emerging institutional framework
between central and federal government
When the intergovernmental consultations officially began on 20 June 1950, the French
delegation envisaged a treaty scheme that reflected the rationale of central government,
not a federal government with separation of powers. The same holds true for Monnet's
opening speech of 21 June,439the explanations of the organization of the coal and steel
pool expressed by Hirsch, Uri and Monnet during talks with the other heads of
delegation from 21-24 June,440 and the 'working document' the French delegation
presented to the other delegations on 24 June 1950.441The working document served as
the basis for the inter-state negotiations and, until the first draft treaty was completed on
9 November 1950, provided the frame of reference for alternative treaty provisions.
After a foreword and a preamble, the document introduces a first section (art. 1-
16), which deals with the common high authority. The second of the two sections treats
the pooling of the coal and steel production (art. 17-40). In its first articles, the working
document follows Reuter's observations of 14 June word for word: the core executive
should be composed of six to nine members appointed for a period of six years with one
439Cf. Kurzprotokoll der Sitzung im franzosischen AuBenministerium, 21 June 1950,
PA AA, B15, 53.
440Compte rendu de la seconde seance tenue le 21 juin 1950 sous la presidence de M.
Monnet, AN 81 AJ 131; Seances restreintes du jeudi, 22 juin 1950, vendredi, 23 juin
1950, samedi apres-rnidi, 24 juin 1950, ibid.
441Document de travail, 24 June 1950, AN 81 AJ 131. For a contemporary English
version of the working document see Bruce to the Secretary of State, Series of five
telegrammes, 24 June 1950, NARA, RG 59, 850.33/6-2450, FRUS III, pp. 728-38.
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third of the college being renewed every two years (art. 2); the members of the high
authority should be appointed by the member-state governments (art. 3); and the
member-state governments were also to vote for the president of the high authority, who
would be appointed for three years (art. 4). The exact number of members of the high
authority - six, seven, eight, or nine - and the number of votes for each state in the
appointment procedure are not specified. The high authority could pursue action against
the member-state governments as well as enterprises in three different ways, namely by
issuing 'decisions' that are legally binding; 'recommendations' that are binding 'as to
their purpose', but not their mode of implementation; and 'suggestions', which are not
legally binding (art. 6). The working document thereby laid the foundation for
classifying the actions not only of the High Authority of the ECSC, but also of the
institutions of subsequent European communities.442
As to the right to appeal, the member-state governments, but not the individual
enterprises may require the re-examination of a decision or recommendation (art. 7).
The right to appeal of enterprises against the action of the high authority, which Uri had
included in his 7 June draft, accordingly did not feature in the working document. If the
high authority confirmed its initial decision or recommendation, the matter could then
be referred to an 'ad hoc court of arbitration' (art. 8). It is further suggested in the
working document that the court consist of five members: for example, of one member
each from the International Court of Justice and the International Labour Organization
and three members from the member-states, to be appointed in the same mode as the
members of the high authority. To involve the member-state governments in the
442 Cf. Mosler, 'Die Entstehung des Modells', p. 368.
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appointment of the court members represents a departure from the internal French policy
papers and perhaps a concession to the criticism by the Benelux governments in that it
attempts to enhance the role of the member-states in the operation of the coal and steel
pool without jeopardizing the supranational principle.
The working document presents three further institutions that introduce a
function of representation: the 'common assembly' (art. 11), an incipient parliamentary
body, whose name most closely follows Uri's treaty scheme of 7 June, while its
functions resemble Reuter's observations of 14 June; the 'consultative committees' that
represent employers, workers and consumers (art. 15); and the 'regional associations'
that represent the interests of the producers (art. 20) These associations were grouped
regionally rather than nationally to further help to overcome national boundaries.443 The
debate on the regional associations evolved mainly around their potential to establish
cartels and will be discussed in chapter 4.2. Here it is sufficient to point out that these
associations were dropped altogether from the negotiations. As to the distribution of
power envisaged in the working document it is noteworthy that the articles on the court,
the common assembly and the consultative committees are embedded in the section on
the high authority rather than being treated in separate sections. This observation
underlines just how rooted the proposed organization was in the concept of central
government. Finally, to give the delegations time to develop their respective positions,
the next intergovernmental meeting was scheduled for 3 July )950. In the meantime, the
French delegation would issue a press statement summarizing the working document.l"
443 Kurzprotokoll Uber die Besprechung der Delegationen unter der Leitung von M.
Monnet im BUro von M. Monnet, 22 June 1950, PA AA, B 15,53.
444 Seance du samedi apres-midi, 24 juin 1950, AN 81 AJ 131.
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During this period, the US Embassy working group and the transatlantic university
network began to impact the negotiations. Specific incidents involving these networks
provide the basis for discussing the main institutional questions that shaped the debate
until the end of the first period of the inter-state negotiations on 10 August and resulted
in a shift from central to federal government.
A first incident involving the US Embassy working group concerned the
preparation of the working document summary. A copy of a draft summary with hand-
written corrections contained in the papers of George Ball445 indicates that Ball
participated in writing this summary, which the French delegation issued on 27 June.446
In fact, Ball who had arrived in Paris before the presentation of the working document to
the other delegations perhaps even took part in its genesis. Ball's diaries, too, confirm
that starting on 20 June he was already involved in deliberations with the French
delegation.t" More importantly, the co-operation of the US Embassy working group
after 24 June draws attention to an initial shift of perspective from central to federal
government. The key to understanding this shift is provided by a constitutional feature
that both the working document and the summary of 27 June address, namely the option
to secede from the coal and steel pool. The working document (art. 39) specifies that the
'withdrawal by a state from the common organization shall be possible only if the other
445 Untitled document (in French), total of 7 pages, 26 June 1950, Personal papers Ball,
147; cf. also Ball's Memorandum of suggestions regarding article 8 of proposed
working paper, 4 July 1950, FJM, AMG 4/6/6, quoted in Anne Boerger, Aux origines de
I 'Union Europeenne: la genese des institutions communautaires (CE.CA., CE.D,
C.E.E. et Euratom). Un equilibre fragile entre I 'ideal europeen et les interits nationaux,
PhD, University of Liege, Liege 1996, part 1, La comunaute europeenne du charbon et
de I'acier, premiere experience supranationale, chapter 4, La Cour de Justice.
446 Resume du document de travail presente par les experts francais Ie 27 juin 1950, AN
81 AJ 131.
447 Diaries 1950,20 June-I3 August 1950, Personal papers Ball, 43.
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states parties to the treaty agree to accept this withdrawal and set the conditions
thereof .448Accordingly, secession depended on the joint approval of all other member-
states. Now the 27 June summary backgrounds the provision with a political argument:
'In a federation, secession is not possible by unilateral decision. At the same time, there
is only a community of peoples if they commit without a time limit and without a sense
of return,.449 It is not possible to assign authorship of the passage to an individual
member of the US Embassy working group. Crucially, however, the question of
secession is approached from a federal viewpoint. This means that although the
institutional set-up of the working document reflects the rationale of central government,
the federal rationale, too, guided the collaboration of the working group at this time.
Contrary to earlier French internal policy papers that show a general commitment to
establishing a federal Europe on the basis of the coal and steel pool, this demonstrates
the specific use of a federal argument to answer a concrete constitutional problem.
Furthermore, as Rosenn pointed out, political scientists disagree on whether or not the
right to secede from a federation is in fact compatible with federallsm.V" For instance,
Carl Friedrich, argues in a volume he co-edited with Bowie, which is referenced by
Rosenn, that
Federal states do not provide for secession. . ..The advantage of adopting an
article providing for secession is usually limited to the initial period of the
federation since some States might be induced to adhere to the federation only if
they are ensued the right to secede.t"
448Document de travail, 24 June 1950; Bruce to the Secretary of State, 24 June 1950.
449Resume du document de travail, 27 juin.
450Rosenn, 'Federalism', p. 5.
451Carl J. Friedrich, 'Admission of New States, Territorial Adjustments, and Secession',
in: Robert R. Bowie and Carl Friedrich (eds.), Studies in Federalism, Boston, Toronto:
Little, Brown and Company, 1954, pp. 753-71, here p. 770.
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At the inter-state conference the negotiating parties did not give much attention
to the question of secession from the organization addressed in article 39. The
delegations did, however, debate the intimately related questions of firstly, a time limit
for the treaty; secondly, the dual problem of defining the exact meaning of the surrender
of power by the member-state governments to the high authority and the source of
power of the high authority; and thirdly, further checks as well as true 'balances' for the
high authority. As to the question of a time limit for the treaty, Belgian head of
delegation Max Suetens on 3 July drew attention to the necessity of such a time limit
and stressed that his government would not commit to an infinite treaty.452 In a
conversation with Monnet on 12 July, Suetens allegedly proposed a time period of fifty
years for the treaty,453which ultimately was the time period accepted by the signatories
of the treaty. At the centre of Suetens' concerns was the question of how to limit the
surrender of sovereignty by the member-states and how to control the powers of the high
authority. The working paper remained ambiguous in that it did not specify the concrete
legal steps a state would have to take when surrendering power to the high authority, but
merely declared that states would 'confide the pooling' of their coal and steel
productions to the high authority (art. 1). The legal expert of the Belgian delegation
Fernand Muuls, for example, objected to the use of 'pooling' of sovereignties, which he
regarded as too far-reachlng.v"
452Kurzprotokoll fiber die Besprechung der Volldelegation im Hause des
Planungsamtes, 3 July 1950, PA AA, B15, 83.
453Fernschreiben Hallstein to Blankenhorn, 12 July 1950, PA AA, B15, 83.
454Kurzprotokoll fiber die Sitzung des institutionellen Ausschusses, 4-5 August 1950,
PA AA, B IS, 102. The minutes of the working group on institutional questions for 4
July- 28 August 1950 are also contained in AN 81 AJ 131.
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To a large extent, the early debates at the inter-state conference resulted from the
novelty of the supranational approach. The comments of two members of the
transatlantic university network, who were involved in the deliberations of the sub-
committee of legal experts, provide evidence for this observation. Firstly, Ophuls as
early as July 1950 began drafting a proposal for the re-organization of the German
federal justice ministry, which he thought would be necessary to accommodate
emerging new areas of law. Analyzing the new 'droit intermediaire' of the Schuman
Plan, Ophuls argued that this was
... a new law that neither theoretically, nor practically can be subsumed under
existing areas of law ... The law of the coal and steel treaty wi II not constitute
international law, but European public and private law, in particular, European
quasi-constitutional law and European economic law that provides for direct
links between individual citizens of the member-states to the treaty.455
In identifying 'European quasi-constitutional law', Ophuls anticipated that the legal
systems of the member-states would undergo dramatic change as a result of the coal and
steel treaty. At the same time, his comments show that when paraphrasing
'supranational law' , OphUls could not yet draw on adequate concepts, or on a developed
terminology.
Secondly, Mosler in a book chapter in 1966 recalled the disputes within the sub-
committee of legal experts, which further confirm just how new the legal implications of
the supranational principle were. Particularly instructive are Mosler's recollections of
the differences of opinion concerning the definition of the surrender of power of
member-state governments to the high authority. Taking as their starting point article 1
455 C. F. OphUls, Draft on key areas of law, 19 July 1950, PA AA, Ophuls papers, vol.
50. 'Constitutional law' represents the closest possible translation of Staatsrecht.
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of the working document, the committee debated whether the 'confiding' of power to
the high authority could perhaps be replaced by more viable alternatives such as
'delegating' or 'transferring' .456 According to Mosler, the delegation of power implied
that the new organization would still derive their authority from the member-states.
Transfer, in contrast, denoted that the member-states surrendered power to the high
authority, which then held and exercised power in the policy area of coal and steel
independently of the member-stares.l" What at first might appear a quibble over
terminology, in fact highlighted the problem of defining the surrender of power as well
as the source of authority once these powers were surrendered: did authority rest with
the member-state governments or the high authority? In the end, the legal sub-
committee failed to reach an agreement on the question and the appropriate terminology.
None of the suggested three formulas was incorporated into the treaty and the
application of the supranational principle left open to Interpretetion.V" Different answers
to the question of where authority rested, however, resulted in different proposals for
institutions for the coal and steel organization that were to not only check, but also to
balance the high authority.
One major proposal concerned the establishment of a special council of
ministers. In the meeting of delegations on 3 July, Spierenburg argued for a council of
ministers, a proposal that Suetens supported immediately. Accordingly, such a council
would safeguard the inclusion of the member-state governments and discuss the
decisions of the high authority. Acceptance of the decisions required a two-thirds
456 Kurzprotokoll des Juristischen Ausschusses tiber die Sitzung vom 21.7.1950, PA
AA, 815,103. Cf. also the report 'Comite d'expertsjuridiques', 25 July 1950, ibid.
457 Mosler, 'Die Entstehung des Modells' p. 375.
458 Ibid.
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majority.459 In constitutional terms, Spierenburg justified his demand for a council of
ministers with the argument that authority rested with the member-state governments. If
one were to apply the pair of opposition debated within the sub-committee of legal
experts, the Dutch and Belgian delegations tended to privilege the 'delegation' over the
'transfer' of power, while the French and the German delegations, albeit with different
institutional consequences, favoured the 'transfer' of power to the high authority.460
Evaluations of the proposed council of ministers by a variety of experts and
government officials focused on its intergovernmental characteristics. In the words of
member of the German domestic committee of legal experts, Herbert Kraus, the
proposal suggested 'falling back on the intergovernmental rationale'. 461As Ball has
rightfully stressed in his unpublished account of the negotiations, the argument for
requesting a council of ministers did not primarily represent an objection to giving up
sovereignty. Rather, the demand of the Dutch head of delegation reflected concerns with
the surrender of sovereignty over a limited subject matter.462Giving up sovereignty in
one policy area could cause disruption in the economies of the member-states. A
measure of the high authority in wage matters, for example, could provoke a strike in
one of the member-states. The co-ordination of the common coal and steel policy with
459Kurzprotokoll tiber die Besprechung der Volldelegation im Hause des
Planungsamtes,3 July 1950, PA AA, B15, 83.
460Cf. Kurzprotokoll tiber die Sitzung des Ausschusses fUrdie institutionellen Fragen,
12 July 1950, PA AA, B15, 102; Kurzprotokoll tiber die Sitzung des institutionellen
Ausschusses, 4-5 August 1950, PA AA, B 15, 102.
461Herbert Kraus, 'Aufzeichung tiber die Frage der Beteiligung der Regierungen an der
Gesamtorganisation der Montangemeinschaft', 9 July 1950, PA AA, B15, 64, p.2.
462117-pages manuscript for Schuman Plan Book, p. 99, undated, Personal papers Ball,
150.
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the overall economies of the member-states would therefore be essential. 463At the same
time, US government officials were concerned the supranational principle would be
compromised. For example, Tomlinson warned Monnet that the US government would
have to reconsider their public position on the Schuman Plan, should the supranational
aspect be watered down.464 Acheson, too, cautioned US foreign policy officials: the
proposal for the council of ministers appeared to 'nullify,465 the supranational character
of the high authority. Against this backdrop, Monnet continued to defend the
supranational principle, epitomized by the central role of the high authority, when
confronted with the demand for more intergovernmental co-operation. German head of
delegation Walter Hallstein, in tum came up with a combination of the supranational
and the federal rationale.
Three ideas were essential to combining supranational and federal reasoning.
Individually and together these three ideas contested the notion of central government
and advanced that of federal government and the separation of powers. Firstly,
Hallstein, did not perceive the proposed council of ministers as a threat to the
supranational principle, but instead as a valuable link between the autonomous activities
of the high authority and those areas of economic policy that remained within the
spheres of sovereignty of the member-states. Undoubtedly, the German chief negotiator
subscribed to a supranational high authority. However, Hallstein considered the council
of ministers a 'further fusion of sovereign powers and therefore a broadening of the
463Kurzprotokoll tiber die Besprechung der Volldelegation im Hause des
Planungsamtes,3 July 1950, PA AA, B15, 83.
464Note, Questions asked orally by Jean Monnet to W. Tomlinson, 19 July 1950, AMG
5/611.
465Telegramme, 25 July 1950, NARA, RG 59, 850.33/7-2550.
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basis of European integration' .466 Hallstein further argued that to realize the additional
potential for integration, it would be necessary to define more clearly the powers of the
high authority without unreasonably restricting them. In fact, he thus re-interpreted
Spierenburg's concept of intergovernmental control or checks on the high authority as
an institution with integration potential of its own to balance the high authority. Further,
this argument provided a new answer to the question that also concerned the sub-
committee of legal experts, namely whether authority ultimately rested with the
member-state governments or the high authority. Kusters has pointed out, moreover, that
the federal preferences served the German government's interests: whereas the
government's international decisions were subject to the Occupation Statute, German
representatives in international organizations, which would include the future high
authority, acted independently of the occupation powers, according to the Peters berg
Agreement.i" The Adenauer government, therefore, would not profit from expanding
the control powers of the council of ministers over the high authority.i'"
Secondly, Hallstein proposed to strengthen the common assembly, which could
serve as the basis for a European parliament. The main functions of the assembly were
to ' ... organize the accountability of the high authority, ... uphold public opinion and
debate in the area of the merged industries and prepare for a European parliament' .469
As Weisser expressed in his statement of expertise, control of the high authority could
466 Cf. Kurzprotokoll tiber die Sitzung des Ausschusses fUrdie institutionellen Fragen,
12 July 1950, PA AA, B15, 102.
467 According to the Petersberg Agreement between the HJCOG and the Federal
Republic (22 November 1949), the Federal Republic was permitted to join international
organizations, including the IAR, and establish consular and trade relations with other
states.
468 Kusters, 'Die Verhandlungen tiber das institutionelle System', pp. 84-5.
469 Ibid.
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not be achieved by strict rules but by conceptualizing the common assembly 'as a
democratic organ with sufficient powers' .470 Their endorsement of a strong
parliamentary assembly with direct elections showed the German delegation attempting
to balance the undemocratic potential of the high authority. Principally as a result of the
limited policy area of the coal and steel treaty, the idea of direct elections to the
assembly was not pursued any further, however.471 Thirdly, Hallstein argued that the
proposed ad hoc court of arbitration could function as 'the guardian' of the high
authority and 'the foundation for a healthy development of law'. 472Accordingly, its
powers were to be extended to those of a permanent court and its composition was to be
reconsidered, toO.473 Contrary to the German delegation's preference for a
democratically elected parliament, Hallstein's conception of a permanent court that
would balance the high authority materialized and was fleshed out later in the
negotiations.
As a result of the deliberations in late June and July 1950, the French officials
responsible for the original conception of the high authority were forced to break with
the guiding principle of central government in order to sustain the supranational
principle. Ophuls has highlighted that the shift from central to federal government was
accompanied by a change of the guiding legal model. Whereas French administrative
law informed the terminology regarding the executive, federal analogies were better
suited to describe the institutional framework and the relations between the member-
470Weisser, 'Bemerkungen zum Schuman-Plan', 17 July 1950.
471Mosler, 'Die Entstehung des Modells', pp. 378-9.
472Protokoll Uber die Zusammenkunft der deutschen Delegation mit Herrn Monnet in
Houjarray, 2 July 1950, PA AA, 815, 53.
473Ibid.
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states.474Although a former participant in the inter-state negotiations, Ophuls' report is
not source-based and therefore shows no awareness of how the French planning officials
were inspired by the administrative practices of the New Deal.475Ophuls did, however,
stress the significance of the US federal constitutional model for the institutional
framework of the coal and steel treaty.476German delegates and Hallstein in particular
drew on analogies to the US system, which confirms this claim.477
Meeting with Monnet, Reuter, Blankenhorn and Dutch delegate Max
Kohnstamm, Hallstein rejected the idea to distinguish between 'more' and 'less
complete European institutions' ,478which was presented in a draft for the 'memorandum
on the institutions' that would form part of the conference interim report of 10 August
1950.479 'More complete institutions' comprised the high authority and the court and
'less complete institutions', which had only transitory character, the common assembly
and the council of ministers. Hallstein argued that the common assembly had to be
supranational because only a supranational assembly would be entitled to monitor the
supranational high authority. Further, asserting that the council of ministers would be a
permanent, not a transitory institution, Hallstein underlined that '[t]he European
union ... would have the character of a federal state, in which the representation of
474Ophuls, 'Zur ideengeschichtlichen Herkunft', p. 393.
475In contrast, Mosler's account in the same volume is at the least based on the minutes
he apparently kept from the inter-state negotiations. Cf. Mosler, 'Die Entstehung des
Modells' .
476Ophuls, 'Zur ideengeschichtlichen Herkunft', pp. 394-5.
477Cf. Ulrich Sahm, 'Stellungnahme zur Bildung eines Ministerrates', AAPA, B 15, I.
478Kurzprotokoll uber die Besprechung bei Herrn Monnet, 27 July 1950, PA AA, B 15,
62.
479Rapport sur les traveaux poursuivis a Paris par les delegations des six pays du 20 juin
au 10 aout 1950, http://www.ena.lu/(accessed 17 March 2008).
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individual state interests would be legitimate' .480 To illustrate his claim, the German
head of delegation drew on the US federal model, but 'despite of the repeated use of the
example of the United States of America, it proved difficult to convey the federal
concept to the French gentlemen' .481
This episode is particularly significant because it demonstrates that Hallstein not
only acted as the head of the German delegation defending domestically derived
interests, but crucially, in promoting a federal and supranational preference, also acted
as a representative of the transatlantic university network. Firstly, Hallstein mediated
between American and European, here predominantly French, administrative and
constitutional concepts. One could argue that Hallstein's reference to the US system
represented a semantic application of American federalism to fulfil a specific rhetorical
purpose. In promoting a federal system Hallstein very likely was informed by the system
of the newly established Federal Republic. This is supported by MosIer's letter to the
German head of delegation, in which he stressed that 'for the French, our federal
organization appears to be a source of continuing misunderstanding' .482 Further, Mosler
guarded against 'resorting too often to the federal solutions of our own constitutional
history' .483 Indeed, Hallstein was aware of Monnet and Reuter's affinity for the US
model, which he tried to incorporate in his strategy to convey the federal concept.i"
These incidents corroborate that while Monnet and, one could add, Reuter were
480 Kurzprotokoll, 27 July 1950, PA AA, B15, 62.
481 Ibid.
482 Letter Mosler to Hallstein, 27 August 1950, MPG-ArchivlllI.Abt.lZA 139, Kasten 2.
Cf. also Ophuls, 'Zur ideengeschichtlichen Herkunft', pp. 397-8.
483 Ibid.
484 Cf. also Hallstein's report in Protokoll tiber die Gemeinsame Sitzung aller
Sachverstandigenausschusse, 8 December 1950, PA AA, B 15,5.
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rhetorically committed to establishing the federal United States of Europe, they did not
share federalist preferences. Therefore, the observation feeds back into the notion of the
marginalization of Monnet vis-a-vis federalist groups in post-World War II Europe.
Secondly, Hallstein evidently was aware of the potential appeal of what he called 'an
incipient separation of powers of an emerging European constitutional system,485 to the
US government. In view of that, the appointment of the professor from Frankfurt
University, who to some degree represented the 'wild card' among the options available
to Adenauer during the period of agenda setting, proved to be a first-rate choice. As a
matter of fact, Hallstein's negotiation tactics buttressed the German chancellor's politics
of western integration of the Federal Republic and good bilateral relations with the
US.486Lastly, with regard to Hallstein's view that the US government would pick up on
the notion of the separation of powers and the court, in particular,487 further early
activities of the US Embassy working group are instructive, too.
As the basis for the relevant activities of the US Embassy working group serves
a memorandum Robert Bowie drafted after meeting with William Tomlinson to discuss
the 24 June working document in Paris.488Among others, the memorandum examines
the functions and the composition of the proposed court and classifies the grounds of
appeal introduced in the working document (art. 8). These grounds constitute treaty
485Protokoll tiber die Zusammenkunft der deutschen Delegation mit Herrn Monnet in
Houjarray, 2 July 1950, PA AA, 815, 53.
486For Adenauer's 'Westpolitik' see Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer, pp. 475-503; for the
chancellor's long-standing preference for western integration cf. Kaiser, Christian
Democracy, pp. 218-9.
487Protokoll tiber die Zusammenkunft der deutschen Delegation mit Herrn Monnet in
Houjarray, 2 July 1950, PA AA, B15,53.
488Memo Tomlinson to Stokes, 30 June 1950, RG 469, Special Representative in
Europe, Office of the General Counsel, Subject Files 1948-53, Box 30.
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violations, on the one hand, and compromises of a member-state's full employment
policies or of its equilibrium of the external balance, on the other. A similar distinction
was first presented in the internal policy paper for the French inter-ministerial
committee of 12 June that acknowledged juridical and substantive appeals,489 a
classification that did not make it into the working document. Bowie, however, raising
this very distinction, argues that two different kinds of grounds for appeal require
different mechanisms for resolution. Appeals against treaty violations were to be
directed to a court composed entirely of judges rather than of judges and general
mediators, as proposed in the working document. Appeals against decisions or
recommendations, which potentially affected the full employment or external balances
of a member-state, in tum, 'raised serious questions'P", since this could concern almost
any decision by the high authority. Therefore, Bowie claims, the appeals procedure
would ultimately 'undermine the standing of the High Authority,'?" whose decisions
would always be challenged. A solution could be to strengthen the common assembly
'for any decisions which raise issues too basic to be left to the ultimate power of the
High Authority':"? instead of resorting to judicial procedure.l" Further, the Bowie
memorandum addresses the notion of 'a check on the High Authority,494 with regard to
implementing agreements (art. 36). In both instances, the memorandum reflects a
concern with checking and balancing the powers of the high authority, which a central
government fails to accommodate. Instead, Bowie's concerns further bolster a federal
489Note pour Ie Comite interministeriel, 12 June 1950, AN 8·1AJ 131.
490Memorandum 30 June 1950, point 1.
491Ibid.
492Ibid.
493Cf. also Boerger, Aux origines de / 'Union Europeenne, chapter 4) La Cour de Justice.
494Memorandum 30 June 1950, point 2.
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perspective on the treaty. Tomlinson later integrated the memorandum into a checklist
he prepared for the US governrnent.t" Collecting 'all the questions and comments that
have been raised either here or in Washington', he intended to ' ... use this check-list
in ... conversations with ... [Monnet] and his staff496 and as an outline to evaluate future
drafts. Finally, as regards the role of the court, State Department officials appeared more
inclined to support the original preference of the working document for an ad hoc court
of arbitration497 than Hallstein, whose federal aspirations superseded even those of the
US government. In summary, the activities of the two policy networks defy Parson's
claim that 'the French alone championed supranationality' .498
In the end of the first period of the inter-state negotiations, the six delegations
agreed to establish four institutions: the high authority, the council of ministers, the
common assembly and the court. The conference interim report maintained the
differentiation into 'supranational regime' and 'simply international Institutions'?",
which according to Mosler matched the distinction between federal and international
law.soo Mosler further recapitulated that the federal and the supranational guiding
principle were equally and best represented in the high authority and the court, while the
council and the assembly would satisfy only pragmatic concerns. Notably, the respective
composition of these institutions would ascertain their independence. 50 I As a matter of
fact, the independence of the members of the high authority and the court and the equal
495 Bruce to Perkins, Check list of first draft of Schuman Proposal Working Document, 5
July 1950, NARA, RG 59, 850.33/7-550.
496 Memorandum 30 June 1950.
497 Telegramrne to US Embassy Paris, 7 August 1950, NARA, RG 59, 850.33/8-750.
498 Parsons, A Certain Idea, p. 59.
499 Rapport sur les traveaux poursuivis ... du 20 juin au 10 aout 1950.
500 Mosler, 'Die Entstehung des Modells', p. 380.
501 Ibid.
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treatment of members of these institutions became part of the ECSC treaty. Equal
treatment covered a range of aspects from the mode of appointment to the decision over
their salaries, which were taken by the council.s02 Lastly, among other examples, the
substantive powers of the high authority still needed defining and its powers
cataloguing. In the interim report, the separation of powers between the institutions was
deemed essential, but not entirely spelled out.S03 Crucially, the precise distribution of
powers between the high authority and the council of ministers remained open. At the
same time, the control and check function of the council and the common assembly over
the high authority required specification. The remaining institutional questions would
only be debated after an official recess that lasted until September 1950 and against the
backdrop of a modified conference setting.
3.5 Fleshing out the constitutional system: the supranational
'community' and the court
External as well as internal developments contributed to changing the conference
setting. Firstly, the inter-state negotiations were increasingly held in the shadow of the
defence question. On 25 June 1950, shortly after the beginning of the negotiations, the
North Korean army crossed the 38th parallel. According to Thomas Schwartz, this
incident was 'the Pearl Harbor of the Cold War [,] an event which catalyzed and
transformed the American response to the Soviet Union,.504 The Korean War brought to
the fore the question of German rearmament. Hans-Peter Schwarz has stressed that
502Ophuls, 'Zur ideengeschichtlichen Herkunft', p. 397, footnote 27.
503Rapport sur les traveaux poursuivis ... du 20 juin au 10 aoOt 1950.
504Schwartz, America's Germany, p. 124.
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Adenauer proposed setting up German contingencies as early as 6, 7 and 8 June, even
before the North Korean aggression. sos In fact, the chancellor raised this question in
individual conversations with the three high commissioners without having informed his
ministers. Adenauer emphasized that an assessment of the security situation in the
Federal Republic indicated that German forces were necessary to contribute to its
defence against a potential Soviet invasion. At this point already, ' ... all the High
Commissioners accepted the need for a German defence contribution,.s06 Following the
French government's initiative of 9 May, US State Department officials highlighted that
next to the contributing to Franco-German rapprochement, the Schuman Pian' ... [m]ight
provide [a] framework within which Ger[man] production c[ou]ld contribute to
NAT[O's] military production without raising difficulties that [a] separate Ger[man]
activity w[ou]ld entail' .507 The question of German rearmament influenced the
negotiations on the economic rather than the institutional provisions of the treaty, which
will be addressed in chapter 4. The issue of defence, however, first emerged at the inter-
state conference as part of the conflict over supranational and intergovernmental
preferences.
In July 1950, the Dutch cabinet suggested to give the council of ministers the
power 'by [a] three-fourths majority to instruct [the] supra-national high authority on
matters relating to defence in [the] coal [... and] steel field,.s08 At the Schuman Plan
conference, Spierenburg pushed the proposal in a meeting with Monnet, Hirsch,
50S Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer, pp. 516-30.
506Ibid. p. 530.
507Telegramme Webb to Acheson, 11 May 1950,396.1 LO/5-1150, FRUS 1950 III, pp.
696-7.
508Chapin to Acheson, 18 July 1950, NARA, RG 59,850.3317-1850, FRUS III, p. 741.
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Kohnstamm and Hallstein after the summer break.509 Hallstein immediately objected to
Spierenburg's demand on two grounds: firstly, the proposal would represent a complete
departure from the principle of the Schuman Plan, which was characterized by the
allocation of authority over coal and steel to 'European officials't'", carefully selected
by the member-state governments and partially controlled by a 'European parliament'
and a 'European court', the members of which would also be elected by the member-
state governments. The Dutch proposal, in contrast, required
". the submission under the opportune and uncontrollable decision by a majority
of foreign ministers whose election one could not influence and who would
represent their national interests. Such a solution does not suggest to integrate
sovereign rights, but to alienate them without any return, that is to give them
away like gifts."!
Hallstein argued, secondly, that while the council of ministers might instruct the high
authority, decisions over defence would in fact be made within the framework of
NATO. Since Germany was not a member of NATO an arrangement like the one
proposed by Spierenburg would be unacceptable for the time being. Hallstein added that
a majority decision by the council of ministers was only conceivable if another high
authority was established for European defence or if Germany participated in NATO.512
Briefly, the Dutch delegation attempted to reinforce the intergovernmental aspect
of the coal and steel treaty with their proposition. Moreover, US foreign policy planners
sympathized with this idea. In early August 1950, ECA and State Department officials
outlined the possible co-ordination of the defence policies of the member-states through
509 Niederschrift Uber eine Unterhaltung im Generalkommissariat des Plans, 9
September 1950, PA AA, B 15, 103.
510 Ibid.
511 Ibid.
512 Ibid.
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the coal and steel treaty.513 In a telegramme to Bruce Acheson proposed that the planned
consultative committees should be entitled to instruct the high authority - as the
institution managing the coal and steel resources - to realize measures to advance the
common defence. One minister of each member-state would serve as a member of a
consultative committee and the committee could pass on programmes that obtained a
two-third majority to the high authority.i" But why were US officials prepared to
strengthen an intergovernmental committee and jeopardize the supranational principle?
Did the proposal symbolize a break with the US government's policy preference for a
supranational western Europe? The US government's attitude and their continued
support of supranational European integration over the next couple of months and even
years prove this was not the case. Instead the proposal reflects the sheer panic of US
foreign policy officials in light of the Korean War and their preoccupation with the
defence of the West. McCloy, who had expressed inconsistent views regarding the
desirability of German rearmament.i" may nevertheless have assumed a critical role in
convincing US foreign policy officials to leave defence out of the inter-state conference
to help the successful conclusion of the coal and steel treaty, when he wrote that' ... the
introduction of [the] common defense problem into [the] Schuman Plan negotiations at
this time might confuse and retard such negotiations without furthering [the]
development of common defense.i" Although ECA and State Department officials had
attempted to pressurize the negotiating parties into accepting a Dutch-inspired proposal
that appealed to vital US security interests, they ultimately resisted the temptation and
513 Cf. also Gillignham, Coal, Steel, pp. 254-5.
514 Acheson to Bruce, 3 August 1950, NARA, RG 59, 850.33/8-350.
SIS Gillingham, Coal, Steel, pp. 252-3.
516 McCloy to Acheson, 24 August 1950, NARA, RG 59, 850.33/8-2450.
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did not part with their long-term goal for a supranational western Europe.517 The
momentary inclination of US foreign policy officials to put the supranational principle at
risk therefore can only be understood by considering the defence question.
Secondly, internal developments at the inter-state conference accounted for
modifying the framework for the negotiations on the institutions, too. Because the heads
of delegation began devoting their energies to the more technical aspects of the treaty
from September 1950 onwards, the conference dynamics changed. Before the summer
break the working group on institutional questions had in co-operation with the sub-
committee of legal experts almost exclusively treated institutional questions. Now a
general shift of focus from the institutional to the economic provisions occurred at the
conference. While it would be wrong to assume that key actors including Monnet and
Hallstein were no longer interested in institutional questions, they increasingly devoted
their meetings to the economic particulars of the treaty. Together the issue of defence
and the shift in focus of the heads of delegation impacted the setting in which the
remaining institutional questions were debated, not the least for the two transatlantic
policy networks.
Generally, informal transatlantic policy-making on the institutional framework
became less important after the summer break. The US Embassy working group began
to focus on the economic rather than the institutional aspects of the treaty. Bowie's
responsibility for realizing the US occupation policies for the German heavy industries
probably triggered the change of direction of the policy network. Further, reflecting the
517 For a subsequent rejection of the link between defence and Schuman Plan see for
example Hoffman to OSR Paris, 20 September 1950, RG 469, Special Representative in
Europe, Office of the General Counsel, Subject Files 1948-53, Box 30.
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shift of attention of the group of the heads of delegation, Monnet and McCloy guided
the activities of the US Embassy working group towards the economic aspects of the
treaty. The guidance of these two policy entrepreneurs underpinned Bowie's
engagement and facilitated Ball's contribution to the anti-trust articles. What might have
reinforced the new focus of the US Embassy working group further is that perhaps, the
policy network was no longer needed to push informally for their institutional
preferences. Not only were the supranational and federal principles asserted in the
conference interim report, but also, one could argue, had the first period of the
negotiations indicated that actors such as Hallstein and OphUls, key actors of the
transatlantic university network, functioned as guarantors of these principles. Contrary
to the US Embassy working group, the transatlantic university network continued to
play a role in the institutional negotiations, mainly through actors' simultaneous
affiliation with the sub-committee of legal experts. Unfortunately, written sources are
inconclusive as to the precise contribution of the transatlantic university network to
fleshing out the operation of the institutions and the relations between them. Evidence
supports two instances in which actors of the two policy networks arguably acted as
mediators between different politico-legal concepts, however. Having introduced this
qualification to assess the role of transatlantic policy-making, the remainder of this sub-
chapter will address the development of the concept of supranationality and the
emergence of the court of justice.
A renewed interest in defining the supranational principle was triggered by a
discussion on the Schuman Plan and the GATT, which had first came up in the sub-
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committee of legal experts in August 1950.518 After the summer break, the sub-
committee debated the legal consequences of the GATT for the coal and steel treaty.
Two articles of the GATT raised important questions for the draft treaty. The 'most
favoured nation principle'I'" of article 1 stipulates that if an advantage in relation to any
measure affecting the trade of goods is given to one contracting party, it must be given
to all other contracting parties. According to article 24, the most favoured nation
principle would not be breached if the contracting parties formed a customs union or a
free trade area or signed a preliminary agreement necessary for the formation of a
customs union or a free trade area.520If the coal and steel treaty served as the basis for
the establishment of a customs union or a free trade area, it would be necessary to
submit the treaty to the GATT assembly, which needed to assert its compatibility with
GATT article 24. To solicit further expertise on the most favoured nation principle,
Mosler exchanged letters with the Max-Planck Institute for Public and International Law
in Heidelbergf", which confirms that informal policy-making continued during this
period. In his book chapter, which reflects word for word the records of a sub-committee
meeting of7 September.f" Mosler reports that legal experts agreed that
[t]he planned supranational institution cannot be subsumed under any form of
union defined by the GATT because the abolition of internal customs barriers
represented only a secondary aspect, which could not be separated from the
economic and political aspects [of the coal and steel treaty].S23
518Kurzprotokoll tiber die Besprechung zwischen Mr. Hubert und Herrn Prof. Ophuls, 8
August 1950, PA AA, B 15, 102.
519GATT article 1 (accessed 20 March 2008):
http://www.wto.orglenglish/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#gatt4 7
520GATT article 24.
521See for example letter Mosler to Strebel, 9 September 1950, PA AA, B15, 102.
522Kurzprotokoll tiber die Sitzung des juristischen Sachverstandigenausschusses, 7
September 1950, PA AA, B 15, 102.
523Mosler, Die Entstehung des Modells, p. 381.
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Legal experts failed to reach agreement over two related questions, however. Firstly,
they disagreed over defining the coal and steel treaty as the basis for a state-like
organization. If this were the case the commitments of the member-states concerning the
coal and steel treaty arguably would supersede those of the GATT. Secondly, it was not
clear to the experts whether the member-states needed to apply for a waiver to the
obligations of the GATT under its article 25.524
Unable to resolve these problems, the sub-committee referred them to the co-
ordinating committee between the various working groups (previously the working
group for institutional questions). Among the problems relating to the supranational
principle, committee members debated how to design the supranational powers of the
high authority so that the coal and steel treaty would not fall under the GATT. Further,
they discussed if the supranational high authority would only be entitled to issue
recommendations to the member-state governments, which then would be binding on
member-states concluding agreements with other states concerning the coal and steel
areas, or whether the high authority itself should conclude such international
agreements.l'" Together these questions required specifying not only the supranational
powers of the institutions, but also the underlying legal concepts for the coal and steel
organization. To answer these questions, in tum, required legal expertise and the
524 GATT article 25; cf. Kurzprotokolle tiber die Sitzungen des juristischen
Sachverstandigenausschusses, 4, 6, 7 September 1950, PA AA, B IS, 102; Mosler, 'Die
Entstehung des Modells', pp. 380-1.
525 Kurzprotokoll der reunion restreinte, II September 1950, PA AA, B IS, 99.
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adjusted questions were therefore referred back to the legal sub-commiuee.F" However,
these questions also had a constitutional dimension, which the new mandate of the sub-
committee reflected. The co-ordinating committee therefore fine-tuned and effectively
widened the sub-committee's mandate527by authorizing the legal experts to clarify 'the
juridical capacity of the Schuman union and its institutions, in the national and
international sphere'. 528One could argue that only against the backdrop of the positive
experience of working with the sub-committee before the summer break and the
changed conference setting did the members of the co-ordinating committee feel
sufficiently confident to entrust the legal experts with the resolution of vital
constitutional questions.
Crucially the debate on juridical competences confirmed the use of 'community'
to describe the coal and steel organization. Important preparatory work to devise this
concept had been done in the sub-committee of legal experts in July 1950. The concept
was first discussed when the sub-committee addressed the 'legal character' of the coal
and steel organization.f" Until then, a variety of terms were used, among other
examples, the 'coal and steel production community,530 in the Schuman Plan
526Cf. also Hermann Mosler, Aufzeichnung uber eine Unterhaltung mit Herrn Calmes
(Luxemburg) im Anschluss and die Sitzung des Juristischen
Sachverstandigenausschusses, 20 September 1950, PA AA, B 15, 103.
527Kurzprotokoll der reunion restreinte, 15 September 1950, ibid.
528Dated 12 September, the new mandate was adopted in the 15 September meeting.
Anlage zum Protokoll vom 12.9.1950, Deutscher Entwurf mit Anderungen des
Ausschusses, PA AA, B 15, 103.
529Kurzprotokoll des Juristischen Ausschusses uber die Sitzung vom 24.7.1950, PA
AA, B 15, 103.
530Declaration officielle du gouvemement francais, 9 May 1950; Bonbright to Acheson,
9 May 1950.
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declaration, 'a community of peoples,S3) in the summary of the 24 June working
document and 'Schuman union,.s32 Against this backdrop, 'community' emerged as the
basis for creating an identifiable legal personality with state-like features and rights and
duties in the international and national spheres, which importantly was to be represented
by supranational institutions.r" The adoption of the term community only occurred after
the summer break in the debate on the competencies of the organization and specified
further the legal implications of supranationality.
Finally, the allegedly diverging economic preferences informing the ECSC and
the GATT also had a transatlantic dimension. By establishing the coal and steel
community between the six member-states, the ECSC treaty violated the GATT's most
favoured nation principle without, however, conforming to the exceptions mentioned in
article 24. Since all six ECSC member-states were members of the GATT, they invoked
article 25 and applied for a waiver. Milward has argued that limited sectoral integration
resulted in the establishment of a protectionist European community, whose preferences
opposed the US government's long-standing preference for trade liberalization.t" In
contrast, Christoph Buchheim has contended that by applying for the GATT waivers, the
six member-states confirmed their commitment to trade liberalization. In accepting the
waivers, moreover, ECSC member-states committed themselves to realizing a common
trade policy, which would be advantageous for other GATT member-states, while the
common institutions were precluded from introducing policies, which would be
53) Resume du document de travail, 27 June 1950.
532 Anlage zum Protokoll vom 12.9.1950, Deutscher Entwurf mit Anderungen des
Ausschusses, PA AA, B 15,103.
533Mosler, 'Die Entstehung des Modells', p. 382.
534Milward, The Reconstruction, pp. 398-400; 421-35.
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contradictory to the obligations of the six member-states under the GATT. According to
Buchheim, a turning point in the post-war multi-lateral trade system, inspired by the US
government, only came with the EEC treaty and horizontal integration.i"
More conclusive evidence for the role of transatlantic policy networks as
mediators between different legal traditions is provided by the negotiations on the court
of justice. The memorandum on the institutions of the conference interim report first of
all recognized the designation 'court of justice,536, previously adopted within the sub-
committee of legal experts.r" Secondly, the report declared that the court of justice and
the high authority were equal in status,538which represented a clear departure from the
initially planned ad-hoc court. Thirdly, when fleshed out, the powers of the court would
have to strike the balance between ensuring the court 'would not take the place of any
other institution, in particular the high authority,539 on the one hand, and fostering the
development of the organization through interpretation of the treaty on the other.
Fourthly, the report identified safeguarding the application of the treaty and the
operation of the institutions within the treaty framework as primary functions of the
court. The scope of action of the court, fifthly, stretched to 'all disputes between the
high authority and the member-states or the enterprises'. 540According to the report,
535Christoph Buchheim, 'Schuman-Plan und liberale Weltwirtschaft (GATT)" in:
Schwabe (ed.), Die Anfdnge des Schuman-Plans, pp. 161-70.
536Since the working group on institutional questions accepted the memorandum on the
institutions on 5 August 1950, the subsequent discussions of the sub-committee of legal
experts on 7 and 8 August 1950 were not reflected in the conference interim report. Cf.
Rapport sur les traveaux poursuivis ... du 20 juin au 10 aol1t 1950.
537Kurzprotokoll des Juristischen Ausschusses Uber die Sitzung vom 24.7.1950, PA
AA,BI5,103.
538Rapport sur les traveaux poursuivis ... du 20 juin au 10 aout 1950.
539Ibid.
540Ibid.
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institutions of the treaty and member-state governments could appeal the court, while it
was left open if individual enterprises had the right to appeal, toO.541In the sub-
committee of legal experts Muuls criticized the potential implications for the national
constitutions, notably that the right to appeal of individual enterprises would mean they
could avoid having to go through the member-states first. The legal experts agreed,
however, that it would be contradictory to the conception of the supranational
community to grant to the court the right to affect enterprises directly, but withholding
from individual enterprises the right to appeal to the court against the decisions of the
high authority.542 Only in mid-October did the heads of delegation agree that individual
enterprises were entitled to appeal against sanctions of the high authority on the grounds
of its alleged abuse of power and the perceived inappropriateness of a monetary
penalty.543
The powers of the court were discussed further in November 1950. A draft treaty
presented by the French delegation" served as the basis for the deliberations. Mainly
responsible for articles 26-29 was Lagrange who had replaced Reuter. According to his
recollections, Lagrange designed the powers of the court on the basis of his experiences
in the Conseil d'Etat.545 Article 26 addressed the court's right to annul sanctions of the
541See also Kurzprotokoll uber die Sitzung des Institutionellen Ausschusses, 4-5
August, PA AA, B 15, 102; Mosler, 'Die Entstehung des Modells', p. 380.
542Kurzprotokoll uber die Sitzung des juristischen Sachverstandigenausschusses, 7
August 1950, PA AA, B 15, 102; cf. for an analysis Herbert Kraus, Bemerkungen zu
dem deutschen "Memorandum sur les Institutions de la proposition du 9 mai 1950
(Schuman-Plan)", 14 August 1950, PA AA, B 15, 17.
543Sitzungsbericht der Delegationschefs, 11-12 October 1950, PA AA, B 15,77.
544lere redaction projet de traite, 8 November 1950, PU, HAEU, 29.
545Maurice Lagrange, 'La Cour de justice des Communautes europeennes du plan
Schuman a I'Union europeenne', in: Melanges Fernand Dehousse, vol. 2, pp. 127-35;
for an English translation see http://www.ena.lu/(accessed 20 February 2008).
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high authority. Member-states or the council of ministers could plea for the annulment
of a decision or recommendation of the high authority, whereas enterprises were only
entitled to challenge individual decisions that affected them directly. Crucially, the court
could evaluate the 'legality' of sanctions of the high authority, but not their
'expediency'. This distinction - according to Lagrange, derived from French
administrative law546 - gave rise to contention because it reduced the powers of the
court significantly, when compared to the framework for judicial review that had been
previously agreed on. The high authority and the council could also call on the court to
demand the tentative interpretation of a treaty clause or a protocol to the treaty (art. 26).
Moreover, on the request of a member-state or the high authority, the court was entitled
to review and annul the proceedings of the common assembly and the council of
ministers if they exceeded their powers (art. 28). Among the omissions the other
delegations highlighted were the failure to incorporate sufficiently broad guarantees for
member-states, enterprises and associations to appeal against the sanctions of the high
authority; the right to appeal against treaty violations; and the power of the court to
address and invalidate an action by a community institution that jeopardized the
economic equilibrium of a member-srate.r" Briefly, in trying to avoid 'the eternally
feared spectre of government by the judiciary'<", Lagrange had resorted to designing a
predominantly administrative court.
The early conceptions of the court, developed by Reuter, had been guided by
international law, according to which only member-state governments would have the
546 Ibid.
547 Boerger, Aux origines de l'Union Europeenne chapter 4, La Cour de Justice.
548 Lagrange, 'La Cour de justice'.
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right to appeal to the court. Subsequently, the notion of a constitutional court within the
community had emerged in the debates on the institutional framework and checks and
balances on the high authority. In this context, Lagrange's articles represented a break
with previous proposals and crucially bore no resemblance to Hallstein's vision of the
court as 'the guardian' of the high authority and 'the foundation for a healthy
development of law' .549 In a high-level meeting, French and German delegates and legal
experts tried to resolve the diverging approaches and proposals for the court.550 Notably,
with Hallstein, who practically directed the meeting, and Uri, who at least attended in
part, two key actors of the transatlantic policy networks participated in the meeting.
Their participation further confirms the notion of Hallstein's and Uri's holistic view of
the emerging treaty, discussed in chapter 2. Further, while Mosler was at this point no
longer in Paris, his informal consultations with the Max-Planck Institute for Public and
International Law551 may have contributed to preference formation within the German
delegation. As late as December 1950, Mosler commented on articles 26 and 27 of the
draft treaty and allegedly discussed questions of phrasing with Schlochauer, his
successor in Paris.552 Notably absent from the meeting, in which French and German
experts tried to resolve the question of the court were legal experts of the Benelux
delegations, who were very critical of the articles presented by Lagrange.553 This
seemed ironic given that the delegates of Luxembourg had stressed the need for
549 Protokoll tiber die Zusammenkunft der deutschen Delegation mit Herrn Monnet in
Houjarray, 2 July 1950, PA AA, B15, 53.
550 Kurzprotokoll tiber die deutsch-franzosische luristensitzung im franzosischen
Planungsamt, 21 November 1950, PA AA, B15, 19.
551 Letter Mosler to Bilfinger, 16 September 1950, PA AA, B 15, 54.
552 Letter Mosler to Ophuls, 3 December 1950, PA AA, B 15, Personal papers
Schlochauer, 355.
553 Cf. Boerger, Aux origines de l'Union Europeenne chapter 4, La Cour de Justice.
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strengthening the court, especially in light of a suspected tendency of the high authority
to privilege the big over the small states.554
Ball in his unpublished account of the negotiations confirms that the smaller
states tried to protect their interests ' ... first by the establishment of the Special Council
of Ministers and, second, by attempting to expand the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice
so that it could review economic decisions'. 555 In his manuscript, which was drafted to
promote the Schuman Plan to an American audience, Ball draws an analogy between the
Schuman Plan conference and the creation of the US federal government in 1787.
Turning to the question of the representation of smaller states, Ball argues that the
'Great Compromise', the establishment of a bicameral system, which resolved the
problem for the US constitution, was no option for the coal and steel pool. Ultimately,
the concerns of the smaller states were addressed in the treaty by permitting any
member-state to require the high authority to consult with the council of ministers
should it feel an action of failure on the part of the high authority. If such a review left
the complaining state dissatisfied, this state could then appeal to the court of justice (art.
37).
In the course of the meeting on the court French and German legal experts
achieved a compromise. Firstly, the decisions, recommendations and, with certain
qualifications, opinions of the high authority could be challenged via the court.
Secondly, the right to appeal was effectively broadened for enterprises and was also
granted to associations. Thirdly, with regard to its scope of action, Hallstein, on the one
554 Ibid.
555 117-pages manuscript for Schuman Plan Book, p. 109, undated, Personal papers Ball,
150.
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hand, stressed the need for a strong court of justice to balance the high authority and to
provide for the effective and comprehensive rule of the law within the cornmunity.l"
Lagrange, on the other hand, agreed with Hallstein in principle but argued that the
application of the concept of exces de pouvoir, the abuse of power, which allegedly
served as the basis for pleas for annulment in the French administrative court system,
would not be appropriate for the community. The French lawyer feared that the
application of this principle would give the court the right to scrutinize the numerous
economic particulars contained in the treaty and thus make the activities of the high
authority 'iIIusionary,5S7. Agreement was finally reached on the grounds for appeal,
which comprised the lack of jurisdiction, breach of form, abuse of power, abuse of
discretion and the violation of regulations. Since this compromise formula for the plea
for annulment also entailed the abuse of power and discretion as well as 'obvious'
violations of regulations for 'economic facts and circumstances'J", the court of justice
would balance the high authority.
At first the compromise appeared to be on shaky grounds, however. While
Luxembourg's legal expert at the conference would have preferred a more extensive
judicial review,559 Lagrange was now faced with opposition within the French
delegation. In a letter to Steindorff, in which he advised the latter on his doctoral thesis
on the court,560Ophuls highlighted that
556Kurzprotokoll uber die deutsch-franzosische Juristensitzung im franzosischen
Planungsamt, 21 November 1950, PA AA, BI5, 19.
557 Ibid.
558Ibid.
559 Cf. Boerger, Aux origines de l'Union Europeenne chapter 4, La Cour de Justice.
560 See Ernst Steindorff, Die Nichtigkeitsklage (Les recours pour exces de pouvoir) im
Recht der Europaischen Gemeinschaft for Kohle und Stahl. Ein rechtsvergleichender
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... Monnet opposed the notion of judicial control. .. This changed with the
appointment of Lagrange, whose juridical authority Monnet was largely prepared
to follow. At the least, within the French Planning Commission, there remained a
certain dislike of judicial control and often, Lagrange was caught in the crossfire
between opposing views.i?'
According to Ophuls, in retrospect, ' ... the guys from the Plan were so unsatisfied with
the compromise that they mobilized the [French] Minister of Justice Rene Mayer' .562
Mayer allegedly summoned Lagrange and pressurized his former colleague at the
Conseil d'Etat to change the compromise formula so it would reduce the checks and
balances on the high authority. According to the letter, Lagrange conveyed Mayer's
demands to Ophuls without, however, sharing the justice minister's preference:
'Lagrange, who has come very close to our position'f", therefore accepted it, when
Ophuls told him there was no room for manoeuvre and informed Mayer accordingly. It
is not apparent from the letter who in the Planning Commission contacted Mayer, who
had supported the Schuman Plan from its inception564 and was a friend of Monnet's.i'"
More importantly, OphUls' testimony indicates that to some extent Lagrange had
modified his preference with regard to judicial review and was therefore prepared to
defend a position that no longer matched the 'French preference' as articulated by the
planning officials. Neither official records, nor Lagrange's recollections reflect the
tensions over the question of the court within the French team. In this context, the
example of Lagrange underlines the insufficiency of a purely intergovernmental
Beitrag zur verwaltungsgerichtlichen Kontrolle der Hohen Behorde, Frankfurt am Main:
Vittorio Klostermann, 1952.
561 Letter Ophuls to Steindorff, 15 September 1951, PA AA, OphUls papers, vol. 19.
562 Ibid.
563 Ibid.
564 Cf. Monnet, Memoirs, pp. 300-3; Parsons, A Certain Idea, p. 55.
565 Gillingham, Coal, Steel, p. 259.
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approach to describe policy and preference formation at the inter-state conference. In
summary, the court of justice of the ECSC would fulfil the function of a constitutional
court if an institution abused its power or did not perform its duties; an administrative
court with regard to the activities of the high authority; and a court of arbitration
between member-states or between member-states and the high authority. Further, the
Statute of the Court, in whose making Lagrange and members of the transatlantic
university network were involved.i'" introduced the right of appeal of enterprises and
natural and juridical persons to the court. According to Kusters, this represented a
'novelty in international law' .567
3.6 Finalizing the institutional framework: the Conference of
Ministers
A number of political questions were left open and decided by the Conference of
Ministers in April 1951. A working document prepared by the French delegation listed
five issues that needed to be resolved.568 These issues concerned firstly the number of
seats in the common assembly. Secondly, the question of how to weigh the votes in the
council of ministers needed to be resolved. Since it had been agreed that all member-
states were to have the same number of votes in the council of ministers, these votes
would have to be weighed differently since the Benelux countries and Italy jointly only
566 See for example Schlochauers Bemerkungen zum Statut-Entwurf Lagrange, 9 April
1951, PA AA, B 15, Personal papers Schlochauer, 355.
567 Kusters, 'Die Verhandlungen', p. 95; see also Carl Friedrich Ophuls, Aufzeichnung.
Betr.: Kritik M. Rolins am Gerichtssystem des Schumanplans, 19 September 1951, PA
AA, B IS, 64; and idem., 'Juristische Grundgedanken des Schumanplans', in: Neue
Juristische Wochenzeitschrift, vol. 4, no. 8 (1951), pp. 289-92, here p. 291.
568 Projet de memorandum pour servir de base de discussion Ii la conference des
ministres sur Ie plan Schuman, Questions reservees a la conference, 11 April 1951, AN
81 AJ 153.
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held twenty-five per cent of the entire coal and steel production. Thirdly, the
composition of the high authority and the court of justice and the procedure for
nomination of their respective members were unresolved. Fourthly, the duration of
office for the president and vice-president and their mode of appointment as well as
fifthly, the number and distribution of seats within the consultative committees were still
unclear. Crucially, all the proposals of the French delegation reflected the decision to
grant to Germany parity with France in all institutions. According to Monnet, he had
previously agreed with the chancellor on the question of parity.569At their conference,
the foreign ministers, therefore, needed to resolve the conflict over whether the
institutions should be designed according to the principle 'one state-one vote', or
whether the composition of the institutions should reflect the share of member-states in
the joint coal and steel production.V"
Turning to evaluating the impact of transatlantic policy networks, this chapter
has demonstrated that as part of a broader advocacy coalition for a supranational
western Europe excluding Britain transatlantic policy networks influenced the inter-state
negotiations on the institutional framework. Already in designing the high authority but
more importantly, in the debate on checks and balances on the high authority including
the notion of a constitutional court, actors mediated between various European and
American ideas and politico-legal concepts.
Finally, transatlantic policy networks contributed to creating an institutional
design for core Europe, which had significant long-term repercussions. The federal
institutional framework served as an important precursor for the unsuccessful joint
569Monnet, Memoirs, p. 354.
570 Cf. Kusters, 'Die Verhandlungen' , pp. 96-9.
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project of establishing the EDC/EPC. Whereas disillusionment with the supranational
principle followed from the failure of the EDCIEPC, the operation of the High Authority
and functional sectoral integration, the federal principle found its way into the common
market proposal, which in 1957 resulted in the treaty establishing the EEC. At least as
important as these institutional path dependencies, however, were the path dependencies
transatlantic policy networks created by contributing to the anti-trust provisions of the
ECSC treaty, which will be addressed in the next chapter.
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4 The anti-trust provisions
4.1 Introduction
This chapter demonstrates how transatlantic policy networks contributed to shaping the
anti-trust provisions embodied in articles 65 and 66 of the ECSC treaty. Not only did
these articles represent a crucial dimension in the formation of the first integrated core
Europe organization of six member-states at the Schuman Plan conference, but they also
set a precedent for EU competition policy. Next to mergers, state aids and public utility,
anti-trust is one of the four separate areas constituting this key policy area. Anti-trust
comprises the scrutiny and control of cartels and restrictive practices and the abuse of a
dominant market position.i" As part of a broader advocacy coalition for consumer
protection outlined in chapter 2.8, transatlantic policy networks influenced the inter-state
negotiations on the anti-trust provisions. Most significantly, the US Embassy working
group contributed to drafting anti-trust articles during the period up to December 1950.
Actors of both policy networks were involved in the deliberations on the reorganization
of the German heavy industries and the final drafting period in February and March
1951.
Two interrelated arguments provide the background for this chapter. Firstly, key
actors contributing to the discussion of the anti-trust provisions for the coal and steel
pool were at the time of the negotiations involved in realizing anti-trust and competitive
policies in post-war administration agencies in western Europe. Secondly, while in the
shaping of these policies officials primarily drew on US anti-trust law, in Germany, the
571 For an introduction s. Michelle Cini, Lee McGowan, Competition Policy in the
European Union, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998.
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American legal tradition crucially interacted with complementary domestic politico-
legal thought and concepts.
This chapter is structured around five distinct stages in the evolution of a
supranational European anti-trust law at the Schuman Plan conference. Taking as its
starting point the reluctance of US Secretary of State Acheson and US Ambassador
Bruce to embrace the Schuman Plan, the first sub-chapter contextualizes the initiative of
the French government within a variety of earlier policy proposals to promote and
safeguard competition in post-World War II Europe. Sketching the anti-trust and
competition policies of France and Germany, respectively, similarities and potential
links between the development of European post-war economic policies and American
anti-trust policy and more generally, the tradition of US anti-trust law will be identified
(4.2). The next sub-chapter outlines the debate following the declaration of 9 May 1950
on the potential of the Schuman Plan to set up an international cartel. Actors who
engaged in this debate were motivated by a blend of political beliefs, rhetorical goals
and material interests. Divergent incentives of American, German and French actors can
be inferred, but are often hard to identify conclusively on the basis of primary evidence.
Certain ideas and positions, however, can be tied to earlier discussions that occurred in
the American debate on the reforms of the New Deal as well as in the German debate on
cartel policy (4.3). Significant external developments, which contributed in October
1950 to Monnet's request to integrate explicit anti-trust provisions in the treaty are
addressed in the following sub-chapter (4.4). The negotiations on the various draft
articles introduced into the conference from October to early December 1950, are the
subject of the next sub-chapter (4.5). With the temporary breakdown of the Schuman
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Plan conference, the debate on the anti-trust provisions shifted from the Paris inter-state
negotiations to the Federal Republic of Germany, where Allied and German officials
discussed the deconcentration and de-cartelization of the heavy industries. Following a
discussion of these separate negotiations between Allied and German officials the last
sub-chapter addresses minor modifications on the anti-trust provisions after 9 February
1951 (4.6). Finally, the impact of transatlantic policy networks on the anti-trust articles,
specifically with regard to the interaction of various legal traditions will be addressed
(4.7).
4.2 A competitive market economy for western Europe:
American, French and German discourses on anti-trust
and competition policy
Initially, Acheson and Bruce rejected the Schuman Plan. When the two Americans were
introduced to the French government's initiative prior to its release, they feared the
proposal would encourage the revival of traditional forms of transnational collaboration
of the European heavy industries, which often took the shape of cartels. Crucially
therefore, the Schuman Plan appeared incompatible with the US government's policy
preference for a competitive market economy for western Europe. Alarmed by
Acheson's initial reluctance to embrace the proposal, Monnet asked Uri to prepare a
publishable statement to contradict the notion that the plan would give rise to cartel
formation. The Schuman Plan declaration itself contained merely a section broadly
stating that
[u]nlike an international cartel whose purpose it is to divide up and exploit
national markets through restrictive practices, and the maintenance of high
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profits, the projected or~anization will insure the fusion of markets and the
expansion of production. 2
Uri's anti-cartel note was more specific, contrasting the proposed supranational joint
authority with an international cartel and establishing five criteria against which the
politico-economic rationale of the Schuman Plan were to be measured: the projected
organization's objective, its mode of operation, means of action, management and
scope.573 Criticism regarding the competitive framework of the coal and steel pool did
not vanish, however. The continuance of criticism can be largely explained by the
importance the US government attached to establishing a competitive market economy
in western Europe.
For US foreign policy planners the need to implement the competitive principle
within European societies was based on the notion that cartels have the potential to
facilitate the rise of autocratic and totalitarian systems. Accordingly, they argued that
there was an intimate economic, political and moral link between the cartelization of the
European heavy industries in the inter-war period and the rise of the nationalist right in
both Germany and France. Evidence for this argument was provided by two sources, in
particular. One source was the foundation of the ISC by Germany, France, Belgium and
Luxembourg in 1926. Ulrich Nocken has argued that the establishment of the ISC was
significant because firstly, the ISC represented an attempt to solve the problem of
balancing the basic industries between France and Germany after the latter had lost
572 Declaration officielle du gouvernement francais, 9 mai 1950; Bonbright to Acheson,
9 May 1950.
573 No author [Pierre Uri], No title [Note], 9 May 1950, HAEU, PU/DO 19, Folder US-
French relations. For the contemporary English translation see London to Secretary of
State: Text of anti-cartel note, 12 May 1950, 396.1 LO/5-1250, FRUS 1950 III, pp. 700-
1.
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sovereignty over Alsace-Lorraine and the Saar as a consequence of the Versailles peace
settlement. Secondly, the ISC resolved the question of which international economic
system would dominate European trade. Thirdly, the ISC would, in the later part of the
1920s, influence the social and economic conflicts in Germany as a result of having
created a new balance within the German industrial system.574 While the cartel
institutionalized international co-operation in the western European heavy industries, the
negotiations on the industrial agreement also fostered transnational coalition building, as
was evidenced by the French steel producers and the South German steel-consuming
industry.575 John Gillingham has demonstrated, moreover, that from the 1920s to the
1940s a largely unbroken tradition of co-operation in the heavy industries co-existed
with the ongoing Franco-German conflict. Gillingham even argues that the collaboration
of industrialists during the inter-war years represented an important precursor to
functional integration in the coal and steel sector after World War 11.576
Alternative and more serious evidence for the link between cartels and the rise of
the nationalist right was provided by the rapid growth of cartels in France and Germany
and the collaboration of the representatives of the heavy industries with the French
Vichy and the German National Socialist regimes, respectively. According to this view,
cartels did not only shape transnational collaboration but they were deeply embedded
574Nocken, 'International Cartels and Foreign Policy', p. 35.
575Ibid.; Clemens Wurm, 'Politik und Wirtschaft in den internationalen Beziehungen.
Internationale Kartelle, Aussenpolitik und weltwirtschaftliche Beziehungen 1919-1939:
EinfUhrung', in: Wurm (ed.), Intemationale Kartelle, pp.I-31, here p. 20.
576John Gillingham, 'Zur Vorgeschichte der Montan-Union. Westeuropas Kohle und
Stahl in Depression und Krieg', in: Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, vol. 34 (1986),
pp. 381-405. For a critical assessment cf. Wurm, 'Politik und Wirtschaft', pp. 21-2.
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within the national economic structures of France and Germany.577 To guarantee the
sustainability of democratic governments in western Europe US foreign policy planners
therefore promoted the implementation of democratic values and a pluralistic society
model in the American style. Briefly, this was the politico-economic rationale informing
the Marshall Plan as well as the US occupation policies for Germany. During the early
Cold War, growing concern with security policy contributed further to increase the
importance attached to the promotion of a democratic and capitalist society model.578
Upheld by the US government in response to perceived external challenges the policy
preference for a competitive market economy relied on an idea developed within an
essentially domestic frame, namely 'competition as a way of life'.
The American concept of competition as a way of life was first identified and
analyzed by Richard Hofstadter in a seminal essay published in 1964.579Arguing that
competition served a means of social regulation, he postulated that, ' ... in America
competition was more than a theory: it was a way of life and a creed' .580 As a result,
competition policy simultaneously pursued economic, political and social-moral goals.
As the legal basis of US anti-trust law, the Sherman Act of 1890 embodied an economic
goal in the belief that competition would produce maximum economic efficiency. The
law was intended to block private accumulation of power and protect democratic
government, which represented its political goal. Moreover, fulfilling its social-moral
577 Cf. Henry A. Turner, German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler, New York,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985; Berghahn, The Americanization, pp. 19-26.
578Smith, America's Mission, pp. 146-76; Schumacher, Kalter Krieg und Propaganda,
fR·41-9.
9 Richard Hofstadter, 'What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?', in: idem., The
Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays, Cambridge/MA: Harvard
University Press, 1996 [1964], pp. 188-237.
580 Ibid. pp. 195-6.
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function, the act corresponded to the belief that competition would engineer the
formation of a constructive national character.i" Due to judicial interpretation and
further congressional legislation, particularly during the period of the New Deal, these
three goals were subject to successive redefinition. While chapter 3 has demonstrated
how New Deal concepts informed French planning officials and Reuter in the context of
the Monnet Plan and the framing of the Schuman Plan declaration and early draft treaty
proposals, this chapter will revisit and further explore New Deal legislation to shed light
on the economic rationale of the coal and steel treaty.
The economic policies of the Roosevelt administration radically differed from
those of the preceding Hoover government. Under the form of 'business
associationism', the latter had already promoted the theme of productivity. 582 Even after
the 1929 crash of the stock market, however, the Hoover government continued to
practice laissez-faire capitalism and regarded welfare legislation a short-term solution at
best. With the economic depression at a new height and unemployment at 25 per cent in
early 1933,583the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt now gave centre stage to the
social problem of economic inequality and to the implementation of appropriate
solutions. Among a variety of attempts at reform, two key laws of the incipient New
Deal tackled the major sectors of the American economy, namely industry and
agriculture. Early New Dealers, who were inspired by the alleged effectiveness of
rationalization and co-ordination of industrial activity during World War I, promoted the
581 Ibid. pp. 199-200.
582 Charles S. Maier, 'The Politics of Productivity: Foundation of American
International Economic Policy after World War II', in: International Organization, vol.
31, no. 4 (1977), pp. 607-33, here p. 613.
583 Brinkley, Liberalism and its Discontents, p. 15.
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National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), enacted in June 1933. Committed to state-
supervised enterprise and national planning, NIRA created a new federal agency, the
NRA that co-operated with business and labour representatives in order to stabilize the
various industries. Moreover, by providing for the formation of new industry authorities,
which were allowed to fix minimum prices, wages and production quotas, the NRA
encouraged groups of business representatives to function as cartels.584 In spring ]935,
the US Supreme Court in a unanimous decision declared NIRA unconstitutional.i'"
Rudolph Peritz has argued that the significance of the act rested not so much on the idea
of centralized planning, but on the efforts to integrate labour unions in the policy-
making process, which is a form of interest group politics associated with the ]960s in
American history.586 The Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA), created by
another piece of legislation in May 1933, proved more successful than the NRA. With
the support of most commercial farmers it managed to stabilize farm prices and to
control production. Accounting for the different results of the NRA and the AAA were
various factors, among them, the contrast between the heterogeneous industrial
economy, on the one hand, and the relatively homogenous agricultural sector, on the
other. Also contributing to the success of the AAA was the fact that governmental
intervention was not entirely new in the agricultural industry. In the US Department of
Agriculture, there existed an administrative elite already.s87
584Ibid. pp. 27-8.
585A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
586 Rudolph Peritz, Competition Policy in America. History, Rhetoric, Law, Oxford,
New York: Oxford University Press, rev. ed. 2000.
587 Brinkley, Liberalism and its Discontents, pp. 30-3.
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While the early New Deal legislation relied on US government planning to
stabilize the American economy, one of the main criticisms of the later New Deal
evolved around the incompatibility of central planning and a free market economy.
Notably, the TVA seemed more acceptable because it differed from other early New
Deal legislation in employing planning on the regional level and fostering the potential
of local democracy. 588 Against the backdrop of the failure of NlRA and another major
economic collapse in 1937, a new generation of New Dealers rejected the collectivist
impulse of the years 1933-35 and its underlying vision ofa 'liberal variant of corporatist
interest intermediation'r'f" While they continued to promote a strong role for the federal
government in the market place, the new generation, which included Thurman Arnold,
Thomas Corcoran, Benjamin Cohen and others, emphasized that de-centralized planning
and competitive markets alone could perform as economic regulators. As one of the
major proponents of the later New Deal, Arnold in his writings elaborated on the
contradiction ofthe concepts of central planning and a free market economy. A political
theorist and professor of law at Yale University, Arnold in 1937 was appointed the head
of the Antitrust Division in the Department of Justice, where Katz, who had also been
involved in the NRA, and later Kronstein temporarily were his co-workers.
Characterizing the NRA as the 'antithesis of the Sherman Act,S90 Arnold condemned the
' ... days of the NRA, when our legislative policy seemed inconsistent with maintaining a
free market ... ,591
588 Maier, 'The Politics of Productivity', p. 614-5.
589 The term is borrowed from Abelshauser, The Dynamics of German Industry, p. 46.
590 Thurman Arnold, The Bottlenecks of Business, New York: Reynal & Hitchcock,
1940, p. 263.
591 Ibid. p. 98.
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Although the economic rationale of anti-trust policies and the effectiveness of
anti-trust law were always being challenged, a strong principle in US society was the
necessity to maintain free competition. In other words, the underlying principles of
traditional (economic) liberalism remained unchallenged during the New Deal era and
beyond and continued to be central to the domestic development of US anti-trust law
and its promotion abroad. First among these principles was the view that competition
would have a positive effect on democratic government and the character of a society,
while the private accumulation of power would endanger individual economic and
political freedom.592 Select European national policies safeguarding free competition
notwithstanding, post-World War II European societies did not share the concept of
competition as a way of life as comprehensively. 593
A key role in trying to implement competition in post-war European societies
and to advance productivity was assumed by the ECA agencies. To obtain American
aid, recipient states of Marshall Plan funds were not only required to collaborate and
formulate a joint economic programme, but they also had to commit to introducing and
promoting policies that would conform to the concept of a competitive market economy.
The ECA missions in Europe pursued a number of strategies to encourage a greater
public understanding of competition policy. Among these strategies were efforts to
enlist the support of trade unions in their campaign to eliminate restrictive business
592 Hofstadter, 'What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?', pp. 199-200.
593 The following ideas have been published in part in Brigitte Leucht, 'Tracing
European Mentalities: Free Competition in Post-WW II Transatlantic Europe', in:
Marie-Therese Bitsch, Wilfried Loth, Charles Barthel (eds.), Cultures politiques,
opinions publiques et construction europeenne, Brussels: Bruylant, 2007, pp. 337-53.
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practices in various European countrlesi" as well as the funding of expert study visits to
the US. With these visits, the ECA aimed at stirring greater public interest in the idea of
competition. Further, the experts and practitioners were expected, on their return, to
apply their experience and know-how to national legislation to enhance and safeguard
competition. A French and a German commission of experts each participated in the
ECA scheme in 1951 and 1950, respectively. 595 In this context, Kronstein, Sch lochauer
and Bohm were involved in the German commission's visit to the US, which has been
acknowledged in chapter 2.
Against the backdrop of the US policy preference for a competitive market
economy and efforts by US government agencies to implement this preference in post-
war Europe, the framework, in which these issues were discussed in France and
Germany, needs to be sketched. Firstly, in France and Germany the discourse on
national anti-trust laws crucially preceded the transatlantic debate on the anti-trust
provisions at the Schuman Plan conference. Secondly, the Marshall Plan administration
provided one important framework for the discussion of anti-trust policy with a
transatlantic dimension. US government agencies threw important political weight
behind initiatives for comprehensive national anti-trust bills, which were domestically
contested. Thirdly, although the actors involved in advocating anti-trust policy and the
nature of the debate on anti-trust and competition policy differed in France and
Germany, in both states a fully-fledged discussion emerged first of all out of domestic
594 Office memorandum US government, 26 April 1950, NARA, RG 59, 840.054/4-
2650.
595 Kai Pedersen, 'Re-educating European Management: the Marshall Plan's Campaign
Against Restrictive Business Practices in France, 1949-1953, in: Business and Economic
History vol. 25, no. 1 (1996), pp. 267-74.
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concerns and was based on domestically derived ideas. The dimensions and scope of the
respective domestic debates will be introduced in the following two sections of this sub-
chapter.
The point of departure for French competition policy was provided by article 419
of the French Penal Code (1810). A legal instrument to prohibit concerted action, the
article was enacted in response to concerns over the price increases, which had
accompanied the Napoleonic wars, rather than to foster the competitive principle.
Applying the article during the second half of the 19th century, French courts introduced
the distinction of 'good cartels', regulating competition to the benefit of all, and 'bad
cartels' which were monopolistic and harmful to other competitors. Article 419 only
applied to bad cartels.596 The notion of good and bad cartels remained a characteristic of
French competition policy, which clashed with conceptions of American anti-trust law.
Further significant to the development of French competition law after World War II
was an ordinance the French government passed in 1945, which introduced means of
price control to combat post-war inflationary pressure. Supplementary provisions to the
ordinance aimed at protecting price-cutting firms against retaliation from manufacturers
and distributors. According to David Gerber these provisions partly reflected the
discrediting of 'big business' and of industrialists accused of co-operating with the Nazi
occupiers. Consequently, while domestic resentment in France could have provided the
impetus to enact comprehensive anti-trust laws, such legislation did not materialize.
Instead Gerber concludes that '[a]t least formally, French competition law developed
596 David Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting
Prometheus, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998, pp. 183-4.
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through amendments to price control legislation'. 597 Matthias Kipping, on the other
hand, has drawn attention to the domestic debate over the question whether private
agreements or state intervention would best guarantee an efficient economy in post-war
France.598 During the period from 1945-48, criticism of restrictive practices and of
'professional dirigisme' intensified and some critics demanded additional state
intervention to safeguard competition and guarantee benefits for consumers. The
initiative for a specific anti-trust law finally emerged within the Committee for
Economic Affairs of the French National Assembly in December 1948, by way of a
resolution introduced by the trade unionist and socialist Albert Gazier.599 It was the
French Planning Commission, however, that presented the first draft for a national anti-
trust bill.
Because he was concerned with the productivity of the French economy and the
efficiency of the modernization programme, Monnet in 1948 set up a working group
under Jean Fourastie, a professor at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers and a
co-worker of the Planning Commission to study the reasons for France's low
productivity. Another member of the task force, Maurice Allais, professor of economics
at the Ecole des Mines, was an outspoken proponent of free competition. Among the
causes the working group identified for the low productivity in France were the
restricted ness of the national market, which in tum provided an incentive for European
integration,600 and the lack of real competition. Even within the working group, the
597 Ibid. pp. 186-7.
598 Matthias Kipping, 'Concurrence et competitivite'.
599 Ibid. p. 435.
600Cf. also Lynch, 'Resolving the Paradox of the Monnet Plan', who has adopted this
explanation to account for the French government's initiative of 9 May 1950.
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question of whether cartels were to be abandoned altogether or whether they could
benefit the economy remained unresolved. In their final report, the group recommended
the introduction of a French anti-trust law to counteract the potential abuses of
concentrations. In May 1949, the report resulted in the establishment of the Comite
Provisoire de la Productivite, the Provisional Productivity Committee, which should co-
ordinate various public and private activities in order to increase productivity.Y' Against
this backdrop, Monnet and planning officials proposed a draft anti-trust law. A US
official, who commented on the bill, acknowledged the link between the concern over
productivity and anti-trust legislation:
Early in 1949 officials in the Monnet Plan, reportedly disturbed over the
additional expenses that cartel agreements were imposing on the cost of the
Plan's projects, prepared an antitrust bill which was largely modelled after the
United States laws on this subject in that it would have prohibited all agreements
in restraint oftrade.602
The external observation underlines that French officials drew on American anti-trust
law when they were realizing the damaging effects of cartel agreements on the
revitalization and modernization of the national post-war economy. At the same time,
this example confirms that processes of cultural transfer are guided by the willingness to
import rather than the intention to export.603 While the Planning Commission's strict
anti-trust bill proved too far-reaching for business representatives and the French
Ministry of Finance and was therefore unsuccessful, it demonstrates that Monnet and
601 Ibid. pp. 436-7; see also for US government support of these initiatives Richard
Kuisel, 'The Marshall Plan in Action: Politics, Labor, Industry and the Program of
Technical Assistance', in: Le Marshall plan et le relevement economique de l'Europe,
Paris: Comite pour l'histoire economique et financiere, 1993, pp. 335-58.
602 US Embassy Paris to US Department of State, 2 February 1950, NARA, RG 59,
851.054/2-250. Cf. Kipping, 'Concurrence et competitivite', pp. 437-8.
603 Middell, 'Kulturtransfer und Historische Komparatistik', pp. 20-1.
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planning officials were practiced in translating the American concept of a free market
economy into French domestic politics.
Crucially, the anti-trust bill was backgrounded by concerns about productivity,
which resonated with the 'supposedly apolitical politics of productivity'F" of the
Marshall Planners. Even though they presented the first national anti-trust bill, planning
officials at the Schuman Plan conference would articulate contradictory preferences, for
example, in the debates on price policy. Planning officials seemed not worried about the
ideological contradiction between establishing a competitive market economy and
employing price fixing as the means to achieve a competitive coal and steel pool. To
explain some of these economic policy preferences Hirsch, Monnet and Uri defended at
the inter-state conference, it is necessary to stress that the Monnet Plan shared affinities
with the rationale underlying the early rather than the later New Dea1.60S As evidenced
by numerous French projects of the inter-war period, which involved economic
planning, the Monnet Plan drew on a domestic tradition of planning. Simultaneously,
however, the modernization programme shared specific goals and techniques of the
legislative programme that instigated the New Deal. Among the main features that can
be identified in both the early New Deal and the Monnet Plan were the focus on specific
basic sectors of the economy and the use of central planning in order to stabilize or
create a free market economy. In an article published in 1962, Hirsch described the
Monnet Plan as ' ... far removed both from classical Liberalism of the laissez-faire,
604 Maier, 'The Politics of Productivity', p. 613.
60S For an assessment see also Richard Kuisel, Capitalism and the Stale in Modern
France. Renovation and Economic Management in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1981, Chapter 8, The Monnet Plan, 1945-52: the Prototype
of Planning, pp. 187-247.
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laisser-aller school and of bureaucratic dirigism' .606According to Hirsch, the authors of
the first plan described its methods as those of a 'concerted economy' and deemed it
essential to integrate in the process of drawing up the plan ' ... all those social and
economic forces who would afterwards need to put the plan into practice' .607Like the
NRA, the Monnet Plan was committed to fostering collective regulatory and decision-
making structures and to institutionalizing the co-operation of representatives of labour
and industry, and specific interest groups.608 Lastly, Steindorff indicated the significance
of the different traditions in which actors were socialized, when he stressed that Uri and
French planning officials ' ... always started calculating right away' when it came to
discussing the economic dimension of the Schuman Plan.609 To put it differently, these
officials were used to predict, calculate and measure the consequences of the Monnet
Plan on the recovery of the French economy. In the development of anti-trust policy at
the Schuman Plan conference, this legacy of the planning officials proved just as
important as the well-known French tradition of distinguishing good and bad cartels.
In France, the anti-trust bill proposed by the planning officials remained the only
bill that fulfilled the expectations of US civil servants. Contesting proposals such as
those developed by the Secretariat d'Etat aux Affaires Economiques, the State
Secretariat for Economic Affairs under Christian democratic (Mouvement Republicain
Populaire, MRP) deputy Robert Buron as well as another bill submitted to the French
National Assembly by Henri Teitgen did not ban cartels, but upheld the traditional
606Etienne Hirsch, 'French Planning and its European Application', in: Journal of
Common Market Studies, vol. I, no. 2 (1962). pp. 117-27, here p. 118.
607Ibid.
608See also Mioche, Le Plan Monnet, pp. 114-7.
609Interview Steindorff.
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distinction of good and bad cartels. In a report to Acheson, Bruce criticized that the
Teitgen bill
... in no sense is [an] antitrust proposal, but rather seeks to encourage
cartelization by creating [a] special statute giving legal status to ententes and by
establishing [a] system for forcing entire industries or recalcitrant firms to enter
into cartel agreements."?
Unfortunately, the authorship of the bill remains uncertain. According to Bruce the
author of the 'private, not government-sponsored' bill was Henri Teitgen, 'Deputy and
Law Professor at Nantes [and ... ] the father of Pierre Henri Teitgen, Minister of
Informaticn'i'"! Like his son Pierre-Henri, Henri Teitgen also successfully combined a
legal and political career. Finally, in 1953, the French government enacted a decree that
added competition law principles to the price ordinance of 1945.612
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the ECA together with the USHICOG
required the introduction of laws protecting free competition. Central to the evolution of
competition policy in Germany was the interaction of the traditions of US anti-trust law
and domestic ordo-Iiberal thought.t" Ordo-liberalism was first developed in the early
1930s by a group of scholars including the lawyers Franz Bohm and Hans GroBmann-
Doerth and the economist Walter Eucken at the University of Frelburg.t" These ordo-
liberals were concerned with generating a response to the traumatic economic and
610 Bruce to Secretary of State, 18 January 1950, NARA, RG 59, 851.054/1-1850. S.
Kipping, 'Concurrence et competitivite', pp. 437-41. Cf. also Pedersen, 'Re-educating
European Management, pp. 268-70.
611 Bruce to Secretary of State, 18 January 1950.
612 Gerber, Law and Competition, pp. 187-8.
613 Cf. Murach-Brand, Antitrust auf deutsch.
614 Franz Bohm, Walter Eucken, Hans GroBmann-Doerth, 'The Ordo Manifesto of
1936', in: Alan Peacock, Hans Willgerodt (eds.), Germany's Social Market Economy:
Origins and Evolution, London: Macmillan, 1989 [1936].
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political experiences of Weimar Republic, which resulted in the rise to power of the
National Socialist regime. An intellectual movement promoting an interdisciplinary
approach to integrate economic policy and law, ordo-Iiberalism therefore also put
forward a political and economic programme. To contextualize the programmatic
interest of the ordo-liberals, it is necessary to outline briefly the foundations of German
policy towards cartels.
Starting in the late 19th century, German cartel policy encouraged cartelization.
According to Knut Wolfgang Norr, the 'protectionist tum' of German economic policy
in the late 1870s proved formative for the 'organised economy' of the Weimar
Republic.t" As the legal basis for free enterprise and freedom of occupation, the 1869
Trade Regulation Act of the North German Federation was only directed against public
restraints, which were derived from the guild system. In 1871 the act was transformed
into a law for the newly established German state. At the time, only few cartels existed
and therefore the notion that private agreements could restrain the freedom to engage in
business was irrelevant. This changed, however, when the number of cartels grew from
the 1880s. In a landmark decision of 1897, moreover, the Reichsgericht, the highest
German Administrative Court, upheld a cartel, which stipulated the use of a common
sales agency by Saxon wood pulp producers under the Trade Regulation Act. By
ranking a private agreement higher than the freedom to engage in business, the decision
further contributed to the growth of cartels. Moreover, not only did the court hold a
cartel enforceable against a member that had violated its terms, but the ruling also
615 Knut Wolfgang Norr, 'Franz Bohm and the Theory of the Private Law Society', in:
Peter Kolowski (ed.), The Theory of Capitaltsm in the German Economic Tradition.
Historism, Ordo-Liberalism, Critical Theory, Solidarism, Berlin et.a!.: Springer, 2000,
pp. 148-88, here p. 148.
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became the basis for distinguishing between good and bad cartels. Essential in
establishing whether a cartel was good or bad was the duration of the agreed restriction.
Good cartels limited competition temporarily whereas bad cartels permanently
destroyed it.616 Just as the French variant of the notion of good and bad cartels, this
conceptualization was also incompatible with US anti-trust law and ideology.
After cartels were fostered to control the economy and cartelization was made
compulsory during World War I, the Weimar government under Gustav Stresemann on
2 November 1923 promulgated a Cartel Ordinance 'against the abuse of economic
power'. Enacted to avert hyperinflation, the decree was directed against cartels abusing
their economic position, while confirming their validity. Further, it sought to protect
cartel members as well as the public interest. Among the measures introduced to protect
the members of a cartel was the statutory right of parties to withdraw from an agreement
on certain grounds. The Reichskartellgericht, a special Cartel Court, whose
establishment was authorized by the 1923 Decree, was responsible for deciding whether
a member withdrew from an agreement on permissible grounds. According to the
ordinance, another key role in realizing cartel policy would be assumed by the Reich
minister of economics. The minister could, for example, permit all withdrawals and
consequently weaken a cartel as well as require copies of agreements and decisions to
protect the public interest. After the 1923 Decree, cartels and concentrations grew
rapidly and corporate combines such as LG. Farben and Vereinigte Stahlwerke, both
616 Decision of the Reichsgericht of 4 February 1897, RZG. 38/155; Corwin Edwards,
Trade Regulations Overseas: the National Laws: a Study in Comparative Law, Dobbs
Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, 1966, pp. 153-4.
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formed in 1926, became the dominant forces in the economy.i'" Moreover, cartels were
turned into governmental policy instruments and cartelization became mandatory when
the Nazi regime came to power in 1933.
From its inception, the development of cartel policy in Germany was
accompanied by a wider debate on restrictive practices, in which politicians, economists
and lawyers engaged. Harm Schroter has demonstrated that cartelization in Germany
can only be understood by supplementing an account of legal norms and economic
concepts with an appreciation of the collective mentality of the German cartel
movement, which had emerged since the late 19th century.618 Crucially, ordo-Iiberals
developed their key arguments not only against the practice of cartelisation, but also
against the justifications for cartels. Arguments in support of cartels helped consolidate
cartels in the period before 1933. Further, they continued to shape the discourse on
competition policy in Germany until the early years of the Federal Republic. Of the
many justifications for cartels, Norr has introduced four main perspectives."? Firstly,
the Historical School with its evolutionist and deterministic traits gave rise to the
argument that the organized economy, which was regarded as the more recent economic
form, was on a higher stage than the free market economy. Secondly, the idea of
organization was reinforced by the notion of collective regulatory and decision-making
structures. Accordingly, cartels were compared with and linked to co-operative societies
that fulfilled a moral function by counteracting the perceived negative effects of
classical individualism. Reflecting this line of argument, the aforementioned court
617Edwards, Trade Regulations Overseas, pp. 155-7.
618Harm G. Schroter, 'Kartellierungund Dekartellierung 1890-1990', in:
Vierteljahrsschrijt for Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, vol. 81 (1994), pp. 457-93.
619Norr, 'Franz Bohrn', pp. 149-52.
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decision of 1897 confirmed that for business actors, co-operation through forming
associations was a legitimate means to control the market. Thirdly, in accordance with
the contemporary conception of Realpolitik, cartels were considered viable instruments
of national assertion in international politics and the ongoing struggle for world markets.
Lastly, Realpolitik and the ideology of power politics were part of a larger phenomenon
of what Norr has characterized as a 'decline in the idea of law' .620Cartel policy
therefore was discussed from the perspective of the interests of the state, the national
economy and specific interest groups rather than politico-legal principles such as
freedom of competition. Significant conclusions as to why cartels should be held up,
particularly arguments pointing to the importance of corporatist interest intermediation
in the economy were strikingly similar to the political and economic rationale informing
both the early New Deal legislation and the Monnet Plan.
Against this backdrop, ordo-Iiberals in Germany were concerned with the
problem of social power. In the writings of Bohm and Eucken, who co-operated closely
since the early 1930s,621 the problem of social power ' ... underlies the analytic and
normative conception of the competitive order in the economic context and the rule of
law in the political context ... ,622Ordo-Iiberals tried to restructure the relations between
state and society, focusing on improving the institutional framework. In line with earlier
620Ibid. p. 151.
621Franz Benker, Agnes Labrousse, Jean-Daniel Weisz, 'The Evolution of
Ordoliberalism in the Light of the Ordo Yearbook: A Bibliometric Analysis', in: Agnes
Labrousse, Jean-Daniel Weisz (eds.), Institutional Economics in France and Germany.
German Ordoliberalism versus the French Regulation School, Berlin, Heidelberg et.al.:
SEringer, 2001, pp. 159-81, here p. 163.
6 Manfred E. Streit, Michael Wohlgemuth, 'The Market Economy and the State.
Hayekian and Ordoliberal Conceptions', in: Kolowski (ed.), The Theory of Capitalism,
pp. 224-69, here pp. 225-6.
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conceptions of liberalism they maintained that a free, equitable and affluent society was
based on a competitive economy. To guarantee such a development of society, ordo-
liberals emphasized the importance of embedding the competitive order in an economic
constitution, or Wirtschaftsverfassung. For the ordo-liberal conception of the economic
constitution a monograph published by Bohm in 1933 proved groundbreaking.Y'
Bohm's research was motivated by the practical experience he had gained enforcing the
1923 Cartel Ordinance while working for the Imperial Ministry for Economics. In his
book on competition and monopolies, which amounted to 'a declaration of
independence of the idea of competition, ,624 he transferred the concept of the economic
constitution from the organized economy to the free market economy. Objecting to the
notion that competition would produce chaos, Bohm contended that it would generate an
order in its own right. Since order stood for legal rules, the question of the adequate
legal order became central to his inquiry. At the time of the Schuman Plan conference,
Bohrn was involved in the development of German anti-trust policy. In his very first
contribution to the newly established journal Ordo, Bohm emphasized the importance of
the German anti-trust law, which accordingly represented 'a basic decision about the
future German economic constitution' ,625 Moreover, that he headed the German
commission visiting the US within the ECA programme indicates that Bohm was at
least interested in US anti-trust law.
623 Franz Bohrn, Wettbewerb und Monopolkampj Eine Untersuchung zur Frage des
wirtschoftlichen Kampfrechts und zur Frage der rechtlichen Struktur der geltenden
Wirtschaftsordnung, Berlin: Heymann, 1933.
624 Norr, 'Franz Bohm', p. 156.
625 Franz Bohrn, 'Das Reichsgericht und die Kartelle. Eine
wirtschaftsverfassunsgrechtliche Kritik an dem Urteil des RG. Vom 4. Febr. 1897, RZG.
38/155', in: Ordo, vol. 1 (1948), pp. 197-213, here p. 199.
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Proponents of the Freiburg school of ordo-Iiberalism shared affinities with the
prevalent tradition of US anti-trust law in that competition provided the key to the dual
goal of economic prosperity and political stability. When referring the prevalent
tradition in US anti-trust history this excludes, for example, the experiences of the early
New Deal. Due to its foundations in the inter-war years, ordo-liberalism, contrary to
American anti-trust law, was chiefly concerned with the problem of private economic
power. After World War II the ideas of ordo-liberalism also shaped the emergence of
the 'social market economy'. 626 Trying to reconcile the idea of a free market economy
with limited intervention by the state, the concept in 1949 was adopted by the Christian
Democratic Union (CDU) in the DUsseldorfer Leitsatze, the party programme, which
provided the basis for their election campaign of the same year. Following its
breakthrough with the successful CDU campaign, the social market economy helped
trigger the German 'economic miracle' of the 1950s.627
The face of the economic miracle and the first minister of economics of the
Federal Republic, Ludwig Erhard, later claimed he applied what he had learned as a
doctoral student with Franz Oppenheimer to the German economy. Discussing
Oppenheimer's 'liberal socialism', 'a theory of a third path between capitalism and
communism' ,628 Dieter Haselbach has challenged Erhard's claim. Born into a liberal
626 See Nicholls, Freedom With Responsibility; Nils Goldschmidt, 'Alfred Muller-
Armack and Ludwig Erhard: Social Market Liberalism', in: Freiburger
Diskussionspapiere zur Ordnungsokonomik (2004), http://www.walter-eucken-
institut.de/publikationenl04_12bw.pdf (accessed I August 2007).
627 Keith Tribe, Strategies of Economic Order. German Economic Discourse. 1750-
1950, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, Chapter 8, The Genealogy of the
Social Market Economy: 1937-48, pp. 203-40.
628 Dieter Haselbach, 'Franz Oppenheimer's Theory of Capitalism and ofa Third Path',
in: Kolowski (ed.), The Theory of Capitalism, pp. 54-86, here pp. 64-5.
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Jewish family in Berlin in 1864, Oppenheimer for most of his professional life worked
as a Privatdozent, a private lecturer of postdoctoral standing, with the exception of the
period from 1918-29, when he held the chair for sociology and theoretical economics at
the University of Frankfurt. After moving back to Berlin, Oppenheimer emigrated to
Los Angeles in 1938, where he died in 1943.629Oppenheimer was not well connected
within professional networks, neither was he affiliated with the Freiburg school of ordo-
liberalism. Haselbach concludes that crucially Oppenheimer's liberal socialism and the
ordo-liberalism of the Freiburg school share the belief in the power of markets as
regulators of modem societies. However,
[w]hile Oppenheimer thought that markets would still have their day in the
future, once power relations in society were eliminated, the ordoliberals had the
opposite conviction, that markets would need to be framed in a state
administered framework, politics of order (Ordnungspo!itik), as without such
order, markets were in danger of destroying with their dynamics the very
preconditions they needed for survival, both economically and culturally.63o
Anthony Nicholls has argued that 'Oppenheimer certainly reinforced Erhard's own
conviction that social responsibility was an essential aspect of the economist's
profession' .631Such an argument supports the notion that Erhard perhaps claimed to
realize Oppenheimer's programme because he tried to implement a third path economic
policy as economics minister, which would avoid the extremisms of the political left and
right. Where he parted with Oppenheimer's scheme and aligned with ordo-liberals,
however, was in deliberately utilizing the state to create a free market economy.632
629Ibid. pp. 58-63.
630 Ibid. pp. 82-3.
631Nicholls, Freedom With Responsibility, p. 75.
632Horst Friedrich Wunsche, 'Der Einfluss Oppenheimers auf Erhard und dessen
Konzeption von der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft', in: Volker Caspari, Bertram Schefold,
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Erhard did not target a political career. As a result of his economic expertise,
however, Erhard came to hold a number of positions, in which he co-operated with the
Allied occupation agencies in Germany. Ultimately, this professional engagement after
1945 paved the way to Erhard's appointment as federal minister for economics on 20
September 1949. Collaborating with the US military government to implement a free
competitive economy in Germany, Erhard served as economics minister for Bavaria
(1945-46) before became head of the Sonderstelle Geld und Kredit des Bizonalen
Wirtschaftsrats, the Social Bureau for Monetary and Currency Matters of the Bizonal
Economic Council, an expert committee that advised the military governments on the
preparation of a German currency reform. Finally, with his appointment as Director of
the Economics of the Bizone, the integrated Anglo-American zones, in 1948, Erhard
found himself in a key position that enabled him to start introducing the transition to a
market economy. On 21 June 1948 Erhard issued the Leitsatzegesetz, a law against
rationing regulations and price fixing, which was accompanied by the introduction of a
new currency, the Deutschmark.t" It was the successful currency reform that
established Erhard's reputation as father of the economic miracle. As minister of
economics at the time of the Schuman Plan conference, Erhard participated in the
negotiations on the de-cartelization and deconcentration of the German heavy industries,
which had implications for the German anti-trust law as well as for the anti-trust policy
(eds.) Franz Oppenheimer und Adolph Lowe: Zwei Wirtschaftswissenschaftler der
Frankfurter Universitat, Marburg: Metropolis, 1996, pp. 144-5; also quoted in
Haselbach, 'Franz Oppenheimer's Theory', p. 82.
633 Cf. Bernhard Loffler, Soziale Marktwirtschaft und administrative Praxis. Das
Bundeswirtschaftsministerium unter Ludwig Erhard, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag,
2002, pp. 56-7; see also Alfred C. Mierzejewksi, Ludwig Erhard: A Biography, North
Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 2004, pp. 51-2.
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applicable to the coal and steel pool. Moreover, like Bohm, he was directly involved in
negotiating a draft German anti-trust law between representatives of the German
economics ministry and the HICOG.634 After a lengthy bargaining process the first
German anti-trust law was finally enacted in 1957.
One of Erhard's most important strategic advisors was Leonard Miksch, a former
student and a collaborator of Eucken's.t" In contrast to Bohm, Miksch did not wish to
become involved in the study of US anti-trust policy to facilitate the creation of a
German anti-trust law. In a lecture at the Institut zur Forderung Offentlicher
Angelegenheiten, the Institute for the Promotion of Public Affairs, Miksch stated that in
this context the study of American legislation would be 'a waste of time' .636 Crucially,
Miksch emphasized the domestic roots of the commitment to a competitive market
economy and mentioned, among other examples, the 'by then unsuitable' 1923 Cartel
Ordinance, the activities of such officials as Paul Josten in the Cartel Division of the
Imperial Ministry of Economics, the jurisdiction of the Cartel Court and the publ ications
of the Freiburg school. Further, as a result of World War II, Miksch argued, German
society rejected planning and the notion of a compulsory economy altogether. In his
discussion of the Allied demand for anti-monopoly legislation, he contended that while
the formation of monopolies in both the US and Germany had originated in the 1880s,
these two countries had differed in their developments since then. In the US, those
economic policies, which were in line with classical liberalism - Miksch actually
634 Murach-Brand, Antitrust auf Deutsch, p. 157, footnotes 188, 190.
635 Leffler, Soziale Marktwirtschaft und administrative Praxis, pp. 72-3; Nicholls,
Freedom With Stability, p. 206.
636 Leonhard Miksch, 'Der Schutz des Wettbewerbs im Rahmen der sozialen
Marktwirtschaft. Phonographische Aufnahme des Referats', PA AA, B IS, Personal
papers Schlochauer, 340, p. 3.
222
referred to a 'restrictive perspective' -, had prevailed and ultimately resulted in a high
degree of concentration of economic power. In contrast, Germany had become the
classical country of cartels. It would therefore be 'dangerous to transfer the American
laws, policies and ideas, which were conceived in a different economic, legal and
sociological context, to Germany'i''" Acknowledging different dimensions of
competition policy, this line of argument illustrates the interdisciplinary approach of the
ordo-liberals of the Freiburg school and at the same time parallels Hofstadter's analysis
of competition as a way of life. Further, these observations provide evidence that within
the ordo-liberal camp divergent opinions existed with respect to the usefulness of
studying US anti-trust law.
Bohm's and Miksch's divergent assessments of the value of studying US anti-
trust law resulted from their different conceptions of the role of competition and cartels.
In his presentation Miksch stressed that he did not share the idea of 'his friend Bohm,638
to prohibit cartels completely. In Miksch's opinion, this would only create opposition to
de-cartelization or the competitive order. Outlining guidelines for a German anti-trust
law, Miksch promoted the notion of 'gebundene Konkurrenz', or 'relative competition',
which he claimed to have first proposed in 1936. Accordingly, ' ... cartels must prevail.
The difficulty is only to identify where a cartel is necessary'. 639 One of the functions a
cartel must not be allowed to have, for example, would be price regulation, which
should instead be performed by a separate, independent agency. At the very least these
remarks demonstrate that the conception, which Miksch forwarded, was further removed
637 Miksch, 'Der Schutz des Wettbewerbs'.
638Ibid. p. 10.
639Ibid. pp. 12-13.
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from the tradition of US anti-trust law than that of Bohm. Contrary to the distinction of
good and bad cartels in French competition law, Miksch based his analysis and
argument for the permissibility of cartels on the goal to foster the competitive principle.
However, in the eyes of US foreign policy officials, the tension between promoting
competition and authorizing cartels was insurmountable and therefore had to be
resolved. Ultimately, this could only be achieved by introducing a ban on cartels in the
context of core Europe formation and within western European states.
4.3 The notion of consumer protection at the Schuman Plan
conference: diverging notions and goals of a competitive
economy
As a consequence of the joint mediation of Monnet and McCloy in May 1950, Acheson
ensured that the Schuman Plan initiative received the necessary official support of the
Truman administration. Drawing attention to the concerns that the economic framework
of the Schuman Plan had raised from their perspectives, Acheson, Bruce and high-
ranking US foreign policy officials at the same time contributed to setting the agenda for
the inter-state conference. While American civil servants together with like-minded
European officials had promoted free competition in western Europe since the end of
World War II, high-ranking US actors had left no doubt that they were only prepared to
support the Schuman Plan as long as it met the requirements of a competitive market
economy and would not establish cartels. Uri's anti-cartel note did not appease critics of
the Schuman Plan. Instead the question of whether the coal and steel pool encouraged
cartelization fostered a vigorous debate on the competitive framework of the proposed
coal and steel pool. While during the period from May to October 1950 no specific anti-
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trust articles were debated, at least four mutually dependent issues emerged that
illustrate the dimension of the discourse on anti-trust and competition policy. These
issues comprised the competitive nature of the coal and steel pool, the question of the
beneficiaries of the community, divergent approaches to price policy, and the regional
associations. This sub-chapter focuses on demonstrating that the deliberations at the
inter-state conference were embedded in a set of overlapping debates, some of which
went back to inter-war period and even before rather than illustrate how actors drew on
the American debate on the reforms of the New Deal and the German and French
discourses on cartel policy or showing links between these discussions.
One issue that shaped the debate on anti-trust and competition policy concerned
different notions of competition. In principle, the actors at the Schuman Plan conference
shared the view that free competition was not feasible in the coal and steel sector.
Evidence for this observation is provided, for example, by Weisser's policy paper,
which was used in domestic consultations in the Federal Republic.64o The social
democratic politician had co-operated with British occupation officials and later
assumed an important role in the discussions over economic policy in the Bizone.?"
Another example for the incompatibility of free competition and the coal and steel
industries is provided by the statement of German member of delegation Bauer. In a
meeting of the co-ordinating committee in early September 1950, Monnet raised the
question to which extent ' ... price fixing resulte[d] in a cartel-like system'. When
Monnet argued that' ... some competition is even possible in the two raw material
640 Weisser, 'Bemerkungen zum Schuman-Plan', 17 July 1950.
641 Cf. Nicholls, Freedom With Responsibility, chapter 9, Theory into Practice: The
Struggle over Policy, ~948, pp. 178-205, for Weisser see pp. 192-4.
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industries that are now regulated through cartels', Bauer maintained that '[0]ne must try
realize as much competition as possible and as much cartel as necessary'. 642Accepting
the existence of cartels and suggesting a concept, which resembled Miksch's notion of
relative competition, Bauer foreshadowed the position the German delegation would
express in the draft anti-trust articles submitted from late October 1950 onwards, which
did not seek to prohibit cartels completely. Actors at the conference, however, also used
a number of other qualifications to describe competition in the coal and steel pool. An
opposition that emerged in the debate was that between perfect and imperfect
competition.
In his anti-cartel memorandum, Uri concluded that economically 'as opposed to
a cartel', the Schuman Plan would' ... tend to produce [the] same effect which would
result from perfect competition ... ' .643 Arguably, as an expert in price policy, Uri might
have used the notion of 'perfect competition', which derives from neo-classical price-
theory,644 rhetorically, in order to satisfy further critics of the proposal. In fact,
economists of American anti-trust law had departed from the model of perfect
competition and introduced into the debate criteria to assess 'workable' competition
since the late 1930s.645 Article 17 of the working document the French delegation
presented to the other delegations on 24 June 1950, did not refer to perfect competition,
642Kurzprotokoll uber die Sitzung des Cornite Restreint, 6 September 1950, PA AA,
B 15,99.
643Text of anti-cartel note, 12 May 1950.
644Gerber, Law and Competition, p. 245, footnote 45.
645William Kovacic, Carl Shapiro, 'Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal
Thinking', in: The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 14, no. I (2000), pp. 43-60,
here p. 52; lM. Clark, 'Toward a Concept of Workable Competition', in: American
Economic Review, vol. 30 (1940), pp. 241-56; and idem. 'An Alternative Approach to
the Concept of Workable Competition', in: American Economic Review vol. 40 (1950),
pp.349-61.
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but stipulated that the high authority, 'shall eliminate those artificial elements likely to
jeopardize normal competitive conditions' .646Crucially, Acheson, in a cable to Bruce in
early October 1950, also acknowledged that in the coal and steel area
'competition ... will inevitably be imperfect' .647At the same time, the Secretary of State
confirmed that US foreign policy officials would continue to monitor the progress of the
conference to ensure the establishment of a competitive market economy. At least on the
level of political discourse, imperfect competition and free competition were not
mutually exclusive. An ordo-liberal variant, which to some degree was similar to perfect
competition, was the concept of 'complete' competition. Contrary to perfect
competition, however, complete competition described an economy that had
successfully resolved the problem of social power, not the efficiency of an economy.t"
Developed by Eucken, this notion does not appear to have resonated with actors at the
Schuman Plan conference.
Another pair of opposition that helps to portray the debate on the competitive
framework was that of free and fair competition. During the early years of the New
Deal, the notion of fair competition replaced free competition in the mainstream
discourse of American political economy.P" Drawing on the ideology of the social
contract, which was based on the idea of equality between the contracting parties, the
early New Deal ' ... introduced a primary commitment to substantive equality,.65o
Effectively, the early New Deal legislation sought to protect small businesses and small
646Document de travail, 24 June 1950; Bruce to the Secretary of State, 24 June 1950.
647Acheson to Bruce, 3 October 1950, NARA, RG 59, 850.33/10·350, FRUS 1950 III,
fE·754-8.
8 Streit, Wohlgemuth, 'The Market Economy and the State', pp. 243-5.
649Peritz, Competition Policy, p. 120.
650Emphasis and italics in the original. Ibid. p. 112.
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producers, including family farmers and tenants, from monopoly power without
attaching sufficient regulations to have a real impact.f" While the egalitarian impulse
persisted throughout the entire New Deal, proponents of the later New Deal, in rejecting
the collective regulatory and decision-making structures set up by associations and co-
operatives that symbolized the early New Deal's struggle for economic equality and
fairness, revived the ideas and images of free competition. The rhetoric of the late New
Deal resembled that of the earlier anti-monopoly movement.652 Contrary to the anti-
monopoly crusaders, however, the actors of the late New Deal were not concerned with
'trust-busting' and the size of economic units. Instead, they' ... were committed ... to
defending the consumer and to promoting full production by expanding the regulatory
functions of the state'. 653 In 1940 Arnold published a monograph entitled Bottlenecks of
businesi54 to raise public understanding for the work of the Antitrust Division. Arnold
proposed to make efficiency and service the criteria against which anti-trust policy was
to be measured: 'What ought to be emphasized is not the evils of size but the evils of
industries which are not efficient or do not pass efficiency on to consumers' ,655 Arnold
addressed consumers in particular and argued that there were two contrasting ways to
distribute goods and services: the 'army system' and planning on the one hand, and free
exchange in a free market, on the other. Accordingly, the latter
... is the only process which does not become static by freezing at the top a
dynasty of men who have the means of keeping new enterprise to the surface. It
651 Brinkley, Liberalism and its Discontents, pp. 28-31.
652 Cf. Hofstadter, 'What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?',
653 Brinkley, Liberalism and its Discontents, pp. 41-2, here p. 42; Maier, 'The Politics of
Productivity', pp. 615-6.
654 Arnold, The Bottlenecks of Business.
655 Ibid. p. 3; and chapter 6, pp. 116-31.
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is the American ideal because the existence of industrial democracy is the only
basis on which political democracy can rest.656
Arnold thus tied the free market economy to a view of the ideals of American
democracy and attacked the early New Deal legislation and the NRA, in particular, for
subtly having changed the idea of competition: 'We were still to have competition - lots
of it - but it was to be "fair" competition, that is, competition with a floor under
prices,.657 To Arnold, fixing minimum prices represented an un-American and
undemocratic policy. It was nonetheless a policy in line with the attempts of the early
New Deal to solve the problem of social inequality.
Within the Antitrust Division under Arnold, important intellectual underpinnings
for consumer protection as the goal of anti-trust policy were developed. In their
enforcement of anti-trust policy, officials in the Antitrust Division assumed an
adversarial relationship between consumers and powerful, private economic
organizations. This antagonism reflected the conflict between the individual and the
collective, which took the shape of an unrestrained majority, of classical individualism.
Offering a fresh explanation for how the late New Deal contributed to the formation of a
consumer society, Peritz has argued that the statutory regulations of the later New Deal
created separate administrative areas and agencies for consumers, farmers, shareholders,
workers and small businesses and therefore contributed to a fragmentation of society. It
was precisely this fragmentation, however, that gave impetus to the development of a
consumer ideology:
656Ibid. p. 11.
657Ibid. p. 265.
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[T]hose statutes, the agencies they empowered, and the Supreme Court doctrine
that followed, were all drawn into a new organic body, a new image of a unified
public interest: the consumer. The rhetoric of consumerism, familiar since the
1880s, now offered a new vision, a new language to fuse fragmented interests, to
negotiate conflicting producer claims, to balance competition policy and private
property rights.658
Consumer ideology saw its breakthrough after the end of World War II. Besides, the
concept of free competition continued to shape American political discourse. In the
debate for the US Employment Act in 1946, for example, the goal to achieve 'maximum
employment' was tied to the idea that the US federal government was to 'promote free
competitive enterprise and the general welfare' .659 Perhaps because it had been
discredited together with the early New Deal, the notion of fair competition was not
revived, not even in the discussion of social policy. Concerns about fairness and
equality, however, were embodied in the legislation. One reading of the 1946 debate
would suggest that such concerns were now subsumed under the prevailing notion of
free competition. It is perhaps less surprising that American business representatives did
not invoke the idea of fair competition. For example, in a speech to the American
Chamber of Commerce, Henry Ford II, President of the Ford Motor Company, pointed
to 'freedom of enterprise' as one of the fundamental privileges of Americans:
It is the foundation on which our immense achievements as a nation have been
built. What has given us our high standard of living is our capacity to produce,
and our productive capacity has its roots in the vigorous, competitive spirit
which freedom of enterprise created.66o
658 Peritz, Competition Policy, p. 113.
659 15 USC 1021, section 2. See also Council of Economic Advisors, 'Third Annual
Report to the President', Papers Clark Clifford, File 'State of the union address:
Economic program', 1948, Truman Presidential Library, Box 37.
660 Henry Ford, Obligations of business management, p. 3, 29 April 1949, Clifford
papers, Box 42.
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Briefly, in the US, fair competition was no longer part of the political discourse.
At the Schuman Plan conference actors did not use the concept of fair
competition. Concerns about social equality for workers and consumers, however, did
reflect a competitive concept that incorporated the notion of fairness. Next to the
different notions of competition, the question of the beneficiaries of the coal and steel
pool further shaped the framework for the debate on anti-trust and competition policy at
the inter-state conference. Uri's anti-cartel note highlighted the commitment to raising
the standard of living of workers, which would differ from a cartel benefiting only the
employers, in this case the industriallsts.f" As a general goal, the promise of raising the
standard of living was also contained in the Schuman Plan declaration.662 Alongside the
formation of a common coal and steel market, therefore, the Schuman Plan set forth a
social policy for the workers of the community. This aspect of the plan received crucial
political support from trade unions. In a meeting of the German delegation with Monnet
at his horne in Houjarray in July 1950, German member of delegation and executive
member of the DGB, vom Hoff, reported on the international consultations of the trade
unions and stressed the importance of maintaining the living standards of workers and of
institutionalizing the communication of the high authority with trade unions.663 At the
inter-state conference it was the working group on salaries and social questions, chaired
by Uri, that during the first period of the negotiations continued to highlight the
significance of protecting workers against wage reduction and exploitation.
661 Text of anti-cartel note, 12 May 1950.
662 Declaration officielle du gouvernement francais, 9 mai 1950; Bonbright to Acheson,
9 May 1950.
663 Protokoll tiber die Zusammenkunft der deutschen Delegation mit Herrn Monnet in
Houjarray, 2 July 1950, PA AA, B 15,53.
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The commitment to raising the standard of living was reiterated in article 17 of
the working document presented on 24 June 1950.664Two other articles dealt with the
beneficiaries of the pool. Article 25 drew specific attention to the protection of
consumers and producers with regard to price policy. Article 26 gave the high authority
sweeping powers regarding wages and work conditions and pointed to the protection of
workers and consumers. The working group on salaries and social questions for the first
time convened on 20 July 1950. The belated start of the group's activity reflected their
desire to profit from the initial discussions of the group on prices, production and
investments, which Uri also chaired.665 'The French delegate', presumably Uri,
explained that the structure of article 26 was analogous to article 25. Article 26 outlined
the objectives and the means of action of the high authority in wage related questions
and had to resolve a twofold problem, namely to protect and amplify the living
standards through an increase in productivity and to eliminate artificial distortions of
competition.t'" Linking the concerns of productivity to the functioning of the market,
Uri's remarks reflected the ideas that drove planning officials to propose an anti-trust
bill for France in 1949. The reference to seeking to eliminate artificial distortions of the
market in turn was in line with the framework of 'normal competition' that article 17 of
the working document had put forth. In their contribution to the conference interim
report of 10 August 1950, the working group on salaries and social questions reiterated
the significance of the social dimension of the coal and steel community.667
664Document de travail, 24 June 1950; Bruce to the Secretary of State, 24 June 1950.
665Rapport du groupe des salaires et des questions socials, 10 August 1950, AN 81 AJ
145.
666Compte-rendus des reunions et des rapports (notes traveaux), 20 July 1950, ibid.
667Rapport du groupe des salaires et des questions socials, 10 August 1950.
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In addition to protecting the workers of the coal and steel sectors safeguarding
the consumers represented an important goal in the negotiations. Article 25 of the
working document authorized the high authority to make recommendations to the
governments of the member-states when finding that ' ... the normal methods of
competition [... were ... ] threatened by discrimination on the part ofconsumers ... ,.668 A
modified version of the working document of 5 July, which was probably used
internally by the French delegation in their deliberations, referred to 'users' rather than
consumers.P" Crucially, however, a variety of actors who did not officially participate
in the Paris negotiations also focused on consumers as the primary beneficiaries of the
coal and steel community. Contributions included the policy paper by Weisser who
warned against any tendency of the high authority to become an institution that would
act against the interest of the' European population ,670 and a report on the Schuman Plan
drawn up in the German Ministry for the Marshall Plan in August 1950.671
In Germany, arguments for consumer protection had already been part of the
politico-legal discourse of the organized economy of the Weimar Republic. In 1927 for
example, the German Cartel Court denied the Steel Plant Association the permission to
boycott a company that had refused to join. The Court held that
... [t]he individual trader is no longer able to act in the interest of consumers
through effecting price changes. This trend leads finally to monopoly and to
dangerous conditions where consumers' interests are unprotected against price
dictatorship ofproducers ... 672
668 Document de travail, 24 June 1950; Bruce to the Secretary of State, 24 June 1950.
669 Modifications du document de travail, 5 July 1950, HAEU, PU/DO 21.
670 Weisser, 'Bemerkungen zum Schuman-Pian', 17 July 1950.
671 [No author given], Analyse aus dem Marshall Plan Ministerium, 26 August 1950, PA
AA, B15, 53.
672 Quoted in Edwards, Trade Regulations Overseas, p. 157.
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In the late 1920s, when the German economy became increasingly cartelized, this
opinion had little effect. Consumer protection and with it the laws and regulations that
guaranteed free competition were installed only after World War II in the Federal
Republic, where consumer protection was linked and contributed to the emergence of
the social market economy. For example, Miksch in his presentation on a German anti-
trust law emphasized that competition first of all served the interest of the consumer, the
white and the blue-collar worker, not that of the entrepreneur. Miksch went further and
proposed that' ...entrepreneurs should understand that by failing to support an efficient
and social competitive system, they were digging their own grave' .673
In France, the Metal Manufacturing Syndicate highlighted the importance of
consumer protection. An important constituent of what became a transatlantic advocacy
coalition for consumer protection was its president, Jean Constant. Constant devoted the
July 1950 editorial in the association's magazine Les Industries Mecaniques to the
Schuman Plan. Acknowledging that industrial groups were not invited to express their
opinions due to the political emphasis of the Schuman Plan, he welcomed the 'Monnet-
Schuman idea' and expressed the 'unreserved support' for the plan on behalf of the
French steel consumers.t" In favour of trade liberalization, Constant also appreciated
the establishment of a competitive common market. He warned against making the high
authority too powerful, however, because its interventionist qualities would endanger
competitiveness. In this case, the Schuman Plan would replace French central planning
with central planning on the international level. Constant promoted consumer protection
673 Miksch, 'Der Schutz des Wettbewerbs', p. 3.
674 Jean Constant, Editorial' Le Plan Schuman', in: Les Industries Mecaniques, vol. 64
(July 1950), pp. 1-4, AN 81 AJ 156, Folder Constant. S. also the summary of the
editorial in Kipping, Zwischen Kartellen und Konkurrenz, pp. 182-4.
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as the key benefit of the coal and steel pool and argued that, ' ... [t]he goal for the
European user, or at least, to start with, for French and German users, is to access coal
and steel at the same prices'. 675Notably, like Weisser in his statement, Constant used
the notion of a European people to defend consumer protection. Moreover, Constant
took concrete action to advance his goals, including helping to initiate the formation of
the Association des Utilisateurs des Produits Siderurgiques, the Association of Users of
Coal and Steel Products. One of the members of the board of AUPS was Pierre
Lefaucheux, the chief executive officer of the state-owned automobile producer Renault.
Lefaucheux was an outspoken critic of the lack of dynamism that in his opinion
characterized the French economic system.676 For Monnet, Constant's initiative to
organize a new association of steel users represented a welcome support in realizing the
Schuman Plan, especially in light of the opposition of the French steel producers. To
support the goal of consumer protection at the inter-state conference therefore became
necessary for Monnet to guarantee the continued backing of Constant and steel users.
Ultimately, the decision whether the coal and steel pool would benefit consumers
or producers depended on the decision on the price rules,677which constituted a related
issue framing the debate on anti-trust and competition policy. According to Uri's anti-
cartel note, an 'increase of production and of productivity by improvement of methods,
broadening of markets and rationalization of production' was among the objectives of
the coal and steel pool. To realize these objectives it would be necessary to employ
temporarily, as 'transitional measures', price fixing, production quotas and the division
675Constant, Editorial.
676Kipping, Zwischen Kartellen und Konkurrenz, pp. 44-5, 184.
677Richard T. Griffiths, 'The Schuman Plan Negotiations: the Economic Clauses', in:
Schwabe, Die An/tinge des Schuman-Plans, pp. 35-71, here p. 47.
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of markets. One could argue that in allowing for the temporary use of price fixing Uri
proposed a system of fair rather than free competition. Identifying the problem of price
fixing as a temporary versus a permanent measure, he anticipated one of the main points
of criticism the plan encountered from US foreign policy officials. The memorandum
Bowie drafted after meeting with Tomlinson to discuss the 24 June working
documentv" and which Tomlinson incorporated into the checklist for the US
government.t" not only serves a case in point, but also provides evidence for the early
activity of the US Embassy working group on the economic dimension of the coal and
steel pool. Regarding article 25, which gave the HA power to fix minimum prices,
Bowie stressed that' ... [i]f this power is to be retained, the Treaty should make it clear
that the power is to be exercised only under abnormal and unusual conditions as a
temporary expedient' .680
The deliberations on price policy were not restricted to the general question of
whether fixing maximum and/or minimum prices would be reasonable in the coal and
steel community pool. Discussions also evolved around different concepts of price
policy. Richard Griffiths has demonstrated that the experts in the working group
meetings debated the advantages and disadvantages of diverging concepts to standardize
prices.681 According to the 'prix-depart' system, prices for consumers of the pool would
have to be standardized, whereas the 'prix-parite' system would standardize the prices
on departure from the mine or mill within a specific region. According to the first
model, suppliers would pay the transport costs and consumers buy their products at the
678 Memo Tomlinson to Stokes, 30 June 1950.
679 Bruce to Perkins, Check list,S July 1950.
680 Memo Tomlinson to Stokes, 30 June 1950.
681 Griffiths, 'The Schuman Plan Negotiations', pp. 47-8.
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closest expedition point, whereas in the second model, consumers would take over the
transport costs. While the prix-parite model of price regulation would prohibit
competition within regions, it stimulated competition between regions. Further, by
standardizing the prices ex-mine or ex-mill, producers could pass on any benefits to
local consumers.682 The prix-parite model therefore encouraged efficient service and
reflected the goals of consumer protection more closely and resonated with the ideas
presented by Constant in his editorial.683 In a meeting of the working group on prices,
production and investments in June 1950, Hirsch defended the prix-parite model and
argued that prices had to be equal for all buyers from the mine or mill. Differences in
price were only permissible in relation to the amount of materials purchased and the
duration of the contract. 684
Another topic in the debate on anti-trust policy related to the question of the
planned regional associations. When in his conference opening speech on 21 June
Monnet addressed the idea of regional groups he outlined they were supposed to link the
high authority with individual enterprises. He also took care to refute the notion that
these groups would establish cartels and emphasized they were aimed at reducing prices.
As an example, Monnet referred to the production in North France and Belgium where
the equality of conditions for production and equal social conditions would be the basis
for such co-operarion.t" Formally introduced into the conference through article 20 of
the 24 June working document, the regional groups were championed by Monnet, Uri
682 Ibid.
683 Constant, Editorial.
684 Conversations sur Ie plan Schuman, 23 June 1950, MAEF, DE-CE, 500; summarized
in Kipping, Zwischen Kartellen und Konkurrenz, p. 210.
685 Kurzprotokoll der Sitzung im franzoslschen Aussenministerium, 21 June 1950, PA
AA, 815, 53.
237
and Hirsch in formal and informal discussions with members of the other delegations.
For Hirsch, the key question was whether participation in the regional groups would be
mandatory, which in tum was linked to how the powers of the high authority would be
defined. Moreover, the deputy commissioner general of the Planning Commission
argued, ' ... the experiences of the Monnet-Plan in France have shown that in general
com pu Isory regulations were unnecessary' .686
At least three further motives guided the defence of the regional groups. Firstly,
Monnet argued that by linking the high authority to enterprises the regional associations
could provide information such as statistics and economic plans to the high authority
independent of the national governments. Secondly, Uri added that the high authority
was not to interfere with business that was better left to the experts. Thirdly, Monnet
claimed that by establishing regional groups instead of national groups the formation of
powerful cartels could be prevented. Against this background, it was ' ... necessary to
develop the supranational psychology'i?" Despite Monnet's pledge to the contrary,
Bowie saw in the regional associations the potential to form cartels:
These associations may involve serious risk of becoming little cartels and of
fostering restrictive activity through cooperation among these associations. It
may be necessary to use such associations for the collection of information ... but
their use for regulation is likely to result in serious abuses.688
686 Kurzprotokoll uber die Besprechung der Delegationen unter der Leitung von M.
Monnet im Buro von M. Monnet, 22 June 1950, PA AA, B 15,53.
687 Ibid. Cf. further Kurzprotokoll tiber die Aussprache, die zwischen Monnet und den
Mitgliedern der deutschen Delegation stattfand, 22 June 1950, PA AA, B 15,53.
688 Memorandum attached to Memo Tomlinson to Stokes, 30 June 1950.
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Bowie's reservations regarding the regional associations were shared by German social
democrat Weisser. 689
4.4 The demand for anti-trust provisions: in the shadow of the
defence question and the reorganization of the German
heavy industries
The need to integrate specific anti-trust provisions into the treaty resulted from a blend
of external pressures and developments at the conference. External events impacted on
the international dynamics of the conference with the outbreak of the Korean War which
caused Acheson to shift his attention from European integration to more pressing
defence issues. As a result of the war, the US government was concerned that only with
the participation of the Federal Republic in the defence of the West could the expected
increase in the demand of steel coupled with the projected need for manpower be met.
The US government's new defence policy embraced German rearmament within the
framework of committing US troops to Europe; organizing an integrated command
structure for the Atlantic alliance; integrating German military units into the alliance;
and raising the limits of German steel production.690 Finally, at the Foreign Ministers'
conference in New York in September 1950 Acheson communicated the new US policy
to Schuman and British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin. Crucially, the US government's
proposals to remove the economic restrictions limiting Germany's defence contribution
and to integrate German units into NATO had important repercussions for the inter-state
conference. As Acheson later recollected:
689 Letter Weisser to Blankenhorn, 18 July 1950, Statement of 17 July attached to letter,
PA AA, B 15,67.
690 Gillingham, Coal, Steel, Chapter 5.2) The Bombshell at the Waldorf, pp. 250·66,
here p. 255.
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Perhaps the most important issue came in autumn when, to anticipate, American
proposals for German participation in the defense of EuroEe gave Bonn a
stronger bargaining position than it had as an occupied country. 91
Acheson's request had at least two significant consequences for the negotiations. Firstly,
the prospect of a quickly rearmed Germany alarmed the French government. Although it
had become clear that Germany would in some way contribute to the defence of the
West, Acheson's announcement alarmed the French government, which felt pressurized
into presenting the Pleven Plan for a European army.692Developed by Monnet and some
of his co-workers since the summer of 1950 and announced on 24 October 1950 by
French Prime Minister Pleven, the plan eventually evolved into the concept for the
EDC. Secondly, as rearmament and with it a greater degree of equality and
independence for the Federal Republic seemed within reach, the German government
began pushing its preferences with fewer restraints both in the domestic context at the
inter-state conference. The Adenauer government displayed resistance therefore to
attempts by Bowie, in his capacity as general counsel of the USHICOG, to enforce Law
27, which dealt with the restructuring of the German heavy industries.693 On 14
September 1950 the HICOG issued three regulations specifying how Law 27 was to be
enforced.t'"
Allied deconcentration and de-cartelization policies in Germany focused on the
Ruhr, the centre of the highly concentrated and cartelized heavy industries. To secure
691 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 389. Cf. also a letter McCloy to Brian
Robertson, IIOctober 1950, McCloy PaperS/13B/HC6/#5.
692For the drafting of the PIeven Plan see Schroder, Jean Monnet und die amerlkanlsche
Unterstutzung, pp. 131-80.
693LappenkUper, 'Der Schuman Plan', pp. 429-31.
694The text of Law 27 and the regulations in English, French and German are published
in: Official Gazette a/the Allied High Commission/or Germany. vol. 2, Bonn: 1950-51.
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the source of production inputs, raw materials and energy, coal and steel in particular
were vertically integrated into the Verbundwirtschaft. In turn, the sales of Ruhr coal
were managed centrally by the DKV. After 1945, military authorities sought to liquidate
conglomerations of economic power with the ultimate goal to eliminate the German war
potential. Based on decisions reached at the Potsdam conference of 1945 and directive
1067 of the Joints Chief of Staff for the US Military Governor, the US and UK military
governments in February 1947 enacted Law 56 and Ordinance 78, respectively. While
both pieces of legislation prohibited excessive concentrations and cartels, ordinance 78
for the UK military zone exempted the Ruhr industries from its applicability. Only the
establishment of the Bizone later in the year, made it possible for American occupation
authorities to directly exercise influence in the British zone and the Ruhr area.
Subsequently, in November 1948, with Law 75, the US and UK military governments
issued a new basis for deconcentration and de-cartelization. Importantly, Law 75 served
an instrument for de-centralizing and returning the German heavy industries to German
control. However, it failed to specify the mode of implementation and to resolve the
controversial question of ownership. Whereas the former was left to regulations, the
latter was to be decided in accordance with a freely elected German government.
Occupation officials were divided on their preferences regarding the question of
ownership, however. While UK occupation officials favoured socialization - the transfer
of the heavy industries to public ownership _695, US authorities, in line with their
695 According to Van Hook, US and UK officials at the time used 'socialization' rather
than 'nationalization'. James C. Van Hook, 'Form Socialization to Co-Determination:
The US, Britain, Germany, and Public Ownership of the Ruhr, 1945-1951', in: The
Historical Journal, vol. 45, no. 1 (2002), pp. 153-78. For the domestic context of the
UK government's preference cf. Martin Chick, Industrial Policy in Britain 1945-51.
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general policy preference for a competitive market economy, promoted private
ownership.F" The 'Ferguson Report', issued in 1949 by a Committee that was set up by
the US Department of the Army to evaluate US occupation policies in Germany,
summarized the main objectives of the US de-cartelization policy:
1. elimination of German war potential;
2. termination of the dominance of a few powerful entrepreneurs and financiers in
industry;
3. restoration of a sound and democratic economy characterized by competition;
4. fostering of economic and political democracy; and
5. assistance in the economic restoration of Germany, which was also essential for
the rest of (Western) Europe.697
A related and equally important part of Allied occupational policy, particularly
in the immediate post-war period concerned the dismantling of German plants. The
usefulness of dismantling was challenged with the initiation of the Marshall Plan,
however, when plants were needed for Germany's economic restoration. On taking
office as US high commissioner, McCloy, for his part, intensified the debate by
proposing an end to 'aimless dismantling' upon sufficient guarantees by the Federal
Republic. Newsweek magazine explained McCloy's propositions as a result of his dual
role as high commissioner and head of the ECA for Germany.698 As Werner BUhrer has
shown, a shift occurred in the motives driving the US government's Ruhr policy that he
characterizes as a process of de-politization and demystification. The memories of the
Third Reich and with it the picture of the Ruhr as a symbol of aggressive industrial
Economic Planning, Nationaltsation and the Labour Governments, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998.
696 Albert Diegmann, 'Deconcentration Policy in the Ruhr Coal Industry', in:
Diefendorf, Frohn, Rupieper (eds.), American Policy and the Reconstruction of
Germany, pp. 197-215, here pp. 197-205.
697Ibid. p. 205.
698'Dismantling Dilemma: The British vs. the U.S. High Commissioner', Newsweek (7
November 1949), pp. 36-7.
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power therefore gave way to more rationally based economic considerations.?" The
question of dismantlement was settled between the Allies and the German government
in the Petersberg Agreement, in which the newly established Adenauer government
agreed to co-operate in the JAR. 700
Lastly, the 1948 agreement on the establishment of the JAR, in which France
participated, and the transition from military to civilian administration in 1949 made a
revision of Law 75 necessary. Law 75 contradicted the agreement on the provision of
the IAR agreement in that it codified that a freely elected German government would
settle the question of ownership, whereas the IAR agreement had established
international management of the Ruhr.701 When Bowie arrived in Germany in February
1950, he procured the task to revise Law 75 from his predecessor McLain. The result of
the revision was tripartite Law 27, which became effective on 16 May 1950, but did not
substantially alter the contents of Law 75. In its preamble, however, Law 27 bestowed
the right to make the ultimate disposition of coal and steel assets on the German
government.
To control the opposition by German industry representatives to the coal and
steel pool, the Adenauer government had stressed that participation in the inter-state
conference represented an important step to full recognition of the newly established
Federal Republic in the international community. The hardened attitude of the German
government from September 1950 onwards reflected the understanding that the
699 Werner BOhrer, 'Return to Normality: The United States and Ruhr Industry, 1949-
1955', in: Diefendorf, Frohn, Rupieper (eds.), American Policy and the Reconstruction
of Germany, pp. 135-53.
700 Schwartz, America's Germany, pp. 68-83
701 Ibid. p. 93; Gillingham, Coal, Steel, pp. 161-2,257.
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Schuman Plan would meet considerably stronger resistance in German industrial circles
now that a major tactical incentive for collaboration within a European supranational
framework had diminished.702
On 14 September 1950, Monnet complained to Schuman about the 'change of
attitude in the German delegation,.703 A series of independent events further confirms
the change of atmosphere. Firstly, at a conference of the Munich Export Club on 30
September 1950, the CDU member in the Bundestag Robert Lehr attacked the Schuman
Plan as an initiative by which the French government merely sought to increase France's
steel capacity. When Lehr was appointed as federal minister for the interior on 13
October 1950, his speech on the Schuman Plan retrospectively stirred political turmoil,
particularly in the French delegation and in French governmental circles.704 In 1923
already, in the Franco-German struggle about the Ruhr area, Lehr had adopted a tough
position vis-a-vis the French governmenr'" and he had a mixed record in German
domestic politics. Competing with the then mayor of Cologne Adenauer in the struggle
about the communal reorganization in the Prussian Landtag and to attract further
political support, Lehr in 1929 had joined the conservative Deutschnationale
Volkspartei, the German National Party. Furthermore in 1932, Lehr officially received
Hitler when the latter gave a speech at the Industry Club, an organization of powerful
industrialists, in DUsseldorf. Expelled from office by the Nazi regime in 1933, Lehr
702William Diebold, The Schuman Plan. A Study in Economic Cooperation 1950-/959,
New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959, pp. 67-70.
703Telegramme Monnet to Schuman, 14 September 1950, in: Jean Monnet, Robert
Schuman Correspondance, p. 56.
704S. Incident Lehr, October 1950, Special Dossier in AN 81 AJ 138; Telegramrne
Bohlen to Acheson, 18 October 1950, NARA, RG 59, 850.33/10-1850. Cf. also Lovett,
'The United States and the Schuman Plan', p. 443.
70SSchwarz, Konrad Adenauer, p. 559.
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became associated with the Catholic resistance circles around Karl Arnold during the
Third Reich. Schwarz has suggested, however, that as a result of his Protestant
confession, Lehr in 1945 was no serious contender for the post of general secretary of
the COU, for which he would have been considered otherwise.?" Kaiser has also
stressed the link between confessional affiliation and internal party division in the CDU,
especially in the case of the policy preference for western integration, which was
pursued by Adenauer and a predominantly Catholic fraction of the party.707 Although
the chancellor probably was aware of Lehr's critical attitude towards the Schuman Plan,
he also knew that his former competitor had only a small power base within the party.
Therefore, the benefits outweighed the costs and Lehr became Adenauer's preferred
candidate to head the Ministry of the Interior.7os Kipping has rightly stressed that Lehr
delivered his critique on the Schuman Plan before Monnet demanded specific anti-trust
articles at the inter-state conference. Therefore the 'Lehr incident' represented only a
precursor to the increasing opposition of German steel industrialists against the
Schuman Plan from October 1950 onwards.709
Secondly, a meeting of Economics Minister Erhard with Monnet in Paris on 28
September 1950 also indicated the atmosphere had changed. Erhard raised serious
concerns about the HICOG's latest efforts to enforce deconcentration and de-
cartelization without consulting the federal government."? Further, the economics
minister argued that these occupation programmes were contradictory to the spirit of the
706Ibid. p. 344.
707Kaiser, Christian Democracy, p. 218.
708Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer, pp. 444, 446.
709Kipping, Zwischen Kartellen und Konkurrenz, p. 225.
710Note Jean Monnet a Schuman pour rendre compte visite Erhard Ii Jean Monnet, 28
September 1950, AN 81 AJ 137.
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Schuman Plan and the agreements of the New York Conference of Foreign Ministers,
which stipulated that by the end of 1950, the German government would be responsible
to carry out deconcentration."! Preceding Erhard's protest was a meeting of the
chancellor with the Allied high commissioners, in which Adenauer also reported that the
Economics Ministry had alerted him to the incompatibility of the regulations enforcing
Law 27 and the Schuman Plan.712 Moreover, corresponding to his ordo-Iiberal
preferences, Erhard criticized the protectionist position the French delegation in his view
defended in the negonetions.i"
Thirdly, Bruce reassured Acheson that in their conversations with French
officials, US Embassy staff stressed their policy preference for a competitive market
economy and the major preoccupations of the State Department and ECA regarding
price flexibility, competition and the cartel dangers of the regional group approach.I"
Yet, in late September 1950, State Department and ECA officials jointly condemned the
progress of the conference concerning the competitive framework. Their criticism
concerned annex IV to the conference interim report of 10 August 1950 and the
memorandum on institutions and permanent economic and social provisions of 28
September 1950.715 A working paper of unidentified authorship that the French
711 Kommuniques zurNew Yorker Aussenministerkonferenz, 14, 19 September 1950,
Europa-Archiv, vol. II (1950), pp. 3405-7.
712 Protokoll Nr. 17,23 September 1950, in: Akten zur Auswartigen Politik der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Adenauer und die Hohen Kommissare 1949-1951, vol. 1,
Munich: Oldenbourg, 1989, p. 244.
713N Mote Jean onnet it Schuman, 28 September 1950.
714 Telegramme Bruce to Acheson, 2 October 1950,850.33/10.250. FRUS 1950 III, pp.
753-4.
715 Telegramme Acheson to Bruce, 3 October 1950, 850.33/10·350, FRUS 1950 III, pp.
754·58; Memorandum on institutions and permanent economic and social provisions, 28
September 1950, PA AA, B 15, 58.
246
delegation had circulated in August 1950 further seemed to corroborate that cartel-like
practices would creep back into the treaty. Kipping, who discusses the paper in the
context of the debate on price policy, has pointed out that the French delegation had in
fact temporarily changed their position and departed from the prix-parite to the prix-
depart concept, when they provided the other delegations with this paper outlining the
role of the high authority during the initial period.716 Possibly drafted or inspired by
Denis, who was responsible for the steel industry in the French Ministry of Industry and
Commerce, the paper promoted a prix-depart policy, standardized prices for consumers
and far-reaching powers for the industrial associations, which were reminiscent of
cartels. After departing from this position in late September 1950, finally, on 23 October
1950, the French delegation returned to their initial position on price policy. Kipping
discusses with great attention to detail the different arguments offered by literature to
explain the initial and the later change of opinion of the French delegation. As to the
initial presentation of the paper in August 1950, he concludes persuasively that it can
perhaps not be explained conclusively on the basis of sources. Concerning the second
policy change Kipping acknowledges the link between going back to the prix-parite
model and the explicit demand for anti-trust provisions for the coal and steel treaty in
early October.717
Against this backdrop two further arguments need to be considered. Firstly, the
critique that US foreign policy officials voiced vis-a-vis key actors and via the well-
established channels of the US Embassy working group might account for the French
716 Note prelirninaire sur l'action de la Haute Autorite au cours de la periode de
demarrage, 8 August 1950, Archives de Saint-Gobein-Pont-a-Mousson, Blois, quoted by
Kipping, Zwischen Kartellen und Konkurrenz, p. 212, note 17.
717 Ibid. pp. 212-7.
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delegation's decision to return to their initial and more consumer friendly price policy
preference. Secondly, the fact that the French delegation was inconsistent in their
preference might also have reflected the ideologieal discrepancies at the heart of the
Monnet Plan, which employed means of central planning to advance productivity and
achieve a free market economy.
Finally, on 4 October 1950, in a meeting of the heads of delegation and select
delegation members, Monnet openly criticized the agreements between enterprises and
the conception of the regional groups in the memorandum on institutions and permanent
economic and social provisions of28 September."! A memorandum of 5 October 1950
reflecting the concerns of US foreign policy officials, whieh the Paris Embassy staff had
expressed to the French negotiarors.l" complemented Monnet's oral critique. At the
core was the call to prohibit cartels and to allow concentrations and specialization
agreements only, if the high authority had previously authorized them.no While
concerns of US foreign policy officials almost certainly triggered Monnet's call to
integrate anti-trust provisions into the treaty, domestic considerations may also have
enforced his move. Gillingham argues that what Monnet had in mind when he proposed
to endow the high authority with far reaching powers to regulate cartel policy was to
prevent the re-concentration of the Ruhr under the Schuman Plan treaty. Once and for
all Europeanized, the Ruhr's resources would no longer provide potential for war.
718 Kurzprotokoll tiber die Sitzung des Comite Restreint im Planungsamt, 4 October
1950, PA AA, B 15,99.
719r Ie egramme Bruce to Acheson, 2 October 1950.
720 Dokument 45: Observations sur le memorandum du 28.9.1950, exposees par M. Jean
MONNET au cours de la reunion restreinte des chefs de delegation le 4.10.50, 5.10.50,
in: Reiner Schulze, Thomas Hoeren, (eds.), Dokumente zum Europalschen Recht.
Grundungsvertrage, vol. I, Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 1999: pp. 241-44.
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Besides, since Law 27 provided that the ultimate determination of ownership lay with
the German government, the Federal Republic technically, could have circumvented
deconcentration simply by nationalization of the Ruhr coal and steel industries, although
nationalization was not the policy preference of the Adenauer govemment.F' While
Monnet may have worried about the Ruhr problem, primary evidence accentuates other
concerns, too.
In a diary entry about an informal lunch on 5 October with Monnet, 'two from
the staff and Denis, US Inland President and former ECA Steel Consultant Randall
recorded that while Monnet was' ... in complete accord that for a vital economy [the]
industry must be self-policed by actual and vigorous competition ... , [t]he difficulty lies
not with Monnet but with those around him here and in the other nations who seek to
defeat him,.722 As one of the most fervent American critics of the Schuman Plan,
Randall might have overstated the degree of Monnet's isolation. Randall's observations,
however, draw attention to the difficulties Monnet faced in promoting free competition
not only at the inter-state conference, but also in the domestic context. French steel
producers, for example, resisted the plan while promoting the continuation of Allied
policies vis-a-vis Germany and the JAR. However, as has been demonstrated with
regard to the preferences articulated by Constant on behalf of the Metal Manufacturing
Syndicate, the French steel industry was not unified in their opposition to the Schuman
Plan.723 Acting as a reliable ally for Monnet and Hirsch, Constant promoted consumer
protection as one crucial benefit of the coal and steel pool and even reinforced his
721 Gillingham, Coal, Steel, p. 267.
722 Memo No.7, 7 October 1950, Personal papers Randall, Box I,ECA Paris 1950
723 Kipping, Zwischen Kartellen und Konkurrenz, pp. 182·7.
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contacts with ECA officials to advance the goals of consumers.724 As the fai lure of the
1949 anti-trust bill introduced by the French Planning Commission indicated, it would
be difficult to find a coalition for anti-trust provisions in France. Arguably therefore
Monnet might have also considered safeguarding the essential domestic support,
especially that of Constant, when he demanded anti-trust provisions for the Schuman
Plan.
Although the negotiations on the reorganization of the German heavy industries
were technically separate from the inter-state conference, their resolution became a pre-
requisite to the successful conclusion of the coal and steel treaty. Bowie's attempts to
enforce the newly issued regulations to Law 27 on 10 October 1950 met strong
opposition by the Adenauer government. Not only had the regulations fixed the
immediate disintegration of six steel corporations but the German government had not
even been consulted. As a result, on 13 October 1950, the Adenauer government
demanded the revision of the Occupation Statute and the dissolution of the (AR.72s At
the same time, the chancellor threatened to call back the German delegation from Paris.
Adenauer therefore made the successful completion of the Schuman Plan conference
dependent on the resolution of the Ruhr situation. As Klaus Schwabe has pointed out he
thereby created a conjunction between the Schuman Plan and the restructuring of the
German heavy industries.P" As the negotiations on the anti-trust articles show, however,
the links between the inter-state conference and the resolution of the deconcentration
724 Telegramme Bruce to Secretary of State, 20 June 1950, NARA, RG 59, 850.33/7-
2050.
725 Memorandum remis par M. Hallstein IiM. Monnet, Comrnunaute charbon-l'acier et
droit d' occupation, 13 October 1950, MAEF, DE-CE, 507.
726 Schwabe, "'Ein Akt konstruktiver Staatskunst'", pp. 232-238, here p. 235.
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and de-cartelization of Germany go far beyond the level of governmental policy-
making.
4.5 Drafting the anti-trust articles: mediating between
American anti-trust and German ordo-liberalism
Following the call for anti-trust provisions, the German and French delegations each
prepared draft versions for treaty articles. A proposal of the German delegation, dated
21 October, which may however not even have been introduced into the inter-state
negotiations, made agreements subject to the authorization of the high authority, but
refrained from barring them.727 This proposal reflected the earlier preference expressed
by Bauer to maintain cartels in the coal and steel pool whenever necessary.J" Against
the preceding analysis of anti-trust and competition policy in Germany the proposal
suggests that the German delegation assumed a position, which was closer to the
conception of Miksch's relative competition, introduced in the discussion on German
anti-trust legislation, than the competitive conceptions of Eucken and Bohm. While
there is no evidence as to who drafted the proposal of 21 October, sources show that in
early October 1950, jointly, Bauer and the head of the Cartel Division in the German
Economics Ministry Roland Risse sketched a memorandum on price policy for the
German delegation.729 Many years later, Steindorff remembered vividly Risse's role in
727 Dokument 8: Bestimmungen zum Schumanplan, 21 October 1950, in: Reiner
Schulze, Thomas Hoeren (eds.), Dokumente zum Europalschen Recht. Kartellrecht (his
1957), vol. 3, Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2000, pp. 23-4; s. also Introduction to this
volume pp. XXII-I. ,
728 Cf. Kurzprotokoll Uber die Sitzung des Comite Restreint, 6 September 1950, PA AA,
BI5,99.
729 Letter Bauer to Hallstein, 10 October 1950, BA, N 1266, 1852.
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the evolution of the anti-trust articles.73o Berghahn has also acknowledged Risse's
involvement with the German delegation for November and December 1950.731One can
only speculate as to whether Risse influenced the first anti-trust draft by the German
delegation. Given that Risse was involved in the deliberations on price policy in October
1950 and on the anti-trust articles in the following two months, it is a possibility at least.
Moreover, Risse's involvement underscores the link between the Schuman Plan
conference and the negotiations on German anti-trust legislation, which points to a
number of observations. Firstly, various actors were at the same time involved in both
negotiations. From 10-19 October 1950, Risse and Economics Minister Erhard
participated alongside Bowie and Kelleher, the head of the USHICOG de-cartelization
branch, in the negotiations on the draft German anti-trust law between representatives of
the German economics ministry and the HICOG.732 According to McCloy, ' ... Erhard
and his group ... provide[d the] main support for anti-cartel legislation,733 in Germany.
McCloy did not specify who belonged to Erhard's group. Multiple afflllations of
individual actors validate, however, that there was an interaction between American
anti-trust law and German ordo-liberal ideas on competition. Further, in October 1950,
Hallstein, for example, was in contact with Bdhm regarding deconcentration and the
problem of cartels.734
730Interview Steindorff.
731Berghahn, The Americanization, pp. 142-45; Murach-Brand, Antitrust auf Deutsch
~uotes Berghahn,
2 Murach-Brand, Antitrust auf deutsch, p. 157, footnotes 188, 190.
733Telegramrne McCloy to Acheson, 9 December 1950, NARA, RG 59, 850.33/12-950.
734Letter Bohm to Hallstein, 12 October 1950, BA, N 1266, 18S3; and letter Ernst
Steindorffto Sahm, 22 October 1950, PA AA, B 15,2.
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Secondly, while Erhard was in favour of a strict ban on cartels for the Federal
Republic,735 his policy preference was contested within his own ministry. When Erhard
expressed his preferences for a cartel ban in the domestic domain therefore, he was not
only faced with opposition from the industry and other federal ministries, but also with
reservations from Risse, his own leading cartel official. 736Like Bohm, Risse had worked
in the Cartel Division of the Imperial Ministry of Economics and defended a moderate
position on anti-trust policy: He was 'no longer a proponent of the old-style cartels; but
he was also no supporter of Josten's ideas,.737 Contrary to Risse, Erhard's policy
preference matched that of Josten,738 formerly head of the Cartel Division of the
Imperial Ministry of Economics. From 1948-49 Josten headed the Division for
Economic Order and Policy in the Economic Council of the Bizone. When the US
military government in January 1947 announced that Law 56 would only be an interim
solution, a task force under Josten, in which Bohm participated, started working on a
proposal for a German anti-trust law. These activities crucially preceded the formalized
co-operation between the Allies and German representatives on the national anti-trust
law for Germany. In 1949, the task force presented Erhard, then the director of the
Economic Council, with an anti-trust bill to secure Leistungswettbewerb or competition
based on efficiency.739 The 'Josten draft' proved too far-reaching for industry
representatives and was therefore unsuccessful.?" Murach-Brand has shown that even
this bill contained two specific clauses providing for exceptions to the general ban on
735Murach-Brand, Antitrust auf deutsch, pp. 148-9.
736Berghahn, The Americanization, pp. 159-60.
737Ibid. p. 159.
738See for Josten Nicholls, Freedom With Responsibility, pp. 326-8.
739Murach-Brand, Antitrust auf deutsch, p. 107.
740Ibid. pp. 110-1.
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cartels and concentrations. These exceptions were either to be defined by the Monopoly
Agency or to be granted jointly by the Monopoly Agency, the Economics Ministry and a
Commission within the Bundestag.?" Having acknowledged this, the Josten draft
represented a first anti-trust bill drafted by German officials and experts, which included
the prohibition of cartels and concentrations and therefore matched the prevalent
tradition of American anti-trust law. In contrast, Risse was more likely to have applied a
moderate approach regarding the cartel question to the Schuman Plan treaty, which may
help shed light on the official anti-trust policy preference of the German delegation.
Thirdly, in the context of the Schuman Plan Erhard did not promote an ordo-
liberal conception of competition law. According to Adenauer and Franz BlUcher, the
leader of the Free Democratic Party and thus Adenauer's partner in the government
coalition as well as the federal minister for the Marshall Plan, Erhard even compromised
the good working relations with Allied officials when he defended the demands of the
representatives of the heavy industries with regard to German deconcentration and the
anti-trust provisions for the coal and steel treaty.742 Berghahn has rightly stressed that
Erhard was first of all a pragmatic politician and not a dogmatic representative of the
Freiburg school. 743As economics minister, Erhard was politically accountable and he
was expected to represent the interests of the German industrialists. While domestically
marginalized in promoting a strict ban on cartels, Erhard nevertheless could trust that
firstly, a sufficient number of German officials and experts shared his preference for
advancing competition and secondly, that USHICOG officials would support this policy
741Ibid. p. 109.
742Loffler, Soziale Marktwirtschaft und administrative Praxis, pp. 534-5. Leffler's
analysis is based on the protocols of the Cabinet meetings of 17 and 29 October 1950.
743Berghahn, The Americanization, p. 158.
254
preference in Germany. Against this background, Erhard - unlike Monnet - might not
have deemed it necessary to press hard to integrate his ideas of a competitive order in
the Schuman Plan treaty.
A first draft that the French delegation presented at the inter-state conference on
27 October 1950 banned cartels. It prohibited firstly, all agreements and practices that
hindered free competition (including price fixing), entailed production quotas, and
divided up markets, products, customers or material resources. The proposal made the
high authority responsible for declaring and terminating such agreements or practices.
To enforce its orders, the high authority was entitled to demand penalty fees from
relevant enterprises. Secondly, the proposal addressed specifically those agreements and
practices likely to secure a market-dominating position for one enterprise, including the
concentration of enrerprlses.I" Critical to the twofold structure of the proposal, later
incorporated into the first complete draft treaty of 9 November as articles 41 and 42, was
the understanding that cartels or agreements between enterprises were made for a
limited period of time and therefore maintained the competitive independence of the
enterprises. Concentrations, in contrast, once they were completed, were virtually
impossible to dissolve. Instead of outlawing transactions creating market-dominating
enterprises, the proposal made them subject to previous authorization by the high
authority and stipulated the precise conditions for authorization. Accordingly,
744 Propositions relatives a la mise en oeuvre du plan Schuman en ce qui concerne les
accords et pratiques restrictives ou tendant a la constitution de monopoles, 27 October
1950, Nr. 18, MAEF, DE-CE, 500. The use of legal terminology is guided by Richard
Hamburger, 'Inter-relationship of the cartel, monopoly and merger provisions of the
European Coal and Steel Community Treaty', in: International Conference on Restraints
of Competition, Cartel and Monopoly in Modern Law Reports on Supranational and
National European and American law, Karlsruhe: C.F.MUller, 1961, pp. 243-60, here p.
250.
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transactions hampering the normal operation of competition or granting to an individual,
an enterprise or a private group more than twenty per cent of the market share were
forbidden. Briefly, the proposal presented by the French delegation was a much more
comprehensive anti-trust draft than that of the German delegation. One could argue,
moreover, that the draft presented by the French delegation represented a departure from
partly ambiguous preferences previously articulated by key actors of the French
delegation, including Hirsch, Monnet and Uri in that it reflected a commitment without
qualifications to the competitive principle. Not only was the draft compatible with the
predominant tradition of US anti-trust law, but it also matched the understanding of the
American concept of competition as a way of life.
It is justifiable to assume that the US Embassy working group was already
involved in sketching the 27 October proposal. At the very least, US officials were
knowledgeable about draft versions even prior to the release of the proposal by the
French delegation: in a telegram me to the Paris Embassy Acheson considered the
'[r]ecent French draft articles on cartels, ... [transmitted to the Department on] October
24... excellent' .745 At the conference, the Italian and Dutch delegations supported the
French delegation's proposal, while it was contested by the Belgian delegation, in
particular. The German delegation, too, in early November officially reaffirmed their
initial position on authorizing agreements and rejected the proposition by the French
745 Telegramme Acheson to US Embassy Paris, 27 October 1950. NARA. RG 469.
Special Representative in Europe, Office of the General Counsel, Subject Files 1948-53,
1950-53, Box 30.
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delegation regarding market-dominating enterprises.i" On 13 November therefore in a
meeting with German diplomat von Marchtaler, Tomlinson expressed in the strongest
possible terms his preference for a 'complete ban on cartels and cartel-like
agreements' .747 To support this, he referred to his experiences within the OEEC and in
negotiations with the French business representatives: 'the slightest exception to a
comprehensive ban on cartels invites cartels back in' .748 Further, Tomlinson apparently
compared the draft article with the latest draft German anti-trust bill and emphasized
that if USHICOG officials appeared more conciliatory on the German bill, this reflected
their having to consider the preferences of their British and French colleagues. In
contrast, the Schuman Plan, which represented a solution for Europe and applied to one
economic sector only, required meeting stricter criteria, not least to satisfy the American
public and guarantee their support for the project. 749
In addition to evaluating the initial articles vis-A-vis the negotiating parties, the
US Embassy working group directly contributed to the drafting process on two specific
occasions, namely from 20-24 November and again in early December 1950. As to the
first instance, Ball, who was then already officially advising the French delegation, on
21 November recorded a lunch with Bowie and a conference at Tomlinson's office in
his journal. Further, on 23 November, after having dinner with Hirsch, he worked on the
746 Dokument 12: Stellungnahme der deutschen Delegation zu den Vorschlagen Oberdie
Inkraftsetzung des Schumanplans, 10.11.1950. Schulze, Heeren (eds), Dokumente zum
Europaischen Recht, vol. 3, pp. 30-2.
747 Gesprachsaufzeichnung Marchtaler fUrHallstein, 13November 1950, PA AA, B IS,
114.
748 Ibid.
749 Ibid.
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'revised draft' /50 without however specifying on which article. Asked about the role of
US anti-trust in the drafting of the anti-trust articles of the coal and steel treaty, Bowie in
an interview expressed reservations and argued that the European negotiators had a
pretty clear idea of what they were doing. At the same time, however, Bowie conceded
his involvement in authoring draft articles:
And I created, as I recaJl it, two articles very much drawn from my
understanding of American antitrust law - not trying to duplicate American
antitrust law, but just based on ... our American experience with the effort to
enforce the competition, but it was not intentionally aping or copying American
[law].751
More reliable evidence for Bowie's role is provided by Sahm's journal. More
particularly, the journal suggests that the general counsel of the USHICOG authored an
'American proposal,752 for article 42, dated 23 November.P' Just like the French
delegation's original proposal, the draft article prohibited concentrations not previously
authorized by the high authority, but outlined different conditions for authorization. In
an inter-ministerial meeting in the German Chancellary on 24 November, in which
Ophuls also participated, Hallstein discussed article 42 with Risse. Hallstein reportedly
observed that 'Bowie's interim draft [was ... ] inadequate since it require[d] previous
authorization'Y" In the debate on article 41, which implied the dissolution of the DKV,
750Diaries 1950, Personal papers Ball, 43.
751Interview Bowie; Bowie's statement has been quoted in Brigitte Leucht, 'Die
Grundung des .Neuen Europa", 1950/51. Die Bedeutung einer transatlantisch-
rechtlichen Perspektive rur die Erforschung der europaischen Integration', in: Wiener
Zeitschrift zur Geschichte der Neuzeit, vol. 3, no. 2 (2003), pp. 53-66, here p, 63.
752Dokument 14: Entwurfzu den Artikeln 32a, 41, 42; 20, 23 November 1950, Schulze,
Hoeren (eds), Dokumente zum Europaischen Recht, vol. 3, pp. 34-8, here pp. 36-8.
753Protokoll Ulrich Sahm, 24 November 1950, pp. 2) 8-9, BA, Personal papers Ulrich
Sahm (N 1474),41.
754Ibid.
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Risse related that Erhard intended to discuss the matter with USHICOG officials.755
Consequently, Sahms's notes not only substantiate Bowie's input into the
negotlations.i" but they also confirm that the drafting of the German anti-trust law
remained closely connected to the debate on the anti-trust provisions of the Schuman
Plan.757
On 24 November, the French delegation presented another version for article 41,
which was co-authored or drafted by Jacques Van Helmont, the Secretary to the
Schuman Plan conference.i" The article gave the high authority power to authorize
temporary agreements concerning the specialization, the purchase or the sale of specific
products if the high authority concluded at first that such agreements improved the
production or distribution of products; were essential to cause these effects without
implying any further restrictions; and did not entitle the enterprises involved to fix
prices or to control or limit the production or distribution of products. 759 In essence, this
draft version represented what was later discussed as article 60 and incorporated into the
ECSC treaty as article 65.
The US Embassy working group for a second time influenced the negotiations
on the anti-trust provisions directly, more specifically on article 42, when Ball
contributed to drafting a memorandum on cartels (28 November) and collaborated with
755 Ibid.
756 Further acknowledged in Telegramme McCloy to Acheson, 9 December 1950,
NARA, RG 59, 850.33/12-950.
757 Cf. also Dokument 17: Vorschlag 1 des Bundeswirtschaftsministeriums zu Artikel 42
a-e, 29 November 1950, Schulze, Hoeren (eds), Dokumente zum Europaischen Recht,
vol. 3, pp. 40-2.
758 Note Van Helmont du 24 novembre 1950, Versions successives des articles 41 et 42
dont notesjointes, AN 81 AJ 138.
759 Article 41, am 24.11.1950 als Entwurf der franzosischen Delegation Ubergeben, PA
AA, B 15, 163.
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Tomlinson and Bowie on several memoranda on the Schuman Plan (5 Decemberj.P" On
6 December Ball provided Monnet with a revised 'Note regarding the French position
on articles 41 and 42', which in its opening focused on the politico-economic goals of
the Schuman Plan: 'the establishment of a single market and the creation within that
market of conditions which wiII serve to bring about maximum productivity, full
employment and low cost' .761 Ball's terminology reflected that of the domestic debate
over the US Employment Act of 1946.762 Linking the objective of full employment to
the notion of creating the largest possible body of consumers, contemporary US political
economy emphasized that consumption rather than production provided the key to a
prosperous economy and consequently highlighted the need for consumer protection.I'"
Further, Ball's memorandum stressed that together, articles 41 and 42, contained the
powers for the high authority to realize the politico-economic goals of the Schuman
Plan. Article 41 would declare invalid cartels and article 42, in turn, would be
... designed to prevent such mergers and consolidations which would result either
in a horizontal development of single enterprises to a point where they would
control an important part of the market or a vertical combination of enterprises
which would result in discriminatory prlcing.?"
It is impossible to show precisely how Ball's note informed the more comprehensive
memorandum the French delegation presented to the other delegations together with a
760 Diaries 1950, Personal papers Ball, 43.
761 Note regarding the French position on articles 41 and 42,6 December 1950, FJM,
AMG 10/6/2bis.
762 15 USC 1021, section 2. See for this argument Leucht, 'Tracing European
Mentalities', p. 350.
763 Brinkley, The End of Reform, pp. 227-64, here p. 229.
764 Note regarding the French position on articles 41 and 42, 6 December 1950,
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revised draft article 42.765 Jointly, however, the two memoranda reflect the co-operation
of the US Embassy working group on the anti-trust provisions. Both notes emphasized
the intimate connection between articles 41 and 42. Even more they argued that the
prohibition of agreements under article 41 - to prevent price fixing, the control of
production and technical progress and market-sharing agreements - would reinforce
efforts at concentration to achieve precisely these effects. Specific horizontal and
vertical concentrations therefore had to be considered as long as they did not create
market-dominating enterprises or restrain competition. Minor modifications
notwithstanding, this article would subsequently be discussed as article 61 and finally
incorporated into the ECSC treaty as article 66.
4.6 Saving the Schuman Plan: the bi-Iateral negotiations on
the reorganization of the German heavy industries
The Schuman Plan conference adjourned on 17 December 1950. The German delegation
insisted that the problem of the deconcentration and de-cartelization of the German
heavy industries had to be resolved before they could agree to the anti-trust provisions
of the treaty and thus caused the temporary breakdown of the Schuman Plan
conference.I'" The following day Monnet urged the US government to complete the
deconcentration of the Ruhr region and warned that the French government would
otherwise not accept the treaty with its anti-trust features.767 In France, Monnet was
765 Memorandum, 6 December 1950, PA AA, B 15, 163; Article 42 ibid.
766 Telegramme (3483) Bruce to Secretary of State, 18 December 1950, NARA, RG 59,
850.33/12-1850.
767 Telegramme (3484) Bruce to Secretary of State, 18 December 1950, NARA. RG 59,
850.33/12-1850.
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confronted with growing resistance to the first draft treaty and its anti-trust articles by
some members of the government, industrialists and trade unions. With the notable
exception of Constant and the steel users, the French steel industry resented the treaty
because of its anticipated effect on prices and supplies of steel products. The
introduction of the anti-trust articles fuelled criticism of the powers and the composition
of the high authority. Crucially, this criticism fed back into the concerns trade unions
had previously articulated regarding the lack of union representation and the degree of
independence assigned to the institutions of the supranational community. Industry
representatives in their criticism of the treaty, moreover, focused on the notions of
planning and state control. Briefly, in their critique of the independence of policy-
makers and the means of policy-making, industrialists and trade unions objected to the
practices they associated with the Planning Commission in the domestic context.768
After Monnet's 'call for help,769 to the US government, French and US officials
attempted to align their policy positions in dealing with the German government."? On
19 December 1950 Monnet facilitated a key meeting in Paris, in which actors of the US
Embassy working group, including Hirsch, Tomlinson, Cleveland and Bowie, who was
accompanied by Willner, participated alongside French Foreign Ministry official and
768Henry W. Ehrmann, 'The French Trade Associations and the Ratification of the
Schuman Pian', in: World Politics, vol. 6, no. 4 (1954), pp. 453-81, here pp. 457-60; for
the French steel producers see Kipping, Zwischen Kartellen und Konkurrenz, pp. 228-
31.
769Schwabe, "'Ein Akt konstruktiver Staatskunst''', p. 232.
770Cf. Lettre Monnet a Schuman, 22 December 1950, plus 2 annexes (a) compte rendu
reunion 19112/50 entre experts francais et americains (b) projet d'instructions par JM Ii
RS, AN 81 AJ 137; see also Jean Monnet-Robert Schuman Correspondence, pp. 90-1.
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Secretary General to the Schuman Plan conference Francois Vah!ry,771 Leroy-Beaulieu
and the French chairmen of the Allied coal and steel control groups.772 Notably, in this
meeting US participants officially represented the agencies they were affiliated with,
namely the USHICOG and the US Embassy in Paris. At the same time, participation
was restricted to French and US civil servants, while UK officials, who favoured the
socialization of the coal and steel industry in the Allied administration ofthe Ruhr, were
sidelined. To McCloy it was apparent that the UK government would not dare to oppose
any agreement reached with the German government or be accused of sabotaging the
Schuman Plan conference.I"
Participants of the meeting generally confirmed that Law 27 and the Schuman
Plan were complementary and that the realization of the deconcentration programme of
Law 27 represented a pre-requisite to achieving the objectives of the Schuman Plan.
Participants agreed on four specific points.774 Firstly, according to Law 27
reconcentration through financial manipulation would be prohibited. Importantly, this
reading of the deconcentration law challenged one possible reading of article 61 of the
draft treaty, articulated by the CDU in Germany. According to this interpretation, article
61 made market-dominating enterprises subject to prior scrutiny and authorization by
the high authority and therefore opened the door to the reconcentration of pre-war
German coal and steel combines, at least to the levels corresponding to the size of
771The source refers to "M. Valerian? [French Foreign Office]". However, it is very
likely that the French Foreign official participating in the meeting was Paul Valery.
Memo of meeting held 19 December at the office of M. Monnet, 20 December 1950,
NARA, RG 466, Office of General Counsel, Decartelization Division. General Subject
Files 1948-55, Box 2.
772Ibid.
773Schroder, Jean Monnet und die amerikanische Umerstiazung. p. 190.
774For a summary see also Gillingham, Coal, Steel, pp. 170-1.
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French combines.i" Secondly, participants agreed that the deconcentration programme
should continue along the lines of the dissolution of certain trusts, which the high
commissioners had previously communicated to Adenauer. Thirdly, the DKV would
have to be dissolved since the existence of a central sales agency for Ruhr coal was
incompatible with both Law 27 and the Schuman Pian. An attempt to transfer the DKV
to public ownership would also be forbidden. To the French government, accustomed to
the practice of state control,176 the dissolution of the DKV did not represent a top
priority. In the meeting Monnet stressed, however, that the very idea that one member-
state, namely Germany, centrally controlled the distribution of Ruhr coal was
inconsistent with the aim of the Schuman Plan of establishing a single market. 777
Fourthly, participants agreed that the complete separation of coal and steel combines
neither would be required by the deconcentration programme of Law 27, nor by the coal
and steel treaty. Vertical integration therefore would be allowed in specific cases.178
Following the meeting Monnet reassured Schuman that combines were only permissible
if they were not damaging to the French industry and remained compatible with the
Schuman Plan.179
Literature has portrayed the 19 December meeting predominantly as a bargaining
process of French and American interests. Accordingly, 'the French' made concessions
concerning the DKV, while 'the Americans' agreed to take on board French concerns
775Haas, The Uniting of Europe, p. 164.
776Lovett, 'The United States and the Schuman Pian', p. 440.
777Memo of meeting held 19 December at the office of M. Monnet, 20 December 1950.
778Ibid.
779Cf. Lettre Monnet a Schuman, 22 December 1950. Warner has argued that Monnet
integrated the results of another meeting of 21 December in his letter to Schuman. Isabel
Warner, Steel and Sovereignty. The Deconceruration of the West German Steel Industry.
1949-54. Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 1996, p. 25.
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regarding the Verbundwirtschaft.P'' In contrast, it has not been sufficiently highlighted
that Monnet used this meeting to transform the official position of the French
government. Perhaps Monnet condemned state intervention and emphasized the single
market rhetorically, to appease or win over US officials. One could also argue, however,
that Monnet used the meeting to help realize his policy preference for a competitive
market economy. From this perspective, Monnet made the best of the impasse at the
inter-state conference by further forging the transatlantic coalition for a competition
policy with strong anti-trust provisions that was unlikely to succeed in the French
domestic context. In any event, French and US civil servants had developed a joint
agenda for the subsequent bi-Iateral talks between German and US officials, in which
McCloy and Bowie would take the lead.
German officials were aware of Bowie's role in Allied preference formation781
and following the temporary breakdown of the negotiations, the Adenauer government
was faced with a difficult choice of tactics. Law 27 and article 61 of the draft treaty
directly concerned the deconcentration of the Verbundwirtschaft. Among the voices
against the abolition of the Verbundwirtschaft was that of industrialist and Christian
democrat member of the Bundestag, Henle. Adenauer's confidant argued that abolishing
the Verbundwirtschaft would destroy Germany's competitiveness. In contrast to the
main bulk of industrialists Henle crucially shared the commitment to establishing a
780 For example Lovett, 'The United States and the Schuman Plan', p. 444; Warner,
Steel and Sovereignty, pp. 24-5. An exception is Schroder, Jean Monnet und die
amerikanische Unterstutzung, p. 189, who does not stress intergovernmental bargaining.
781 See for example Niederschrift Uber die Sitzung im Haus des Bundeskanzlers, 8
January 1951, PA AA, B 15, 10; Vermerk. Betr. Verbundwirtschaft, Besprechung im
Bundeswirtschaftsministerium am 6.1.1951 unter Vorsitz von Ministerialrat Schmid, 8
January 1951, PA AA, B 15, Personal papers Schlochauer, 340.
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competitive market economy expressed in the draft treaty. However, the industrialist
rejected the far-reaching powers granted to the high authority, especially since the
regional associations would no longer balance the core executive.782 Increasing
opposition to the treaty and the USHICOG's attempts to enforce Law 27 not only
originated with industrialists, but also with representatives of the Economics Ministry.
While the anti-trust articles of the draft treaty in priniciple reflected the ordo-liberal
preferences of officials in the Economics Ministry, they challenged their evaluation
regarding the necessity to maintain the Verbundwirtschaft and the DKV.783 In
negotiations with steel industry and trade union representatives Economic Ministry
officials worked out proposals, reflecting an attempt to increase the size of industrial
units permitted under Law 27, that served as the basis for developing the position of the
German government. 784 On 27 December 1950 Adenauer transmitted the memorandum
on the reorganization of the steel industry to the HICOG.78s
Another related dimension of policy development in Germany with
repercussions for the inter-state conference concerned the temporary withdrawal of trade
union support. The ensuing struggle between the Adenauer government and the German
trade unions over co-determination, the notion to achieve parity with 'capital' in
managing the economy,'86 would only be resolved in April t 951. At first German trade
unions had supported the French government's initiative and its social policy,
782Berghahn, The Americanization. pp. 179-80; Kipping, Zwischen Kartellen und
Konkurrenz, p. 226-7; Van Hook, 'Public Ownership in the Ruhr, 1945- 1951', p. 174.
783 Leffler, Soziale Marktwirtschaft und administrative Praxis, p. 532.
784Warner, Steel and Sovereignty, pp. 26-7.
785Lettre et memorandum Adenauer a la Haute Commission, 27 December 1950, AN 81
AJ 137.
786Bo Strath, The Organisation of Labour Markets: Modernity, Culture and Governance
in Germany, Sweden, Britain and Japan, London: Routledge 1996, pp. 64-5
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represented by the commitment to raising the standards of living of workers and
consumers. More importantly, the coal and steel pool promised co-determination on the
supranational European level.787Trade union representation featured importantly in the
proposed consultative committees of the high authority and originally, in the regional
associations, too. The potential to realize their core preference for co-determination
between labour and management at the supranational level was particularly important to
the social democrat-dominated DGB since the Adenauer government did not indicate
they would support co-determination in the domestic context. Erhard's announcement to
the DGB in early January 1951 that co-determination would be abolished in the steel
industry, where it had been introduced in 1947, rather than extended to other industries
confirmed this doubt.788 Finally, the DGB made their support for the coal and steel
treaty dependant on the satisfactory resolution of the problem of co-determination in
Germany.789 To safeguard the support of the DGB, Adenauer signed the German Law
for Co-determination on 10 April 1951.790While he acknowledges the concession of the
German government, Van Hook neglects the European dimension of policy formation,
which forced the chancellor to make this concession.
Against this backdrop, actors of the transatlantic policy networks were involved
in the deliberations on the reorganization of the German heavy industries and the final
787See John Gillingham, 'Solving the Ruhr Problem: German Heavy Industry and the
Schuman Pian', in: Schwabe (ed.), Die An/tinge des Schuman-Plans, pp. 399-453, here~i8~:~social democratic party also embraced co-determination after having abandoned
their earlier preference for socialization. Van Hook, 'Public Ownership in the Ruhr,
1945-1951', p, 175-6.
789Gillingham, 'Solving the Ruhr Problem', pp. 427-8; Berghshn, The Americanization,
~fo'226-30.
o Van Hook, 'Public Ownership in the Ruhr, 1945-1951', p, 175.
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drafting period in February and March 1951. Actors of the US Embassy working group,
for example, Tomlinson together with ECA official Goldenberg, continued to meet with
French industry representatives to help facilitate a successful conclusion to the Schuman
Plan.791 The inter-state negotiations resumed on 16 January 1951792 and on 6 February
1951, Cleveland noted that Tomlinson gave a memorandum with revised proposals for
articles 60 and 61 to Hallstein.793 Officially, the deliberations on the anti-trust provisions
only continued on 9 February 1951, when according to Clappier, the German delegation
expressed that the separate discussions on the German economy had proceeded
sufficiently to reopen the talks on the anti-trust provisions.?" The suggestions
articulated by Cleveland and Tomlinson appear to respond to modifications, very likely
proposed by the German delegation. The Cleveland/Tomlinson note does not alter the
substance of the articles, but discusses in detail viable alternative adjectives and verbs
for the articles and reiterates the overriding significance of strong anti-trust provisions
for the treaty. 795
As a key mediator of the transatlantic university network, Hallstein understood
the expectations of the US government. For example, when the German head of
delegation informed members of the delegation and the cabinet about the deliberations
on the anti-trust provisions in December 1950, he acknowledged that 'the Americans'
favoured consumer protection and the prevention of the concentration of [economic]
791 Tomlinson to Department of State, NARA, RG 59, 850.33/12-2150.
792 Memorandum de M. Monnet aux chefs de delegation, 16 January 1951, PA AA, 8
15,54.
793 Proposed revisions articles 60 and 61, 6 February 1951, AN 81 AJ 138.
Unfortunately, it could not be clarified satisfactorily which contribution of the German
delegation the memorandum referred to.
794 Clappier to Harvey, 9 February 1950, HAEU, FO, 371/93826.
795 Proposed revisions articles 60 and 61, 6 February 1951.
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power.796 Following the adjournement of the inter-state conference, however, Hallstein
turned to Kronstein for further guidance on the US government's position on the Ruhr.
In a letter to Hallstein, Kronstein answered questions the former had raised and
suggested that Hallstein would 'overestimate the American interest in vertical
integration'. In contrast, Kronstein confirmed the US government's firm approach to the
dissolution of the DKV.797 Moreover, Kronstein also attempted to act as a broker on
behalf of the German delegation in the State Department?" Hallstein continued to play
a vital role in preference formation within Germany.799 Another actor of the transatlantic
university network Ophuls, also contributed to the debate on modifying article 61 in late
February 1950.800 Minor modifications notwithstanding, articles 60 and 61 were
incorporated into the final treaty as articles 65 and 66.801
It has been established in the literature that the key to the successful conclusion
of the negotiations on the anti-trust articles was the agreement on the restructuring of the
German heavy industries. Literature has demonstrated the role of Bowie and particularly
McCloy in the bi-lateral negotiations between January and March 1951.802 A break-
through in the deliberations was only reached in early March 1951, when Adenauer and
796Sitzung, 7 December 1950, PA AA, B IS, S.
797Letter Kronstein to Hallstein, 6 January 19S1, BA, N 1266, 1864.
798Letter Kronstein to Cheseldine, 12 January 19S I.
799For example Sitzung Schaumburg, 13 January 1951, Sahm Diary 1951, BA, N 1474,
17.
800 See for example New proposal art. 61 Professor OphUls, 24 February 195 I, PA AA,
BI5,170.
801Documents 24-40, Evolution des negotiations par article dans Ie projet du traite, 13
February-14 March 1951, [from FJM, AMG], Schulze, Heeren, Dokumente zum
Europaischen Recht, vol. 3, pp. 52-98.
802See for example Gillingham, Coal, Steel, pp. 272-82; Lovett, 'The United States and
the Schuman Plan', pp. 442-52; Schroder, Jean Manne: und die amerikanische
Unterstutzung, pp. 181-98.
269
McCloy agreed that the DKV would not be dissolved before 1 October 1952. Agreement
on a number of other questions was reached in a conversation with Bowie, McCloy and
the French high commissioner. Subsequently, Adenauer on 14 March 1951 transmitted a
memorandum to the US high commissioner, which clarified the remaining questions. 803
According to the memorandum, the German government would accept the coal and steel
treaty with its anti-trust provisions. Further, the Adenauer government committed to
reorganizing the twelve German steel companies into twenty-eight units to ensure their
competitive positions - reconcentration would be prevented. The Verbundwirtschaft of
coal and steel, in contrast, could be partially retained and steel plants were permitted to
cover up to 75 per cent of their coal needs from mines in their ownership.
4.7 The first European anti-trust law: the interaction of
American and European thought and politico-legal
concepts
An evaluation of the role transatlantic policy networks played in the making of the anti-
trust provisions reveals a number of findings. Firstly, the legal traditions of US anti-trust
law and German ordo-Iiberalism interacted with each other in the making of the anti-
trust provisions for the ECSC treaty, albeit in the context of the negotiations on German
deconcentration and the German anti-cartel law. A purely textual analysis falls short of
attributing the articles fully to either American anti-trust law or German ordo-liberalism.
OphUls in an article on the economic law of the ECSC treaty, published just after the
803 Telegramme McCloy to Acheson, 15 March 1951, NARA, RG 59, 850.33/3-155 I,
FRUS lVII, pp. 102-3; for a summary of the memorandum see Leffler, Soziale
Marktwirtschaft und administrative Praxis, p. 537.
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conclusion of the conference, acknowledged that the anti-trust articles matched more or
less the German Freiburg School and contemporary US anti-trust law. 804 An analysis of
the final articles shows that the ban of agreements and practices hampering competition
(art. 65) and of market-dominating enterprises (art. 66) resembled American anti-trust
law. Treating differently an accumulation of power depending on whether it results from
concentration or from an expansion of an existing enterprise, however, is an idea
contrary to US anti-trust law80s and hence more likely derived from an ordo-Iiberal
position.
Secondly, transatlantic policy networks assumed a crucial function in shaping
the negotiation tactics of various stakeholders. Monnet and Erhard, for example, both
shared a belief in the competitive principle and, on the surface, were both marginalized
in their respective domestic context. Arguably, the very existence of transatlantic policy-
making on the anti-trust provisions, allowed Monnet to transfer his efforts to break with
French cartel traditions to the core European level. At the same time, it allowed Erhard
to defend the position of the industrialists in the context of the Schuman Plan.
Advancing his policy preference for a ban on cartels in the domestic setting instead, the
economics minister could rely on external pressure by USHICOG officials.
With regard to the competitive principle, the findings of this chapter further
suggest that the preference of Monnet and planning officials for a competitive market
economy solidified as a result of transatlantic policy-making. While these French actors
had embraced the notion of a competitive market economy based on productivity in the
804 Carl Friedrich OphUls,'Das Wirtschaftsrecht des Schumanplans', in: Neue Jurlstlsche
Wochenschrift, vol. 4, no. 10 (1951), pp. 381-4, here p. 382.
80S Hamburger, 'Inter-relationship', pp. 254, 256.
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national domain, they increasingly focused on the notion of consumer protection at the
inter-state conference. It may be argued therefore, that they followed the shift of
contemporary US economic policy according to which consumption rather than
production provided the key to a prosperous economy.
Thirdly, a process of transnational coalition building that included Monnet and
planning officials, Constant and the Metal Manufacturing Syndicate and proponents of
German ordo-liberalism was essential to the formation of the supranational European
anti-trust law. Triggered by Monnet, the process was successful because its goals
matched the US government policy preference for a free market economy and for
consumer protection in western Europe.
Finally, the emergence of the anti-trust provisions clearly highlights the
significance for the history of European integration to broaden its scope of analysis and
go beyond the geographical and chronological confines of core Europe formation at the
Schuman Plan conference.
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5 Conclusions
This chapter will draw on the findings of the empirical chapters and underline the
original contribution to knowledge of the thesis. It will review firstly, the empirical
findings and secondly, methodological issues raised by the thesis within a wider
framework of historical research on post-war Europe. Thirdly, it will address how these
findings could be utilized for future research.
5.1 Transatlantic policy networks: creating core Europe
The thesis sheds new light on how the process of European integration was triggered in
1950-51. It offers an empirically based explanation for the integration of core Europe of
the six founding member-states at the Schuman Plan conference. More specifically, the
thesis has demonstrated that the ECSC treaty was the product of a complex negotiation
process of a variety of academic and other experts and civil servants, state and non-state
actors from both sides of the North Atlantic. As part of transatlantic policy networks
these actors facilitated the successful conclusion of the inter-state negotiations and
contributed significantly to drafting the institutional framework and the anti-trust
provisions of the ECSC treaty. Crucially, transatlantic policy networks were linked to
political decision-makers that shared a commitment to advancing core Europe formation
through the coal and steel pool and excluding the UK. These links were vital to account
for the formation, the operation and the impact of informal transatlantic policy-making
in fleshing out the French government's initiative of9 May 1950.
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This explanation of why and how core Europe materialized differs, firstly, from
Milward's propositions and more generally, intergovernmental approaches to European
Integration.f'" The findings of the thesis corroborate that the formation of core Europe
was not merely the result of the bargaining of domestically derived (economic) interests
by national delegations at the inter-state negotiations in 1950-51. The results defy
approaches and explanations that are informed exclusively by the national paradigm.
The complexity of the negotiation process, especially the interplay of formal and
informal policy-making, has suggested that intergovernmental accounts unduly simplify
the complex reality of policy- and decision-making processes. The integration of the
anti-trust provisions in the ECSC treaty, in particular, has underlined the importance of
material interests and ideational motivations in domestic policy and preference
formation. While Milward regarded integration as instrumental for the rescue of the
nation-state, the interpretation forwarded here substantiates key general assumptions
about the role of transnational actors of Lipgens' approach to understanding the post-
war period.
Secondly, the French government's proposal to advance European integration
through the coal and steel pool responded to a combination of factors, namely the
political and economic decline of Europe during the inter-war period and the rise of the
Soviet Union and the USA; the experiences with nationalism and the fascist and
National Socialist regimes; and most importantly, the perceived anachronism of the
aggressive nation-state asserting itself by means of military and economic power instead
806 Milward, The Reconstruction.
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of co-operation and negotiation in new supranational institutional structures.f'" The last
factor pertains specifically to the desire by the French and German governments to
overcome Franco-German antagonism after three major wars within less than seventy-
five years. In sharp contrast to Lipgens, however, this account of the formation of core
Europe has studied the role of actors at the interface between states and societies. It has
identified the links between ideas and preferences of state and non-state actors for
European unification and integration and the concrete policy initiative proposed by the
French government as well as its realization through transatlantic policy networks.
Empirical findings therefore reinforce the reconceptualization of the crucial role of
networks in the informal politics of European integration.808
Thirdly, empirical data has substantiated the claim that early European
integration was an American as well as a European project. The empirical chapters have
delivered the missing systematic assessment of the role of US state and non-state actors
involved in the Schuman Plan conference and an exploration of the interaction of
American and European politico-legal concepts in the negotiations, respectively.
Crucially, this goes beyond confirming that the wider goals of US foreign policy
officials in the Truman administration matched the aspirations of the French and
German governments to overcome the antagonism between them, as shown by
Lundestad and Neuss.809 To outline the scope and the limits to transatlantic co-operation
has been important to arrive at a differentiated view of which US government agencies
or European organizations co-operating with US agencies provided the backbone for
807 Cf. Wurm, Early European Integration.
808 See most importantly Kaiser, Christian Democracy.
809 Lundestad, The United States; Neuss, Geburtshelfer.
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policy network formation. A ranking of the relevant agencies relies on the number of
actors involved and the estimated frequency of contacts between them. The most
important governmental organizations for the formation of policy networks, therefore,
were the ECA, the USHICOG and the French Planning Commission. These
organizations were followed by the OSR, where Katz at the least sustained an ongoing
interest in the negotiations and lastly, the OEEC, where Alphand functioned as a
communication node, especially in the early days of the negotiations. Due to its
intergovernmental foundation and the participation of the UK government, neither the
OEEC, nor the Council of Europe provided a source for policy network formation,
however. A ranking of the influence of organizations is vital to understanding the
circumstances that enabled the emergence of informal transatlantic policy networks.
Further, the systematic assessment of the role of US officials at the conference has
suggested that there was a relationship between the status of actors within the foreign
policy system and their point of involvement in the negotiations. Higher-ranking US
foreign policy officials tended to dominate the initial discourse on the importance of the
competitive framework of the proposed coal and steel pool. In contrast, only once the
negotiations had begun, did US officials, who were less established in the hierarchy, and
American non-state actors participate informally. McCloy proves an exception to this
rule. Parallels can, however, be drawn with the involvement of Christian democrat
leaders whose role as party politicians in the actual Schuman Plan negotiations was most
significant during the period of agenda setting.810 Together the differentiated assessment
810 Kaiser, Christian Democracy, chapter 6.
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of the role of US actors and organizations corroborates that the empire approach is
insufficient to capture the reality of policy- and decision-making processes.
Furthermore, is has been confirmed that a policy network approach to explore
the formation of core Europe indeed requires considering actor behaviour and policy
formation from a long-term perspective. While 1945 was a turning point in transatlantic
governmental relations, experiences of co-operation between individual actors that
served as the basis for the accumulation of social capital and consequently, the
formation of policy networks in 1950-51, often went back to the inter-war period. World
War II, from this point of view, was particularly significant for actors involved because
it necessitated further collaboration, mainly to devise the logistics involved in aiding the
liberation and occupation of Europe. Findings have also confirmed the significance of
shared experiences of actors or shared socialization. Among other examples, this
included their professional backgrounds and the socialization of European actors in the
US. As regards the impact of the US socialization of European actors on the policy
debates, the transatlantic university network and Hallstein in particular serve as an
important illustration.
Turning attention from the networks to the policies, it needs to be stressed that
here too, a long-term perspective has proven vital to analyzing the interaction of
American and European politico-legal concepts. With respect to outlining the
framework for negotiating the anti-trust provisions, for example, domestic friction in
France and Germany occurred because traditional concepts of competition, shaped since
the late 18th century, were challenged. On the whole, the thesis highlights the
277
importance of going back beyond 1945 for the history of early European integration and
transatlantic relations.
Moreover, the thesis has provided empirical evidence in support of certain
approaches to European integration. The findings have on the one hand highlighted the
importance of sociological constructivist studies, which emphasize the importance of
social interaction and the role of EU institutions in socializing actors within them. On
the other hand, they have confirmed the emphasis which historical institutionalism has
placed on the examination of political processes over time. Lastly, Paul Hirst has
defined governance as 'new practices of coordinating activities through networks,
partnerships and deliberative forums that have grown up on the ruins of the more
centralized and hierarchical corporatist representation of the period up to the 1970s' .811
Empirical evidence has demonstrated, however, that in early post-war Europe these
practices were not as new and nation-states were not as cohesive as Hirst's reference
suggests. Transatlantic policy networks co-ordinated their preferences and constrained
the policy options of governmental actors at the inter-state negotiations on the Schuman
Plan prior to the governance turn that designates the shift from state-centred government
.. . h ddt d . t 812In more unitary states to governance In t e present- ay more e-cen re socie y.
Empirical findings have contributed to demonstrating the extent to which
transnationalization preceded European institutionalization and helped lock in the
integration process by determining major policy choices, particularly for supranational
integration and a competitive market economy.
811 Paul Hirst, 'Democracy and Governance', in: Jon Pierre (ed.), Debating Governance,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 13-35, here p. 19f.
812 Borzel, 'Organizing Babylon'; Heard-Laureote, 'Transnational networks'.
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5.2 The evaluation of the conceptual tools: methodological
challenges
Multi-national archival research focusing exclusively on governmental sources is
insufficient for developing a historical narrative that goes beyond intergovernmental
bargaining. In contrast, the combination of multi-archival research - including the
personal testimonies and papers of actors not before analyzed in the context of the
formation of core Europe - and the application of a set of new research questions -
informed by the network concept and the concept of cultural transfer - has proven
crucial in identifying processes of informal and transatlantic policy-making that helped
to shape the outcome of the inter-state conference. More generally, this strategy draws
attention to the importance of revisiting 'older' source material. This is particularly
relevant for the institutionalized historiography of European integration, which tends to
frame its research questions in line with the opening of new governmental records, in
general following the thirty-years-rule.
An approach that focuses on informal policy- and decision-making processes
faces major methodological challenges, however. It has been argued here that social
capital, including various forms of trust between actors, was essential to initiating and
utilizing the joint expertise of transatlantic policy networks. If actors had established
trust and familiarity between them, they were likely to further discuss policy-relevant
issues outside of the negotiations, however, and therefore moved outside the range of
written governmental sources. To some extent, the private papers of actors have tilled
some of these gaps in written evidence. Another course employed during the research
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process involved the exploration and identification of multiple affiliations of some
actors. This strategy led to the detailing of overlapping spaces of policy-making, which
in turn necessitated the inclusion of additional literature. A case in point is the overlap
between the deliberations on the anti-trust provisions at the Schuman Plan conference
and on the German anti-trust law. As a rule, however, the informality of decision-
making outside formally established and recognized consultation structures means that
sometimes there is only little written evidence historians can draw on. Having
acknowledged this, one should not draw false epistemological conclusions from this
basic fact. In the end, this would suggest that the sources indeed tell the story or, to put
it differently, that there is no story if it cannot be found in the written sources. Without
doubt, sources provide the foundation of historical research, not the least to make
historical findings verifiable. To fill the void created rather involuntarily by positivist
approaches to historiography, however, it is useful to strengthen the analytical tools and
thus the framework for interpretation. The combination of the network concept and the
concept of cultural transfer has been essential in this sense.
Another potential methodological challenge presented itself with the notions of
showing and measuring impact. One solution applied to this problem in the empirical
chapters has been to focus on the varying functions - again provided by the combined
conceptual tools - to describe the role of individual and collective actors. Showing and
measuring impact therefore only represents methodological problems when the focus is
too narrowly set on the role of policy networks in contributing draft treaty provisions.
To address the challenge further it is helpful to draw on Peter Bachrach and Morton
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Baratz' 1962 article on power.813The authors draw specific attention to the question of
' ... how ... one [can] be certain in any given situation that the "unmeasurable" elements
are inconsequential, are not of decisive importance?,814 Bachrach and Baratz argue that
actors also exercise power invisibly, by establishing or buttressing 'barriers to the public
airing of policy conflicts' .815To be fully debated therefore issues and ideas have to
reach the agenda. The notion of the invisibility of power crucially reinforces the
argument that transatlantic policy networks restrained policy options merely through
their existence. For example, they reinforced barriers to having any serious discussion
about protective practices for the ECSC treaty and guaranteed its compatibility with the
US government's preference for a competitive market economy for western Europe.
5.3 The potential of the thesis: future threads for historical
research
Empirical findings also raise important questions as to their significance for future
research. One question concerns the extent to which we can generalize from the
historical evidence presented. It could be argued that the transatlantic policy network
approach has been successfully applied and therefore may be able to shed light on
subsequent inter-state conferences, including, for example, the negotiations on the EEC
and Euratom treaties. Is it justified therefore to argue that this approach has the potential
to produce an alternative, more transatlantic narrative of EU history that would modify
Europe-centric accounts of the negotiations of 1956-57, for example? Yet, it is
813Peter Bachrach, Morton S. Baratz, 'Two Faces of Power', in: The American Political
Science Review, vol. 56, no. 4 (1962), pp. 947-52.
814Ibid. p. 948.
815Ibid. p. 949.
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paramount to distinguish between two forms of research potential inherent in the
transatlantic policy network approach. Firstly, its potential pertains more to the
transnational than the transatlantic dimension of the policy network approach of
conceptualizing policy- and decision-making processes in the present-day EU after its
original institutionalization, which induced a process of Europeanization of European
policy-making. Secondly, the approach can be usefully applied to understand better the
temporal dimension of informal transatlantic co-operation beyond the post-World War II
period.
To background these two pathways for future research it is useful to stress the
conditions that gave rise to informal transatlantic co-operation in the post-World War II
period. The framework that had provided the backbone for policy network formation in
1950-51, specifically the US Embassy working group, changed after that, however. By
the mid-1950s, the US government's support for an initiative for European integration
was less important than in 1950. From a security and military perspective, consolidation
had been achieved within the North Atlantic alliance, while US strategy had made the
presence of the US in western Europe a permanent feature. From an economic and
socio-cultural point of view, financial aid and the attempts by the US government to
promote a pluralist and democratic US style model reached their peak during the years
of the Marshall Plan.816 Productivity and welfare in western European societies were on
the rise in the 1950s. In the case of France, consumption and income levels increased by
a third between 1949_58.817 Further, the socio-cultural critique of mass consumption as a
816 For the public relations of the Marshall Plan administration in France see McKenzie,
Remaking France.
817 Kuisel, Seducing the French, p. 104.
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perceived specificity of American capitalism became increasingly popular once more. SIS
In Germany, the introduction of the 'social market economy', devised by Erhard and the
leading official and later State Secretary for European Affairs in the Ministry for
Economics, Alfred Muller-Armack, marked the beginning of the German economic
miracle.i'" At the same time, the US government lost its enthusiasm for European
integration as a result of the failure of the French National Assembly to ratify the EDC
treaty in August 1954, which to President Dwight Eisenhower represented a personal
defeat. The reaction of the US government was rather detached, therefore, when in May
1955, the Benelux countries proposed the formation of a European atomic energy
community, a customs union and a common market with common institutions. A change
of US government policy from supporting only the Euratom project, championed by
Monnet,820 to embracing all proposals only occurred after the six ECSC member-state
governments had adopted the Spaak Report in May 1956.821In a nutshell, the conditions
for informal transatlantic co-operation had altered by the time the six governments
entered negotiations on pooling their nuclear policies and establishing a customs union
and a common market.
Another factor to consider when sketching the changed conditions for policy
network formation is the institutionalization of the ECSC. Once supranational
institutions began operating in 1952, the US preference for an integrated western
Europe, at least in one policy sector, became a reality. One could argue, therefore, that
818Ibid. pp. 103-30.
819Nicholls, Freedom With Responsibility.
820For the support of the Euratom project by the Eisenhower government see Winand,
•European Insiders', pp. 212-21.
821Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, pp. 110-4.
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transatlantic policy networks, which had shared and helped to implement this
preference, no longer had an incentive, nor the immediate necessity for informal co-
operation. Instead, transatlantic relations between the US government and supranational
institutions became formalized. Tomlinson co-operated with the High Authority as
deputy to Bruce. Other key actors of the US Embassy working group also became
affiliated with the High Authority. Uri, for example, took a leading role in designing its
administrative structures.822 Ball continued to provide legal counsel for the French
government and began advising the High Authority with the law firm Cleary, Gottlieb,
Friendly and Ball. Other actors continued working for European integration, but through
different channels: Bowie co-edited together with the German-born political scientist
Carl Friedrich823 a comparative study on federalism, commissioned by the European
Movement, before accepting the nomination as head of the Policy Planning Staff in the
US State Department in 1952.824 Mosler in tum served as head of the Legal Department
in the German Foreign Ministry (1951-53), took over the Max-Planck Institute for
Public and International Law (1954-76) and became a judge at the European Court for
Human Rights in Strasbourg (1959_81).825
Against this backdrop, transatlantic policy networks were much less likely to
take shape and influence the preparation of the EEC and Euratom treaties in 1956-57. It
would be inappropriate, therefore, to propose a one-to-one application of the
transatlantic policy network approach to these negotiations or, for that matter, to
822 Cf. Seidel, 'Gestalten', pp. 140-1.
823 Bowie, Friedrich (eds.), Studies in Federalism; for Friedrich cf. also Cohen,
'Constitutional ism without constitution', here pp. 124-5.
824 In fact the main bulk of the editorial work was therefore allegedly left to Friedrich.
See Carl Friedrich, 'Preface', in: Bowie, Friedrich, Studies in Federalism, p. v.
825 'Curriculum vitae', undated [ca. 1995], MPG-Archiv/Ill.Abt./ZA 139, Kasten 2.
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subsequent inter-state conferences reforming the existing treaty framework. In contrast,
the transnational rather than the transatlantic component of the approach can be
exploited. Without going into a detailed debate of the incipient transnational history of
the EU, which indeed offers an alternative to Moravcsik and Milward's
intergovernmental accounts,826 two areas of application shall be addressed briefly.
Firstly, the thesis has stressed the role of policy expertise and of academic and other
experts in the Schuman Plan conference. One could explore further, for example, the
role of transnational expert networks, including their interaction with supranational
expert communities in the EEC Commission.827 It is suggested that such an exploration
could rely on the combined tools of the network concept and the concept of cultural
transfer. While the transatlantic policy network approach therefore does not have model
character, its conceptual foundations could be utilized productively.
Secondly, the thesis has helped to undermine the notion that business actors only
represent business or material interests. An example of a business actor in the wider
sense of the term is Ball, who in 1950 represented a private law firm, but clearly came to
Europe for strong ideational motives. A case for the significance of ideational
motivations as well as material interests has been made with regard to the role of the
European Roundtable of Industrialists in helping to initiate the 're-launch' of the
826Cf. the conceptual chapter by Wolfram Kaiser, 'Transnational Networks in European
Governance: The Informal Politics of Integration', in: Kaiser, Leucht, Rasmussen (eds.),
The History; and the empirical chapters in the same volume.
827For an example for such a supranational community see Katja Seidel, 'DO IV and the
Origins of a Supranational Competition Policy: Establishing an Economic Constitution
for Europe', in: ibid.
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European integration process in the early 1980s.828 It is proposed therefore that the
systematic assessment of the informal role of business actors in the process of European
integration, which started at least as early as 1950, still needs to be fully investigated.
Again, such an investigation could draw on the tools developed for the thesis. The
applicability of the transatlantic/transnational policy network approach is not restricted
to the transnational history of the EU, however.
Another fruitful area of application is opened up with the long-term dimension of
informal transatlantic co-operation. Policy networks formed against the backbone of the
reconstruction and occupation programmes for western Europe were no longer
influential after the institutionalization of the ECSC. This is not to say that there was no
potential for informal transatlantic co-operation, however. Crucially, there is still a
relative lack of research on the temporal dimension of informal transatlantic co-
operation between 1945 and 1973, which US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
declared as the 'Year of Europe', but which really marked a low point in transatlantic
relations in a period of global turmoil. Partial exceptions to this observation include
Winand who has demonstrated the significance of non-state actors in informal policy-
making processes on European integration in the late 1950s and early 1960s;829
Berghahn who has accentuated the contribution of philanthropy to US Cold War cultural
diplomacy beyond the scope of core Europe;830 and Aubourg and Gijswijt who have
each explored how European integration was debated in the high-level informal
828 See for example Maria Green-Cowles, 'The European Round Table of Industrialists:
The Strategic Player in European Affairs', in: Justin Greenwood (ed.), European
Casebook on Business Alliances, Hemel Hempstead: Prentice-Hall, 1995, pp. 225-36.
829Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy.
830Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars.
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meetings of the Bilderberg Group.!" On the basis of these existing works and the
conceptual approach developed in the thesis one could, for example, assess the changing
role of transatlantic policy networks over time. In other words the transatlantic policy
network approach has the potential to enhance our understanding of how the role of
these networks changed with respect to influencing inter-state negotiations between the
six core member-states; why transatlantic policy networks became more fragile from the
1960s onwards; and if the increasing importance of supranational European actors such
as the European Commission and an emerging European administrative elite influenced
and possibly diminished the role of transatlantic policy networks for policy-making in
the present-day EU. A study of informal transatlantic co-operation over time may
improve our understanding of the role of transatlantic networks in promoting co-
operation on different levels of policy-making. Ultimately, the extension of such study
would enhance our understanding of current transatlantic relations. The thesis, which
has advanced the history of European integration and post- World War II transatlantic
relations, could serve as the foundation for this larger enterprise.
831 Aubourg, ,Le groupe de Bilderberg'; Gijswijt, 'The Bilderberg Group'.
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